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Abstract 
The South-to-North Water Transfer Project, which aims to mitigate the 
severe water shortage in the north of China, is the largest water transfer 
project in the world. However, the success of the middle route of this project 
is threatened by water pollution in the water supply area and insufficient 
funding to tackle this problem. This study focused on how to use the policy 
instrument of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) to ensure the 
success of water protection of the middle route project.  
Non-market valuation was conducted in this study to provide policy 
suggestions on the design of PES schemes for water protection. From the 
service demand perspective, a Contingent Valuation survey with a total of 
755 questionnaires was conducted in 4 cities (i.e. Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou) along the water transfer route in order to 
investigate urban residents’ Willingness To Pay (WTP) for the service of 
water protection. From the service supply perspective, a Choice Experiment 
survey with 246 questionnaires was conducted in 7 villages in the water 
supply area in order to reveal farmer households’ preferences for different 
designs of two water protection programs, namely the existing Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP) for reforestation and a hypothetical fertilizer 
reduction program.  
Results of the Contingent Valuation survey indicate that urban residents’ 
WTP for water protection was significantly influenced by their income, their 
knowledge of the water transfer project and their attitudes to the general 
idea of PES. Model estimation results show that, on average, respondents in 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou were willing to pay an increase 
of 0.71, 0.25, 0.39 and 0.36 yuan/m3 in the water price, respectively. In this 
case, though the annual WTP per capita would only account for 0.14%, 
0.04%, 0.09% and 0.07% of the annual disposal income per capita in the 
four cities, respectively, the total annual WTP of all water users in the four 
cities could account for 76% of the annual cost of water protection in the 
water supply area. Therefore, It is argued that a multi-source PES scheme 
co-funded by water users and governmental budgets is financially feasible 
without imposing a heavy financial burden to water users in the four cities. 
Moreover, results of the Choice Experiment survey show that farmer 
households in the water supply area significantly preferred higher annual 
payment, longer contracts and less restrictions on the land use activities 
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regarding both water protection programs. The trade-offs between the three 
attributes indicate that, on average, farmer households were willing to forgo 
about 8 yuan/mu/year (mu is a commonly used unit of land which equal to 
1/15 hectare) for each extra SLCP contract year and 13 yuan/mu/year for 
the permission of planting each 10% more “commercial trees” (which are 
more profitable but generate less ecological benefits). Furthermore, analysis 
also found that the current SLCP contracts have underestimated farmer 
households’ preference for the “commercial trees”, and thus are 
discouraging them to choose the “ecological trees” which are less profitable 
but generate more ecological benefits. For the hypothetical fertilizer 
reduction program, farmer households were willing to forgo about 26 
yuan/mu/year for every extra contract year but required 16 yuan/mu/year for 
reducing each 10% of the use of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers.  
Overall, this research contributes to the literature of linking non-market 
valuation and PES studies in environmental and natural resources 
management. It is concluded that PES is a promising policy instrument to 
secure the supply of clean water for the middle route of the South-to-North 
Water Transfer Project in China, and non-market valuation methods 
(Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments) are useful tools to reveal 
public attitudes and preferences in the design of PES schemes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, Section 1.1 introduces the research background 
of this thesis. Section 1.2 outlines the research aim and objectives. Section 
1.3 highlights the significance and contributions of this research to multiple 
stakeholders. Section 1.4 describes the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 The South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China 
Water shortage is one of the greatest challenges for China’s sustainable 
development. Although China’s total water resources is the sixth largest in 
the world, its water resources per capita is only a quarter of the world 
average due to its large population (Zhang 2009). This problem is 
exacerbated in the north of China due to the highly uneven distribution of the 
water resources. With 44.4% of the country’s total population and 59.5% of 
its total arable land, the north of China only possesses 14.4% of its total 
water resources (Xie et al. 2008). In Beijing and other regions of the north, 
the water sources per capita is less than 500 m3/year while this figure is over 
1700 m3/year in the south (see Figure 1.1). As many rivers have undergone 
severe cessation of water flows or pollution, water supply in the north has 
heavily relied on the groundwater which has been damagingly overexploited 
to meet the increasing water demand of the fast growing economy and 
population. For example, the average groundwater table of Beijing has 
continuously declined by 20 metres from 1975 to 2005 (Stone and Jia 2006). 
On the other hand, the south of China frequently suffers from disastrous 
floods caused by the monsoon climate, particularly in the Yangtze River 
Basin (Varis and Vakkilainen 2001; Xie et al. 2008).   
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Figure 1.1 Water Resources per Capita in China 
Source: Yang and Zehnder (2001) 
 
The idea of transferring the surplus water from the south to the north was 
first proposed in the early 1950s, but debates over its rationality, feasibility, 
the design of water transfer routes and potential environmental impacts 
lasted for half a century (Liu 1998; Liu and Zheng 2002; Berkoff 2003). 
Finally in 2002, the Chinese central government launched the South-to-
North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP) which aimed to transfer about 44.8 
billion m3/year of water from the Yangtze River and its largest tributary (the 
Hanjiang River) to the north and northwest of China via the eastern, middle 
and western routes (see Figure 1.2). The total budget of the whole project 
will amount to 500 billion yuan (£50 billion) by 2050 (Stone and Jia 2006).  
So far, the western route project of the SNWTP which aims to transfer 17 
billion m3/year of water is still at the planning stage and is unlikely to start the 
construction before 2020. The middle route project which aims to transfer 13 
billion m3/year of water has completed the construction and will start to 
transfer water after the flood season (September) of 2014. The eastern route 
project which aims to transfer 14.8 billion m3/year of water has begun the 
water transfer since November of 2013. 
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Figure 1.2 The South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China 
WRP: the western route project. MRP: the middle route project. ERP: the eastern 
route project. 
Adapted from Wei et al. (2010a) 
 
Particular attention has been paid to the middle route project by 
policymakers and researchers. While the east route project needs a series of 
pumping stations to transfer water, the middle route can divert water entirely 
by gravity (Zhang 2009). The source of the middle route project, i.e. the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir, is much cleaner than the source of the eastern route 
project, i.e. the lower reaches of the Yangtze River (Zhang 2005). Thus high 
expectation has been given to the middle route to provide high-quality 
drinking water for northern cities such as the capital city of China, Beijing. In 
fact, the middle route is also the only water transfer route that is responsible 
for supplying water to Beijing. 
The middle route project contains 1,274 km of water canals and tunnels 
which start from the Danjiangkou Reservoir in the middle reaches of the 
Hanjiang River, then run northward across the Henan and Hebei provinces 
and arrive at the municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin (see Figure 1.2). The 
domestic and industrial water demand in northern cities will be the priority of 
the supply of the transferred water, so local water resources can be spared 
for agricultural use and ecological restoration. A northern section of the 
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middle route project was first completed in 2008 to transfer water to Beijing 
for securing the water supply for the Olympic Games. By the May of 2014, 
the middle route project has cost over 200 billion yuan (£20 billion) in total1
1.1.2 A Threat to the Success of the Middle Route Project 
. 
The success of the middle route project is dependent on, among other things 
(e.g. engineering management), whether the Danjiangkou Reservoir can 
maintain a high water quality. This is particularly doubtful in China where 
water quality in rivers, lakes and reservoirs has extensively deteriorated in 
the past three decades (Liu and Diamond 2005; Xie et al. 2008). Most of the 
surrounding and upstream districts of the Danjiangkou Reservoir are 
mountainous and deprived districts which have inadequate wastewater 
treatment facilities (Zhang 2009). Over 80% of the 13 million residents in 
those districts are farmers, and non-point source pollution caused by their 
agricultural activities is a major threat to the water quality in the districts 
(Zhang et al. 2009).  
In order to maintain the water quality of the Danjiangkou Reservoir at a 
relatively high level of Class II 2, the Chinese central government issued The 
Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in Danjiangkou 
Reservoir and Upstream Districts (referred to as the governmental water 
protection plan) in 2006. This plan designated 40 counties in three provinces 
(i.e. Hubei, Henan and Shannxi) that cover 88,100 km2 as the water supply 
area (of the middle route project) to implement multiple water quality 
protection measures, including inter alia construction of wastewater 
treatment plants and soil conservation projects, closure of heavy-pollution 
factories, reforestation on sloping farmland and logging ban. The budget of 
the water protection plan amounts to about 19.5 billion yuan (£1.95 billion) 
for the period of 2006-2020, and it is co-funded by the central government 
and local governments in the water supply area3
                                            
1
  This cost is more than double the planned budget in 2001 (92 billion  
yuan) due to the rising commodity prices in the last decade.  
.  
2  The national Environmental Quality Standards for Surface Water (GB3838-
2002) of China defines five classes of water quality, and Class I is the 
highest quality level. Class III is the threshold level safe for drinking after 
treatment (it is also the required water quality of the eastern route project).  
3
  For water treatment facilities, the central government undertakes the cost 
of construction while the local governments undertake the cost of 
operation. Soil conservation projects are generally funded in a fifty-fifty 
form. 
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The implementation of this water protection plan has brought a heavy 
financial burden to the governments in the water supply area as the GDP per 
capita of this area is less than half of the average GDP per capita of the 
whole country. Moreover, the budget of the governmental water protection 
plan focuses on the direct cost of engineering projects but has largely 
overlooked the opportunity cost of residents such as farmer households to 
change their economic/agricultural activities. In fact, policy makers of the this 
plan did foresee this funding problem and they called for diversification of the 
funding sources and establishment of compensation mechanisms between 
the water consuming area (northern cities) and the water supply area. 
However, no clear picture has been drawn by researchers and policy makers 
for such compensation mechanisms so far. Insufficient funding could lead to 
the failure of water quality protection of the Danjiangkou Reservoir and thus 
threatens the success of the middle route project. 
1.1.3 The Promise of a New Policy Instrument and the Research 
Needs  
In fact, insufficient funding for water quality (watershed) protection can be 
seen as a typical problem of market failure and externality effect (Kinzig et 
al. 2011; Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008). Since the service of water protection 
is not priced in the current market, beneficiaries of such service (water 
users) are not paying for it and service providers like upstream farmers 
receive little benefits or even incur economic loss from water protection 
activities. Such market failure has caused extensive degradation of 
ecosystems around the world (MEA 2005a). In the last two decades or so, 
there has been a growing interest in applying Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES), a market and incentive-based policy instrument, to motivate 
environmental protection by direct payments to land managers (Chichilnisky 
and Heal 1998; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008; 
Kinzig et al. 2011). Despite debates over its academic definition, theoretical 
framework and socio-economic impact (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and 
Costanza 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013), payment schemes labelled 
as PES have been widely applied in both developed and developing 
countries for watershed protection, forest conservation, biodiversity 
protection and carbon sequestration (Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 2008; 
Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). 
In addition to the innovative nature of using direct payment to motivate 
environmental protection, some PES schemes exhibit another innovative 
nature i.e. they are directly funded by beneficiaries of the environmental 
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protection rather than governmental budgets. For example, in Costa Rica, 
the pioneer developing country to apply the PES, downstream water users 
are levied additional water fees to pay upstream land managers for 
watershed protection through forest conservation. Similar schemes can also 
be found in Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico, Tanzania and other 
countries (Kosoy et al. 2007; Munoz-Pina et al. 2008; Moreno-Sanchez et al. 
2012; Lopa et al. 2012).  
The examples of user-funded PES schemes for water protection in other 
countries raise the question: can such a scheme also be established for the 
middle route project in China? This question is particularly important for 
policy makers since the large populations in the northern cities (e.g. Beijing 
has over 17 million residents) imply a great potential to raise water 
protection funds if a user-funded PES scheme is possible. To answer this 
question, information is needed on whether residents in the northern cities 
are willing to pay for water protection and whether their willingness to pay 
(WTP) is enough to make substantial supplement to or even replace the 
governmental funding. However, no studies in the literature have provided 
such information yet. Interestingly, despite the great attention policy makers 
have paid to the water quality issues of the middle route project, the opinions 
of millions of residents in the northern cities are largely overlooked. 
Therefore, a study on their WTP for water protection is also a chance to 
bring the public voice in water resources management to the academia and 
policy arena. 
Although user-funded environmental programs are still uncharted waters for 
Chinese policy makers and researchers, there have been several 
government-funded programs to directly pay farmers for environmental 
protection activities in China. A national-scale program funded by the central 
government i.e. the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) which pays 
farmers to convert sloping farmland to forestland for reducing soil erosion, 
has been implemented in the water supply area of the middle route project 
since 1999. Later this program was incorporated into the central 
government’s water protection plan (issued in 2006). However, the SLCP 
has some critical limitations.  
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Firstly, the program adopted two flat payment levels4
Moreover, although the SLCP plays an important role in water protection in 
the water supply area, it only enrols land with a gradient larger than 25 
degrees which is more vulnerable to soil erosion. Many farmers have 
relatively flat farmland and grow crops for their livelihoods. The use of 
nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers on those croplands could cause non-point 
source pollution to the surface water and result in eutrophication in the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir. However, this problem has not been taken account 
of either by the SLCP or any other water protection measures in the central 
government’s Plan. Therefore, it is also worthwhile to examine the farmer 
households’ opinion about a new (hypothetical) program that pays them for 
reducing the use of fertilizers in the water supply area.    
 across the country 
despite the much greater regional heterogeneity of China (Liu et al. 2008). 
Secondly, the contracts of the SLCP in terms of the annual payment, 
contract year and requirements of reforestation were designed by policy 
makers in the late 1990s and have not updated ever since then despite the 
substantial development and changes in the socio-economic contexts of 
China. Thirdly, the SLCP was designed in a top-down process which lacked  
consultation with the rural households (Bennett 2008). These limitations call 
for studies in the water supply area on farmer households’ opinions about 
the design of the SLCP, especially their required payment levels under 
different policy scenarios (e.g. different contract lengths). Such studies can 
help to improve the SLCP for better adapting to the local socio-economic 
context but have rarely been conducted yet.      
While the WTP study in northern cities focuses on the fundraising issue on 
the consumer/demand side of PES, the study in the water supply area 
focuses on the program design issue (from farmer households’ perspective) 
on the provider/supply side of PES. Together the studies on both sides 
constitute a systematic research of developing PES for water protection.  
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
This study aims to answer the research question of how to design Payments 
for Ecosystem Services schemes for the water protection of the middle route 
                                            
4
  The two payment levels are 3450 yuan/hectare/year in the south and 2400 
yuan/hectare/year in the north due to approximately different 
productivities of farmland.  
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of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China. Major research 
objectives are as follows: 
(1) Conduct a literature review on PES  and its application in China context. 
(2) Review the existing literature on the SLCP to identify the strengths and 
limitations, review the methods for estimating the public’s WTP for water 
protection and modelling public choices of policy scenarios of PES 
programs 
(3) Design surveys to collect research data and develop models in order to: 
(a) Investigate public WTP for water protection in northern cities and 
identify influential factors on their WTP. 
(b) Assess the financial feasibility of a user-funded PES scheme for water 
protection of the middle route project. 
(c) Investigate farmer households’ opinions about the design of SLCP and 
a new (hypothetical) fertilizer reduction program in the water supply 
area, especially their required payment levels under different policy 
scenarios.  
(4) Analyse the collected data and results from the model estimation, and 
provide critical discussion on the research findings and implications. 
(5) Make suggestions and recommendations on the use of the research 
findings, in particular on the policy making of the South-to-North Water 
Transfer Project and projects of a similar nature.    
1.3 Significance and Contributions 
This research makes multiple contributions to the academia, policy makers 
and the public in both northern cities and the water supply area. For the 
academia, this research:  
(1) Contributes to the literature of estimating public WTP for water protection 
and increases the knowledge of influential factors on public WTP for 
water protection.  
(2) Contributes to the PES literature on the SLCP, a national-scale PES 
scheme for reforestation in China and reveals insights of farmer 
households’ opinions about the design of PES schemes and their 
choices between different policy scenarios.  
- 9 - 
(3) In a holistic view, this research contributes to the literature of developing 
PES for water protection and incorporates public opinions in the design 
of PES. 
For the policy makers, this research provides policy suggestions on: 
(4) Solving the problem of insufficient funding for water protection of the 
middle route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project.  
(5) Improving the design of the SLCP and introducing a new fertilizer 
reduction program in the water supply area.   
For the public in the northern cities and the water supply area, this research: 
(6) Helps to bring their voice to the academia and policy makers.  
Potentially, the success of water protection of the middle route project will 
ensure the supply of clean water to residents in the northern cities, and 
better designed SLCP (and probably a new fertilizer reduction program) will 
prevent the decline in farmer households’ livelihood or even improve it under 
the PES program. 
Lastly, although this research is based on a case study in China, the 
practical problem stimulating this research (e.g. insufficient funding for water 
protection) and its underlying idea (e.g. PES) are universal in the world, 
especially the developing countries. Thus the knowledge and insights 
obtained from this study can also be helpful for applying PES in the context 
of large-scale water infrastructures in other countries.   
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises 7 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature of this research. It first provides a 
brief review on the PES and China’s indigenous policy instrument with the 
similar idea of PES (i.e. Ecological Compensation). It is followed by a review 
of the existing literature on the SLCP and their limitations. Then the methods 
for estimating public WTP for water protection (Contingent Valuation) and 
modelling public choices of policy scenarios of water protection programs 
(Choice Experiments) are critically evaluated to identify the gap between the 
PES studies and the WTP/Choice Modelling studies that this study aims to 
fill. 
Chapter 3 depicts the research design and methodology adopted in this 
study. It first describes the Contingent Valuation survey in the northern cities 
for investigating the public WTP for water protection. It is followed by 
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detailed explanation of the econometric models for Contingent Valuation and 
descriptions of the modelling procedures adopted in this research to develop 
and refine the models. Then the Choice Experiments survey in the water 
supply area to reveal farmer households’ choices and preferences for the 
design of water protection programs. The econometric models for the choice 
experiments study are explained at the end of Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 depicts and discusses the results of the Contingent Valuation 
survey in the northern cities in detail. It starts with the description of the 
characteristic of the 755 respondents in 4 northern cities and their 
environmental awareness, knowledge and attitudes. Then it presents the 
model results derived from each city to explain respondents’ willingness to 
pay higher water prices for water protection of the middle route project. It is 
followed by a comparative analysis of the final (best) models of the four 
cities. To conclude the chapter, the estimates of respondents’ mean WTP by 
multiple models are compared and discussed. 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the results of the Choice Experiments 
survey in the water supply area in detail. It starts with the description of the 
characteristics of the 246 farmer households interviewed in 7 villages in the 
water supply area and it is followed by the survey results of the households’ 
participation in the SLCP and their post-program land use decisions. Then  
an analysis of the effect of SLCP on participants’ livelihoods is presented 
and it is followed by the choice modelling results on farmer households’ 
preferences for the design of water protection programs and the 
heterogeneity in their preferences.   
Chapter 6 discusses the implication of the research results from Chapters 4 
and 5. It first assesses the financial feasibility of establishing a user-funded 
PES scheme for water protection of the middle route project. It then 
discussed improvements that should be made on the current SLCP 
contracts and the policy implications of the hypothetical fertilizer reduction 
program. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the major research findings and policy 
recommendations that are offered by this research. Research limitation and 
future research directions are also given to conclude this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Following the introductory chapter, this chapter provides a review of the 
relevant literature of this research. Section 2.1 provides a brief review on the 
PES. Section 2.2 introduces Ecological Compensation (EC), China’s 
indigenous policy instrument with the similar idea to PES. Section 2.3 
reviews existing literature on the SLCP and their limitations. Section 2.4 
reviews the non-market valuation methods for estimating public WTP for 
water protection (Contingent Valuation) and modelling public choices of 
policy scenarios of water protection programs (Choice Experiments). Section 
2.5 highlights a literature gap between the PES studies and the non-market 
valuation studies that this study aims to fill. Section 2.6 provides a summary 
of this chapter. 
2.1 A Brief Review of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
The well-being of human societies relies on “the benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems” which have been conceptualized as Ecosystem Services, 
including provisioning services like food production, regulating services like 
water purification, supporting services like nutrient cycling and cultural 
services like recreational benefits (MEA 2003). Over the past 50 years, 60% 
of the global ecosystem services have undergone rapid degradation (MEA 
2005a). This is partly due to the fact that many ecosystem services such as 
water purification by upstream forests are not priced in existing markets, 
causing the problem of externalities that markets failed to tackle (Kinzig et al. 
2011; Jack, Kousky and Sims 2008). For example, farmers in upstream 
watersheds usually receive much less benefits from forest conservation than 
timber logging, thus they have no incentives to conserve the forests for 
ensuring water purification for downstream water users. 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is an emerging policy instrument to 
tackle the market failure and externality problem in the management and 
protection of ecosystem services. This section gives an overview of the 
origin and development of PES wherein the basic terms, concepts and 
rationale underpinning this study are introduced in the relevant contexts.  
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2.1.1 Origin in the 1980s 
Efforts from economists to tackle the problem of externalities can be traced 
back to the 1920s and 1960s. While Pigou (1920) suggested the use of 
governmental taxes and subsidies to internalize externalities, Coase (1960) 
argued that externalities could be resolved through private negotiation and 
transaction if transaction cost was low and property rights were clearly 
defined and enforced (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). With the emergence 
of modern environmentalism in the 1960s, researchers of Environmental and 
Resources Economics began to develop a range of non-market valuation 
methods such as Travel Cost and Contingent Valuation to place monetary 
value on environmental benefits like water quality improvement so that these 
environmental benefits could be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis for 
decision making (Liu et al. 2010). Yet, these environmental benefits were not 
conceptualized as ecosystem services until the 1980s when researchers 
initially introduced the concept to explain the importance of biodiversity from 
an economic perspective (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
2010).  
Also in the 1980s, some developed countries started to implement 
government-funded, national-scale conservation programs, such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the U.S. (Claassen, Cattaneo and 
Johansson 2008) and the Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA) program in 
the U.K. (Dobbs and Pretty 2008), to compensate farmers for reducing 
negative externalities of agriculture activities like soil erosion and increasing 
positive externalities like scenic landscapes (Baylis et al. 2008). Since the 
concept of PES was not formed yet at that time, these programs were 
referred to by the term of Agri-environmental Program/Scheme/Policy which 
is still widely used at present in developed countries (Gibbons et al. 2011; 
Whittingham 2011; von Haaren et al. 2012; Hasund 2013).  
2.1.2 Development in the 1990s 
The 1990s witnessed the development of ecosystem services studies 
symbolized by the publication of Costanza et al. (1997)’s study on the 
economic value of the world’s ecosystem services in the highly influential 
journal,  Nature (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). In the same period, a 
famous example of paying for watershed services was established by New 
York City and later reported in Nature (Chichilnisky and Heal 1998). Since 
1996, New York City has invested US$1-1.5 billion to restrict land use in the 
upstream watershed (in the Catskill Mountains) by land acquisition and 
conservation easement so that the natural soil ecosystems can be restored 
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to better purify drinking water for nearly 9 million downstream water users. 
And by doing this, the city saved $6-8 billion that would be required to build a 
new filtration plant (Smith and Porter 2010; Smith et al. 2013).    
It is also in the 1990s that conservation payment programs emerged in the 
developing countries. In 1997, Costa Rica launched the first and most well-
known national payment program in developing countries to pay farmers and 
forest owners for reforestation and forest conservation in order to ensure 
multiple services provided by forest ecosystems, including water provision, 
biodiversity conservation, carbon emission mitigation and scenic beauty for 
recreation and ecotourism (Zbinden and Lee 2005; Pagiola 2008). The name 
of this program, Payments for Environmental Services 5, has become a 
widely used term in literature (Herrador and Dimas 2000; Sanchez-Azofeifa 
et al. 2002; Pagiola, Arcenas and Platais 2005; Kosoy et al. 2007; Wunder, 
Engel and Pagiola 2008; Swinton 2010; Newton et al. 2012), which is 
generally interchangeable with the term, Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(Shelley 2011)6
2.1.3 Mainstreaming in the 2000s 
. Moreover, Costa Rica’s PES program is innovative 
compared with agri-environmental programs implemented earlier in 
developed countries because part of the program funding comes directly 
from beneficiaries (e.g. water users) of ecosystem services instead of 
government budgets. This “Principle of Beneficiaries Pay”, together with the 
use of direct payment to providers of ecosystem services, was one of the 
key elements to form the concept of PES (Wunder 2006; Wunder 2007; 
Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008). 
The worldwide acceptance of the concept of Ecosystem Services was 
greatly consolidated by the international project of Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment during 2001-2005 which involved more than 1,300 experts from 
95 countries to appraise “the condition and trends in the world’s ecosystems 
and the services they provide” (MEA 2005b; Carpenter et al. 2006; Gomez-
Baggethun et al. 2010). With the growing awareness of the economic values 
of ecosystem services and the absence of markets to present these values, 
                                            
5
  This is the English translation of the original Spanish program name 
Pagos de Servicios Ambientales (PSA) (Zbinden and Lee 2005). 
6
  Shelley (2011) provides interesting discussion on the nomenclature issues 
of PES and she suggested that consistent use of the choosing term 
(Payment for Environmental/Ecosystem Services) was actually more 
important than the choice itself.  
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researchers and policy makers are increasingly interested in establishing 
market-based mechanisms like PES to motivate conservation (Mooney, 
Cropper and Reid 2005; Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). The success of 
Costa Rica’s PES program, as reported by Ferraro and Kiss (2002)’s 
influential paper in Science, was followed by a number of similar programs 
which were implemented in Mexico (Munoz-Pina et al. 2008), Nicaragua 
(Pagiola et al. 2007), Bolivia (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder 2008) and 
Ecuador (Wunder and Alban 2008), making Latin America the focal region of 
PES practice in the world. Countries in Southeast Asia and Africa such as 
Cambodia (Clements et al. 2010), Vietnam (McElwee 2012), Madagascar 
(Wendland et al. 2010) and Zimbabwe (Frost and Bond 2008) also launched 
conservation programs bearing the characteristics of PES such as the use of 
direct payments and transactions between beneficiaries and providers of 
ecosystem services.  
The increasing application of PES programs stimulated researchers’ efforts 
to conceptualize this emerging policy instrument with rigorous definition and 
economic theory/principle. Wunder (2005) was the first to propose a clear 
definition of PES in terms of five criteria, i.e. “a PES scheme is: (1) a 
voluntary transaction where (2) a well-defined ecosystem service (or a land-
use likely to secure that service) (3) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) 
service buyer (4) from a (minimum one) service provider (5) if and only if the 
provider secures the provision of ecosystem service (conditionality)”. This 
definition became prevalent due to its adoption by Engel, Pagiola and 
Wunder (2008), the most cited paper in PES literature 7
                                            
7
 All Bibliometric information used in this PhD study was retrieved from Web 
of Science and double-checked on 15 May 2014.   
, which 
comprehensively reviewed and discussed major issues of PES design and 
implementation in view of environmental economics. In this paper, Engel, 
Pagiola and Wunder (2008) considered the Coase Theorem of internalizing 
externalities by voluntary transaction (under clear property rights and low 
transaction cost) as the theoretical basis of PES and classified PES 
programs into user-financed programs and government-financed programs, 
so the agri-environmental programs using voluntary contracts with farmers 
and direct payments for conservation in developed countries were also 
regarded as part of PES practice around the world, although these programs 
actually existed before the term PES was coined.  
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Interestingly, both Wunder (2005)’s definition and Engel, Pagiola and 
Wunder (2008)’s discussion used the term of Payments for Environmental 
Services instead of Payments for Ecosystem Services. In fact, the latter term 
did not appear in literature until 2007 (McNeely 2007; Corbera, Kosoy and 
Tuna 2007) but has been increasingly used and has gradually become 
dominant in recent years (Figure 2.1). This could be logically connected to 
the aforementioned increasing acceptance of the concept/term of Ecosystem 
Services after the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Given this trend of 
terminology choice in PES literature and the predominant use of Ecosystem 
Services in the wider academic and policy arena, the term Payments for 
Ecosystem Services has been chosen for this PhD study as shown in the 
thesis title.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Yearly Publications of PES Studies 
Data Source: Web of Science, last accessed on15 May 2014 
 
Disregarding the choice between the two similar PES terms, the overall 
publications of PES studies have experienced a fast growth since 2007 
(Figure 1).  By the end of 2013, 437 PES studies have been published in 
over 100 journals such as Ecological Economics (15.3%), Ecology and 
Society (4.6%), Environmental Conservation (3.7%), Land Use Policy (3.7%) 
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and Forest Policy and Economics (3.2%).8
Entering this new decade, a new direction of  PES study and practice are the 
efforts and discussions to integrate PES with Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in tropical regions as a result of the 
growing international concern of climate change (Pattanayak, Wunder and 
Ferraro 2010; Corbera 2012; Mahanty, Suich and Tacconi 2013). 
Meanwhile, the term of PES is also receiving growing acceptance in 
developed countries where Agri-environment Policy/Programs dominate the 
discussion of conservation payments schemes. For example, the 
Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs of the UK recently 
published Payments for Ecosystem Services: A Best Practice Guide to help 
with the design and implementation of PES programs, particularly for 
watershed protection at catchment and local scale (Smith et al. 2013). 
 Hoepner et al. (2012) assessed 
6597 papers (in any topics) published in 14 major peer-reviewed journals in 
the area of environmental and ecological economics between 2000 and 
2009, their results showed that 2 of the top ten most influential papers were 
PES studies (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008; Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 
2008). These bibliometric analyses demonstrate that PES has attracted 
interests in diverse research areas and become one of the most influential 
study topics in environmental and ecological economics.    
2.1.4 Criticisms and Reflections on PES  
The increasing popularity of PES has raised criticisms and reflections on its 
conceptualization, distributional effect, design and implementation. The 
prevalent definition of PES (Wunder 2005) was criticized for being too 
narrow to encompass the majority of PES programs in practice which did not 
meet the criteria of voluntary transaction and conditional payments due to 
some extent of forced participation, loose monitoring and weak sanction on 
non-compliance of conservation contracts (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and 
Costanza 2010). The mainstream conceptualization of  PES following 
Coase’s theorem on externalities (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008) was 
also criticized for over-emphasizing market transactions which are difficult to 
be realized for many ecosystem services due to technical and institutional 
constraints (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and Costanza 2010; Tacconi 
2012). Therefore, Muradian et al. (2010) provide an alternative definition of 
                                            
8
 These are the top five journals that published the most PES studies. 
Values in the parentheses are the percentage of published papers in the 
total of 437 papers.    
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PES, i.e. “a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to 
create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with 
the social interest in the management of natural resources”. Tacconi (2012) 
reviewed debates over PES definition and revised Muradian et al. (2010)’s 
definition as “a PES scheme is a transparent system for the additional 
provision of environmental services through conditional payments to 
voluntary providers”.   
The alternative definitions proposed by Muradian et al. (2010) and Tacconi 
(2012) are broader to encompass possibly all existent PES programs, but 
they lose the plainness of Wunder (2005)’s definition to explain the basic 
logic and characteristics of PES mechanism. Moreover, the violation of the 
criteria of voluntary and conditionality in existent PES programs is largely an 
implementation problem to be overcome rather than the reason for loosening 
the definition of PES. Instead of criticizing the narrowness of Wunder 
(2005)’s definition, it may be better to consider it as a theoretical reference 
while acknowledging the great difficulties to establish such ideal PES 
programs in real life. 
The distributional effect of PES is another focal point of researchers’ 
concerns and criticisms.  Vatn (2010) and Van Hecken and Bastiaensen 
(2010) raised similar concerns from the institutional and political views that 
paying upstream farmers as providers of watershed ecosystem services 
implicitly grants them the property rights over upstream water resources 
(which is highly controversial before the PES mechanism is introduced) and 
turns the normative paradigm of “Polluters Pay” into “Pay the Polluters”. 
Thus, they argued that a clearly defined baseline/reference point of 
ecosystem services is needed to determine whether PES is justified or not. 
Another concern for PES is that the introduction of economic incentives may 
in some cases “crowd out” intrinsic conservation motivation from local 
culture and social norms (Vatn 2010; Muradian et al. 2010; Muradian et al. 
2013). Furthermore, Kronenberg and Hubacek (2013) suggested that 
without careful account of institutional issues like rent seeking, unequal 
bargaining power of service beneficiaries and providers and capacity 
building for future development, the rapid development of PES can be 
detrimental to regional and potentially national economies, causing an 
“Ecosystem Services Curse” analogous to the known “resource curse”.     
Another widely concerned issue is the social-economic effect of PES in 
poverty alleviation. In practice, poverty alleviation is often an embedded 
objective of government-funded PES programs under the expectation of 
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pursuing a win-win solution for environment and development (Wunder, 
Engel and Pagiola 2008; Liu et al. 2008; Turpie, Marais and Blignaut 2008), 
but evidences of achieving this dual goal are not convincing (Engel, Pagiola 
and Wunder 2008; Pagiola 2008; Muradian et al. 2010). Actually, advocators 
of PES are quite cautious about claiming PES as a win-win solution. Instead, 
they argued that PES programs must focus on the efficiency of conservation 
and consider poverty alleviation as a positive side-effect which should not 
distract the primary environmental goal (Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Pagiola, 
Arcenas and Platais 2005; Kinzig et al. 2011; Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 
2008). This efficiency-prioritizing argument, which is deemed an 
environmental economics perspective, has incurred criticisms from the 
ecological economics perspective which insist on a more holistic 
consideration of efficiency and equity (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley and 
Costanza 2010; Tacconi 2012).  
Ensuring the voluntary participation is an important safeguard to prevent 
negative distributional and socio-economic effect of PES. As Wunder, Engel 
and Pagiola (2008); (2013) suggested, the voluntary nature would require 
PES to be “interpersonal win-win across all participants”, i.e. farmers would 
not participate unless the payments at least match their (anticipated) 
opportunity cost, so they could be better off (or at least not worse off) under 
the PES program. It is also important to mitigate the unequal barging power 
of the beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services in PES by 
improving information availability and involving providers in the PES 
designing process (Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013). In practice, efforts have 
been found to deal with controversial distributional effect of PES like turning 
the paradigm “Polluters Pay” into “Pay the Polluters”. For example, Wen, Siu 
and Hubacek (2012) reported a two-way (“carrot and stick”) payment 
mechanism for watershed protection in China wherein the downstream 
Zhejiang province pays the upstream Anhui province about US $16 million 
as a reward if the water quality of the Xin’an River is better than the average 
level of the last three years, but the same amount of payment will be 
delivered in the opposite way, as penalty, if the water quality deteriorates. 
With regard to the practical design and implementation of PES programs, in 
addition to the aforementioned failure to meet the conditionality criteria due 
to weak monitoring and sanction (Muradian et al. 2010), criticisms have 
focused on low efficiency caused by poor targeting, i.e. adopting uniform 
payments and contracts which neglect the heterogeneity in the importance 
of different land in producing ecosystem services and in the opportunity cost 
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of different farmers to protect ecosystems (Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 2008; 
Pagiola 2008; Munoz-Pina et al. 2008; Bennett 2008; Uthes et al. 2010). 
This is particularly the case of government-funded PES programs in 
developing countries, such as the PES program of Costa Rica (Pagiola 
2008) and the SLCP of China (Bennett 2008). In contrast, PES programs in 
developed countries have applied differentiated payments and contracts for 
years, e.g. the Conservation Reserve Program of the U.S. uses auction to 
reduce the cost of enrolling farmers (Claassen, Cattaneo and Johansson 
2008), and the Countryside Stewardship Scheme in the U.K. signed different 
contracts for each “agreement farm” according to specific environment 
concerns (Dobbs and Pretty 2008). The experiences of developed countries 
may not be simply copied to developing countries due to technical and 
institutional constrains, but the efforts to better understand local farmers’ 
expectation of PES payments and contracts for better program designing are 
warranted.    
2.2 The Chinese Version of PES: Ecological Compensation  
Literature of PES in China is dominated by studies on SLCP (which will be 
reviewed in detail in Section 2.3). In fact, SLCP is part of China’s 
environmental economic policy of Ecological Compensation (EC). Though 
most Chinese researchers treat EC and PES as synonymous terms and 
adopt PES to report their studies in international journals, EC is used by 
Chinese policy makers and mass media as a buzzword in recent years. In 
addition to national EC programs in forest restoration and conservation 
(including SLCP), the National Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) 9
There is a lack of review of China’s EC policy in international literature from 
a more holistic view instead of introducing a single program of this policy 
tool. This section briefly introduces the conceptual framework and major 
practice of EC policy in China, which serves as the indigenous policy context 
 
has issued the Guidelines on Pilot Practice of Ecological Compensation to 
help with policy experiments of regional and inter-regional EC programs  for, 
inter alia, watershed protection and natural reserves protection (NEPB 
2007). The central government of China has also commenced the legislation 
process of a national Ecological Compensation Ordinance since 2010.   
                                            
9
 The NEPB was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 
2008.  
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of this PhD study. A number of Chinese EC studies were also reviewed to 
complete this section. 
2.2.1 What is Ecological Compensation?  
The most influential two definitions of EC were provided in the most cited  
Chinese EC study  (Mao, Zhong and Zhang 2002) 10
In the NEPB guidelines (NEPB 2007), EC was described as “an 
environmental economic policy that adjusts relationships between 
stakeholders in ecological conservation via both administrative and market 
means and on the basis of the value of ecosystem services and the direct 
and opportunity cost of conservation”. The guideline also stated the basic 
principles of EC as “Developer Protects (the environment), Destroyer 
Restores, Beneficiary Pays, and Polluter Pays”.  In other words, developers 
of natural resources must undertake the external cost and compensate for 
the damage/pollution to the environment and nature resources, and 
beneficiaries of ecological protection should remunerate protectors of 
ecosystems. Moreover, four priority conservation issues were designated by 
the NEPB for EC policy experiments, namely natural reserves protection, 
conservation of important ecological function districts (e.g. shelter forests 
belts against desertification), ecological restoration of mining districts and 
watershed protection.     
 and the NEPB 
Guidelines on Pilot Practice of Ecological Compensation (NEPB 2007) 
respectively.  Mao, Zhong and Zhang (2002) were the first to provide a 
formal definition of EC, i.e. a policy instrument that “charges (raises the cost 
of) environment and resource damaging behaviours to decrease the external 
diseconomy, or compensates (raises the benefit of) environment and 
resource protection behaviours to increase the external economy”. Also in 
this paper, Pigou’s theory of external economy and diseconomy (positive 
and negative externalities) and Coase’s theorem of property rights 
transaction for tackling externalities were considered as the theoretical basis 
of EC.  
The descriptions above indicate that eco-compensation is also a policy 
instrument to tackle the problem of externalities in conservation like PES. To 
some extent, the NEPB’s vague description of “an environmental economic 
policy that adjusts relationships between stakeholders in ecological 
                                            
10
 This bibliometric information was retrieved from the China Academic 
Journals Full-text Database, the most comprehensive full-text database 
of Chinese journals, and double-checked on 18 May. 
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conservation……” resembles Muradian et al. (2010)’s broad definition of 
PES as “a transfer of resources……to align individual and/or collective land 
use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural 
resources”. However, a distinct difference between EC and PES is that 
policy makers of EC have included both the Beneficiary Pays Principle 
(BPP) and Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) as the basic principles of this policy 
tool. The intention is to apply the PPP to decrease negative environmental 
externalities while apply the BPP to increase positive externalities. But as 
discussed by Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) regarding controversies 
over PES, whether an externality is positive or negative is actually a tricky 
political and moral question. A similar question could also arise in the 
practice of EC, causing controversies over which principle should be applied 
in which circumstance. 
2.2.2 Practice of Ecological Compensation Policy  
The inclusion of both PPP and BPP in the conceptual framework of EC 
reflects two branches of policy practice shaping the current concept of EC, 
i.e. BPP-based, government-funded compensation policies/programs for 
ecological benefits of forest ecosystems and PPP-based policy experiments 
of levying fees on mineral resources exploitation for ecological restoration. 
Early policy practice in both branches originated in the 1980s, but substantial 
progress was made in the late 1990s and early 2000s.    
In 1998, the National People's Congress of China approved the amendment 
of the National Forestry Law, wherein Article 8 (6) stipulates that “The State 
shall establish the Forest Ecological Benefit Compensation Fund (FEBCF) 
for the planting, tending, protection and management of forests”. This is the 
first Chinese law to legitimize economic compensation for the provision of 
ecological benefits. Accordingly, the national FEBCF was founded during 
2001-2004 which paid state-owned forestry companies, village communities 
or private forest managers who signed annual contracts with local forestry 
departments 75 yuan/hectare/year 11 for the protection and management of 
designated “prime public welfare forests” 12
                                            
11
 5% of this payment is allowed to be used by local forestry departments to 
cover the cost of inspection and other administration affairs. 
 (Han et al. 2006). By 2007, the 
12
 The National Bureau of Forestry has classified China’s forests into two 
major types, i.e. “commercial forests” which can be managed for timber 
production and “prime public welfare forests” which should be protected 
for providing ecological benefits. All the prime public welfare forests 
amount to 105 million hectare, accounting for 37.2% of the total forests of 
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FEBCF had allocated 13.34 billion yuan to cover 44.53 million hectares of 
forests (Dai et al. 2008). Recently in 2013, the payment level has been 
raised to 225 yuan/hectare/year for those community and private-owned 
forests (Cao 2013). Encouraged by the central government, many local 
governments have also established local FEBCF for the conservation of a 
total of 76.67 million hectares of “local public welfare forests” that are not 
designated as “prime public welfare forests” by the Ministry of Forestry. The 
payment level of Local FEBCF varies in different regions, largely depending 
on the financial capability of local governments (Dai et al. 2008). 
It was also in 1998 that China underwent disastrous floods in multiple 
watersheds including, inter alia, the Yangtze River and Yellow River (the 
largest two rivers of China). Apart from the abnormal climate, it was widely 
believed that forest destruction and degradation in the upstream watersheds 
were the major reasons for the disastrous floods. To learn from this 
experience, the central government commenced two large-scale payments 
programs for forest conservation and restoration in the following years, 
namely the Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) and the SLCP. 
The NFCP launched the pilot scheme in 1998 and extended to the full scale 
of 17 provinces in 2000. This program pays state-owned forest companies to 
cease commercial logging of natural forests and afforest additional 31 million 
hectares of mountain areas (Cao et al. 2010). The payments of NFCP vary 
for different activities, e.g. 1050 yuan/hectare/year for logging cease and 
3000-4500 yuan/hectare/year for afforestation (Liu et al. 2008). The total 
budget of NFCP amounted to 96.2 billion yuan from 2000 to 2010, and the 
ratio of central government funding to local governments funding was about 
8:2. After the completion of the first duration in 2010, the NFCP was 
prolonged from 2011 to 2020 with the total budget increasing to 244 billion 
yuan by the central government.  
The SLCP launched the pilot scheme in 1999 and extended to the full scale 
of 25 provinces in 2002. Farmers signed volunteer contracts to convert 
sloping farmland (with gradients larger than 15° in Northwest China and 25° 
in other regions) to forestland or grassland (Liu et al. 2008). The duration of 
SLCP contracts is 2 years for grassland, 5 years for “economic forests” (fruit 
trees or trees with medicinal use) and 8 years for “ecological forests” (timber 
trees which are supposed to provide more ecological benefits). Payments of 
                                                                                                                           
China. About 59.5% of them are state-owned, 34% community-owned 
and 6.5% private-owned. 
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SLCP were both in kind (grains) and in cash at the beginning of the program, 
but they have been paid all in cash since 2004 at the level of 3450 
yuan/hectare/year in the upper reach of the Yangtze River and 2400 
yuan/hectare/year in the upper and middle reach of the Yellow River 
(Bennett 2008). In 2007, the central government announced the extension of 
SLCP with the same duration. 
2.3 Studies on Sloping Land Conversion Program and 
Limitations  
As the largest PES program in the developing countries, SLCP has attracted 
great interest from both Chinese and international researchers. Studies on 
SLCP have dominated the literature of PES related to China. Major research 
issues of SLCP studies are evaluation of its ecological and socio-economic 
effects, and assessment of its sustainability, i.e. whether farmers will convert 
the forestland back to farmland after the program expires. There are also 
two choice modelling studies found in SLCP literature. This section reviews 
major studies on SLCP and discusses their limitations.   
2.3.1 Ecological and Socio-economic Effects of SLCP 
Most research findings of the SLCP’s ecological effects were positive. As Liu 
et al. (2008) reported, nearly 9 million hectares of cropland had been 
converted to forest or grassland under SCLP after 8 years of implementation 
in 25 provinces, which increased the overall forest in these provinces by 2%. 
Zhou et al. (2009) found that the decrease of sediment concentration in the 
middle-reach Yellow River and upper-reach Yangtze River was strongly 
correlated with the implementation of SCLP. Deng, Shangguan and Li 
(2012) reported the reduction of surface runoff by 18% and soil erosion by 
45.4% in 11 watersheds (involving farmland conversion) in the period of 
2003-2007 compared with 1998-2002. Increases in soil organic carbon 
sequestration following the SLCP were also reported in literature (Song et al. 
2014b). Nevertheless, a few studies have raised concerns over the low 
diversity of trees planted under the SLCP (Liu et al. 2008) and the 
inappropriateness of large-scale afforestation in the arid and semi-arid 
regions of China (Cao 2011). 
In contrast, investigations of SLCP’s socio-economic effects generated 
rather mixed results. Cao et al. (2009) interviewed 1768 farmer households 
in Shaanxi Province (North China) in 2005 and found that only 19.1% of the 
households felt their livelihood was negatively affected by SLCP. Li et al. 
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(2011) conducted regression analysis based on 1074 household survey 
questionnaires collected in Shaanxi Province in 2008, results showed that 
participation in SLCP had significantly positive effect on household income, 
and there was less income inequality among participants of the program 
than among non-participants. More recently, Song et al. (2014a) interviewed 
146 households in Shanxi 13 (North China), Anhui and Hubei Province (both 
in Central China) in 2011, their results indicated that SLCP had generated 
minor improvements in livelihood for the majority of participating farmers. It 
is also reported that participation in the SLCP had shifted farmers from crops 
farming to off-farm work 14
On the other hand, some studies also found negative effects of SLCP on 
farmers’ livelihood. A survey of 156 farmer households in Jilin Province 
(Northeast China) found that 58% of the farmers felt their life quality declined 
after participation in the SLCP (Wang and Maclaren 2012). In another survey 
of 137 farmer households in Sichuan Province (Southwest China) in 2004, 
61% of farmers reported a decrease in household income after the SLCP, 
and only 20% reported an increase of income (Xu et al. 2007). There are 
also reports that SLCP had not actually shifted participants from on-farm to 
off-farm work (Uchida et al. 2007; Li et al. 2011).  
 and diversified farmers’ income source (Ye, Chen 
and Hong 2003; Liu et al. 2008; Uchida, Rozelle and Xu 2009). 
2.3.2 Farmers’ Post-program Land Use Decisions 
Another important research question in SLCP studies is whether farmers will 
keep the forests or convert them back to farmland after the program ceases. 
This is usually referred to as the “sustainability” of SLCP in literature 
(Uchida, Xu and Rozelle 2005; Grosjean and Kontoleon 2009; Song et al. 
2014a; Yang and Xu 2014). An similar term used in some PES studies is 
“permanence”, which is an important criteria to evaluate the success of PES 
programs (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008; Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 
2008).  
Generally, at least part of the participating farmers will not keep the forests 
without continuous payments. The percentage of farmers with the 
reconversion plan varied in different studies but was normally below 50%. 
                                            
13
 Shanxi and Shaanxi (mentioned earlier) are two different provinces in the 
north of China. 
14
 This shift is desired by the policy designers of SLCP as off-farm work 
generates higher income and at the same time reduces the pressure of 
farming activities on rural ecosystems.    
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Uchida, Xu and Rozelle (2005) interviewed 144 farmer households in 
Ningxia Autonomous Region 15 (Northwest China) and Guizhou Province 
(Southwest China) in 2002, 34% and 29% of participants in the two 
provinces respectively would return to crop growing if the payment ceases. 
Cao et al. (2009) reported that 37.2% of farmer households in their survey 
planned to reconvert their forestland back to farmland, while this percentage 
was 16% in the study of Wang and Maclaren (2012) 16
A few  researchers have looked into the factors affecting farmers’ post-
program land use decisions. Yang and Xu (2014) applied the Ordered Probit 
model on data from a survey of 255 households conducted in 2005 in 
Shaanxi, Gansu (Northwest China) and Sichuan Province, they found that 
farmers would be less likely to convert enrolled land with steeper slopes and 
lower productivity. Moreover, larger share of crops income in farmers’ total 
income and unduly delivered program payment in previous years would 
make farmers more likely to return to crops cultivation, while the flexibility of 
choosing trees planted in the enrolled land would reduce the possibility of 
reconversion. Chen et al. (2009b) applied the Tobit Regression model on 
data from a survey of 304 participating households in Wolong Nature 
Reserve (established for the famous giant panda) in Sichuan Province in 
2006, their results indicated that the amount of enrolled forestland that 
households planned to convert back to farmland significantly decreased with 
the age of household heads and households’ off-farm income but 
significantly increased with the number of labourers in the household and the 
total amount of land they have enrolled in SLCP.   
. More substantial 
regional difference was found in another survey  wherein 34.5% of farmers 
in Shanxi Province would not keep the forests when payments end, but only 
2.3% of the interviewed farmers in Hubei Province had reconversion plan 
while all interviewed farmers in Anhui Province would keep the forest even 
without continous payments (Song et al. 2014a). 
2.3.3 Choice Modelling Studies on SLCP 
Only two choice modelling studies have been found in SLCP literature, both 
of which investigated farmers’ possible decisions after the current SLCP 
                                            
15
 There are five ethnic autonomous regions in China (Ningxia, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi) which are equivalent to provinces in 
terms of the administrative level. 
16
 Information of the study sites and sample sizes of these two studies can 
be found in last section, thus are not repeated here.  
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contracts expire. Using the same dataset of  Chen et al. (2009b), Chen et al. 
(2009a) applied the Stated Choice model to reveal farmer households’ 
willingness to re-enrol in SLCP under different policy scenarios which were 
composed of 3 program attributes at different levels, i.e. contract length, 
annual payment and hypothetical percentage re-enrolment by respondents’ 
neighbours 17
Based on a survey of 286 farmer households in Ningxia and Guizhou 
Province in 2006, Grosjean and Kontoleon (2009) investigated farmers’ 
preference for policy scenarios of new SLCP in terms of 5 program 
attributes, i.e. annual payment, the percentage of commercial forest 
(economic trees) allowed to be planted in the enrolled land, secured land 
tenure (no land redistribution after the current tenure expires), the rights of 
land renting and assurance of payment delivery. With no explanation, the 
contract length in all the policy scenarios was fixed to 30 years, which is 
much longer than the maximum duration of the current SLCP (8 years). 
Results indicated that all the five attributes showed significant and positive 
effects to farmers’ willingness to enrol in a new SLCP, and farmers were 
willing to forgo 1.17 yuan/mu/year for every increase of 1% more commercial 
forest to be planted, 171.23 yuan/mu/year for no land redistribution, 26.18 
yuan/mu/year for land renting rights and 114.87 yuan/mu/year for assured 
delivery of all payments.      
. Results showed farmers’ re-enrolment decisions would be 
significantly influenced by neighbours’ behaviours and tended to follow the 
majority. The effect of contract length was not consistent. While farmers 
significantly preferred 6-year contract to 3-year contract, they did not show 
significant preference for 10-year contract over 6-year contract. As the 
authors explained, longer contracts bring more stable income and larger 
aggregate payments but at the same time limit farmers’ flexibility to adapt to 
change in conditions such as market prices of crops.  
2.3.4 Limitations of the Existing SLCP Studies. 
Since study results of SLCP’s ecological effects were overwhelmingly 
positive, the discussion here focuses on studies on the socio-economic 
impacts and sustainability of the program. Despite the valuable findings 
provided by existent literature, there are critical limitations to be overcome in 
terms of outdated survey data, overlooked study regions and methodology 
shortcomings. 
                                            
17
 These hypothetical neighbours’ behaviours were considered an indication 
of “social norms” among farmer households (Chen et al 2009 a).   
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Firstly, most of the existing SLCP case studies were based on surveys 
conducted around 2005 or even earlier. Given China’s rapid growth and 
change in the last decade, data from those case studies is becoming 
outdated and the corresponding findings may be no longer applicable to the 
current situations. New case studies conducted in more recent years are in 
great need to provide updated information and insights regarding SLCP.  
Secondly, multiple studies have indicated that there were substantial 
regional disparities in SLCP’s socio-economic effects and farmers’ post-
program land use decisions (Wang et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2009b; Grosjean 
and Kontoleon 2009; Song et al. 2014a), which means sufficient studies in 
different regions are important for better understanding the local 
implementation and impact of this program in China. However, current SLCP 
studies are too focused on several provinces such as Sichuan and Guizhou 
while the program has been implemented in 25 provinces. Only one SLCP 
study has been found in literature to conduct a survey with merely 44 farmer 
households in Hubei Province 18
Thirdly, although the  impact of the program on participants’ livelihood is one 
of the most sought research themes in SLCP literature, many of the existing 
studies used rather simple and general survey questions to investigate this 
issue, such as “How has your family’s livelihood been influenced by SLCP” 
(Song et al. 2014a) or a yes/no question to the statement of “The SLCP 
adversely affected my income” (Cao et al. 2009). There is a lack of detailed 
information about which crops/trees  farmers planted in the sloping land 
before and after participation in the SLCP and the income generated from 
the crops/trees. Such detailed information can help to better understand 
farmers’ livelihood under the SLCP and provide quantitative evidence of the 
program’s socio-economic impact.  
 (Song et al. 2014a). More case studies in 
those overlooked provinces and regions are necessary to fill in this literature 
gap. 
Fourthly, although some SLCP studies included both participant and non-
participant farmers for comparative or integrated analysis (Uchida et al. 
2007; Grosjean and Kontoleon 2009; Li et al. 2011), these studies did not 
                                            
18 This survey is part of an integrated survey in three provinces with a total of 
146 farmer households. The Danjiangkou Reservoir is located in Hubei 
Province. But the survey was conducted in a township near Wuhan, the 
capital city of Hubei Province, which is over 350 km away from the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir.  
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differentiate the non-participant farmers who have no qualified sloping land  
for the program19 (simply referred to as unqualified farmers hereafter) from 
those who have qualified land but were truly unwilling to participate (referred 
to as unwilling farmers). The unqualified farmers will not be influenced by 
any improvement in the design and implementation of SLCP anyway unless  
there is a fundamental change in the program’s criteria for land qualification. 
So there is hardly any relevance to include them in analysis of farmers’ 
willingness to participate in a new (updated) SLCP20
Fifthly, the current SLCP has been criticized for adopting uniform payment 
and contract length which neglects the regional heterogeneity of China (Xu 
et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2008), thus increasing local communities’ input has 
been suggested in program design and implementation in order to adapt to 
local environmental and economic contexts (Bennett 2008). Although the 
possibilities of farmers’ reconverting forestland back to farmland after the 
current SLCP contract expiries have been widely reported in literature 
(Uchida, Xu and Rozelle 2005; Cao et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2009b; Wang 
and Maclaren 2012; Song et al. 2014a; Yang and Xu 2014), a few studies 
have further investigated what adjustment in annual payment, contract 
length or other program attributes  the local households prefer to continue 
with SLCP. As for the only two Stated Preference/choice studies 
investigating this issue, shortcomings are not negligible.  
. Moreover, as gradient 
is a highly influential factor to land productivity, the income received from flat 
(unqualified) land can be substantially higher than that from sloping land 
(Yang and Xu 2014). It could be misleading to examine SLCP’s impact on 
farmers’ livelihood by comparing the unqualified farmers and participant 
farmers disregarding the topographic characteristics of their land (Uchida et 
al. 2007; Li et al. 2011). A better strategy is to exclude unqualified farmers 
from the survey and compare the participant farmers and those who have 
qualified sloping land but did not take part in the SLCP.  
As reviewed above, Chen et al. (2009a)’s study provided interesting insight 
that social norms (neighbour behaviour of reconverting or keeping enrolled 
                                            
19
 Only land with gradient larger than 25 degrees in the south of China or 15 
degrees in the north is qualified for the SLCP. 
20
 No studies clarified that they only included those truly “unwilling farmers” 
as non-participant farmers in analysis, nor have they discussed the 
possibility of the fundamental change in land qualification, so it is very 
likely that they have indeed overlooked this issue. 
- 29 - 
forestland after the current SLCP expires) could play an important role in 
farmers’ post-program land use decisions, but they overlooked another 
important program attribute of SLCP, i.e. the percentage of economic trees 
allowed to be planted in the enrolled sloping land, which were proved be 
significantly influential on farmers’ choices by Grosjean and Kontoleon 
(2009). Moreover, incorporating neighbour behaviour in the policy scenario 
is useful to reveal interesting insights but cannot provide practical policy 
suggestions since neighbour behaviour is not adjustable by policy makers of 
SLCP. With regard to Grosjean and Kontoleon (2009)’s study, they excluded 
another important program attribute, namely contract length, from policy 
scenarios and arbitrarily fixed it at 30 years. Such research design lost the 
ability to reveal farmers’ preference for different contract lengths which is 
useful information for designing more flexible SLCP. Additionally, it is also 
arguable that Grosjean and Kontoleon (2009) adopted the assured delivery 
of program payment as one of the program attributes. Unduly and 
incomplete delivery of contracted payment should be considered as a 
problem in program implementation instead of an attribute of program 
design. It is not surprising that farmers would forgo some stated amount of 
payment to ensure the delivery of certain less payment, but asking farmers 
to trade-off program payment and assured delivery is less informative than 
revealing the trade-off between payment and contract length if the study 
aims at providing policy suggestions to improve the design of SLCP.      
The review and discussion in this section indicate that the limitations of 
existing studies on SLCP call for: 1) updating case studies, especially in the 
overlooked province/regions; 2) better examination on the effect of the SLCP 
on participants’ livelihood and 3) further studies of farmers households’ 
preference for the design of SLCP.   
2.4 Non-market Valuation Methods for WTP and Choice 
Modelling Studies  
The previous three sections review the origin and development of PES, the 
Chinese indigenous policy instrument of Ecological Compensation which has 
a similar idea to PES and the existing literature of SLCP, the largest PES 
program in China. These sections serve as the policy context of this study. 
This section focuses on the literature regarding the methodological aspect of 
this study.  
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2.4.1 Major Economic Valuation Methods for Ecosystem Services 
As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, this study aims to investigate 
public WTP for water protection. WTP is a welfare measure of the monetary 
value of ecosystem service, thus the methods for estimating WTP belong to 
the family of economic (monetary) valuation methods. The history of 
economic valuation for environmental goods/services can be traced back to 
the 1960s (Liu et al. 2010). Since then, a number of valuation methods have 
been developed. Generally, these methods can be classified into two 
groups, i.e. the Revealed Preferences Methods and the Stated Preferences 
Methods. 
The Revealed Preferences Methods infer people’s WTP for ecosystem 
services’ values from their behaviours in real or surrogate markets (Pearce 
and Seccombe-Hett 2000). Major revealed preferences methods include the 
Hedonic Pricing Method and the Travel Cost Method. The Hedonic Pricing 
Method reveals the values of ecosystem services through the prices people 
pay for other goods in the market which are associated to the valued 
services (Farber, Costanza and Wilson 2002). For example, it is common to 
use this method to value local environmental resources such as aesthetic 
views and urban wetlands through the variations in housing prices (Mahan, 
Polasky and Adams 2000; Birol, Karousakis and Koundouri 2006). However, 
if the service is provided far away from the consumer like the case of this 
study, its value can hardly be captured by this method. The Travel Cost 
Method estimates the values of recreational sites/amenities by the cost 
people pay to visit them (Farber, Costanza and Wilson 2002). As indicated 
by its name, this method cannot be used to value the ecosystem services 
that do not involve any travel.  
On the other hand, the Stated Preference Methods elicit people’s WTP for 
ecosystem services through hypothetical survey questions, and they can be 
used to value ecosystem services that cannot be traded in either real or 
surrogate markets (Birol, Karousakis and Koundouri 2006). Therefore, the 
stated preference methods are also referred to as Non-market valuation 
methods. Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments are two major non-
market valuation methods and they are introduced as follows. 
2.4.2 Contingent Valuation 
Contingent Valuation constructs hypothetical scenarios to ask how much 
people are willing to pay (accept) for a certain increase/decrease in 
ecosystem services (Portney 1994; Carson 2000; Carson and Hanemann 
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2005). After nearly 50 years of development, the Contingent Valuation 
Method has become a widely accepted economic valuation method. In the 
U.S., it has become a standard tool in institutional decision-making for large-
scale infrastructure projects at both the federal and state level. In Europe it 
has regularly been used since the 1980s. Contingent Valuation studies have 
also been used in developing countries such as the Philippines since the 
early 1990s  (Bateman, Willis and Arrow 2002).  
In comparison, Contingent Valuation studies in China did not appear in the 
literature until the early 2000s (Xu et al. 2003). This may be attributed to the 
different socio-economic context of China, where the market economy was 
only kick-started by the “Open and Reform” policy in 1978. Both policy 
makers and the public were unfamiliar with and even suspicious of the idea 
of using surveys to assign monetary values on public goods. However, in the 
past decade, China has witnessed an accelerated reform toward market 
economy after joining the World Trade Organization, a growing awareness 
of public participation in policy making and the development of ecosystem 
services valuation study in academia (Liu and Costanza 2010). Some 
researchers have started to conduct Contingent Valuation surveys to 
investigate individuals’ or households’ WTP for urban green spaces (Chen, 
Bao and Zhu 2006; Chen and Jim 2008; Chen and Jim 2011), biodiversity 
conservation (Chen and Jim 2010), air quality improvement (Wang and 
Mullahy 2006; Wang and Zhang 2009; Du and Mendelsohn 2011; Yu and 
Abler 2010; Hammitt and Zhou 2006), water pollution reduction in lakes 
(Zhen et al. 2011), ground water preservation (Wei et al. 2007), protection of 
natural reserves (Han et al. 2011), and health insurance (Barnighausen et al. 
2007; Ying et al. 2007).  
These studies have, to some extent, demonstrated the applicability of using 
Contingent Valuation for cost-benefit analysis and providing policy 
suggestions in the context of China. However, there are gaps in the 
literature. Firstly, many studies have used payment cards or open-ended 
questions to elicit respondents’ WTP, rather than the closed-ended 
referendum form of questions which are more reliable (Arrow et al. 1993a; 
Carson 2000; Hoyos and Mariel 2010). Secondly, the study areas of these 
studies were confined to a few cities (such as Beijing and Guangzhou) and 
regions despite China’s vast territory and significant income differences 
between different regions. Thirdly, only a few  existing studies have been 
based on real environmental initiatives to produce results that are of high 
relevance to policy making. Therefore, there is a need for more careful 
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designed case studies to examine the heterogeneity in residents’ WTP in 
multiple study sites.  
Particular focus is given to Contingent Valuation studies on water quality 
improvement (summarized in Table 2.1) in China.  
   
Table 2.1 WTP Studies on Water Quality Improvement in China   
 
Study Time of Survey Valued Services 
Wang et al. 
(2013a) 
2007 
Rural households’ WTP for improving water quality 
of two major local rivers from Grade IV a to Grade 
III, Yunnan Province, Southwest China 
Wang et al. 
(2013b) 
2007 
Rural and urban households’ WTP for improving 
water quality of Puzhehei Lake from Grade III to 
Grade II, Yunnan Province, Southwest China 
Zhao et al. 
(2013) 
2008 Urban households’ WTP for restoring ecosystem services of a urban river in Shanghai, East China a 
Zhang (2011) 2008 
Urban households’ WTP for improving water 
quality of Tai Lake (reaching at least Grade IV), 
East China 
Jiang, Jin and 
Lin (2011) 
2009 
Urban households’ WTP for ensuring water quality 
of upstream Min River at Grade III, Fujian 
Province, Southeast China  
Shang et al. 
(2012) 
2011 Urban households’ WTP for improving river network c, Shanghai, East China 
 
a  Surface water quality is classified into Grade I to V in China and Grade I is the 
highest water quality. Water used for tap water should be at Grade III or above.  
 
Interestingly, none of these studies were conducted in North China, perhaps 
because water quantity is a more pressing issue in North China while water 
quality is a more urgent issue in South China. Therefore, this study can also 
increase the knowledge of residents’ WTP for water protection in the north of 
China. The estimated WTP in these studies will be used to compare with the 
results of this study in Chapter 6. 
2.4.3 Choice Experiments 
Choice Experiment is a relatively new tool in the family of non-market 
valuation methods, which can be seen as an extension or variant of the 
traditional Contingent Valuation method. This method has its roots in 
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Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value, the random utility theory and 
experimental design (Adamowicz et al. 1998; Louviere, Hensher and Swait 
2000). In a Choice Experiment survey, respondents are asked to choose 
between different bundles of (environmental) goods, which are described in 
terms of their attributes/characteristics and the levels they take. One of these 
attributes is usually price. By repeating such choices and varying attribute 
levels, the researcher can infer the useful information of the implied ranking 
of these attributes, the marginal WTP for an increase or decrease in any 
significant attribute, and the implied WTP for a program which changes more 
than one attribute simultaneously.  
Choice Experiments was thought to be first introduced into environmental 
research by Adamowicz, Louviere and Williams (1994) from marketing and 
transportation research areas. In the past 15 years, the CE method has 
been used in valuing ecosystem services or environmental protection 
activities including inter alia recreational hunting (Boxall et al. 1996) and 
climbing (Hanley, Wright and Koop 2002), ecotourism (Hearne and Salinas 
2002), forest and wildlife protection (Adamowicz et al. 1998), fisheries 
management (Wattage, Mardle and Pascoe 2005), wetland management 
(Birol and Cox 2007), water supply (Scarpa, Willis and Acutt 2007), 
improvement of river ecology (Hanley, Wright and Alvarez-Farizo 2006) and 
landscape (Scarpa, Campbell and Hutchinson 2007). 
Generally speaking, the existing Choice Experiments studies focused on the 
demand side of ecosystem services but largely overlooked the supply side of 
ecosystem services, i.e. what do farmers want from environmental schemes 
that are designed to ensure the provision of ecosystem services (Espinosa-
Goded, Barreiro-Hurle and Ruto 2010). A few  examples can be found in 
recent literature (Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Ruto and Garrod 2009), but much 
more efforts are needed to fill this gap.  
Detailed introduction and explanation of the economic models used for 
Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments will be provided in Chapter 3. 
2.5 A Missing Bridge between Non-market Valuation and PES 
Studies  
As reviewed in the “history” section, non-market valuation has played an 
important role in researchers’ efforts to tackle environmental externalities 
and in the conceptualization of ES which led to the development of PES. 
While non-market valuation attempts to place monetary value on ES which 
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are not priced in conventional markets, PES programs endeavour to create a 
new market wherein those ES are bought by beneficiaries from providers. 
Theoretically, a PES program is feasible to improve the total social welfare 
only if the beneficiaries’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the ES exceeds the 
payment that providers are willing to accept. Consequently, non-market 
valuation which can be used both in the demand-side for WTP (benefit) 
estimate and the supply-side for payment (cost) estimates can contribute to: 
1) assessing the feasibility and welfare effect of PES programs with cost-
benefit analysis, 2) providing guidance for determining payments amount in 
PES programs, and 3) targeting ES providers with low required payment 
(cost) and thus improving efficiency of PES programs (Whittington and 
Pagiola 2012; Ferraro 2011).   
It is thus logical to suppose that non-market valuation is extensively applied 
in PES programs and studies. However, the fact is rather opposite. As 
Pattanayak, Wunder et al. (2010) noticed, despite the importance of 
estimating potential ES consumers’ WTP and revealing how to induce them 
to pay for PES, there is almost no overlap of the non-market valuation and 
PES literatures. Most non-market valuation studies are not linked to real 
policy contexts and thus provide results with limited policy implication 
(Ferraro et al. 2012). Ferraro (2011) argued that it is a waste of effort to 
estimate ES values disconnected from real policies or programs since 
people are actually interested in understanding the benefits of environmental 
initiatives securing ES provision rather than the benefits of the ES itself.  
In real PES program implementation, non-market valuation has rarely been 
used to determine payment amount either (Liu et al. 2010). In user-financed 
programs, payment amount is typically negotiated by the beneficiaries and 
providers, which can be reasonable as it reflects Coase’s theory of solving 
the externalities problem by voluntary transactions. In government-financed 
PES programs, payment amount is usually set based on implicit or explicit 
estimated opportunity costs of providing ES instead of the estimated ES 
values (Ferraro 2011; Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 2008). Liu, Costanza et al. 
(2010) contested this cost-based approach as it is prone to result in 
underpayment and thus fail to attract potential ES providers in important 
conservation areas, which is the case in the UK’s Environmental 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas program and the US’s Conservation 
Reserve Program. They also argued that many PES programs are based on 
shaky scientific foundation without guidance from ES valuation study, and 
- 35 - 
applying a benefit-based approach supported by non-market valuation is a 
future direction of PES.  
Clearly, there is a missing bridge between the non-market valuation and 
PES studies in literature which impedes the future development of the two 
research areas. Although studies applying non-market valuation in the 
context of PES programs are emerging recently (Van Hecken, Bastiaensen 
and Vasquez 2012; Moreno-Sanchez et al. 2012), substantial efforts of more 
empirical studies are in great need to fill the literature gap. By applying non-
market valuation on both the demand and supply sides of potential PES 
schemes, this study is promising to contribute to building this missing bridge. 
2.6 Summary  
This chapter provides a literature review for this research. The review of the 
origin and development of PES shows PES is a promising policy instrument 
to tackle the problem of market failure (externality) and it has been widely 
applied for watershed protection. Reflections on the controversies over PES 
indicates that the distributional effects (such as effect on participants’ 
livelihood) is one of the focal issues in PES studies, and increasing the 
public input such as consultation with farmer households is helpful to 
improve the design of PES and take account of its distributional effect. The 
Chinese version of PES, Ecological Compensation (EC), also aims to use 
economic measures to tackle the externality problem in environmental 
protection and apply the Principle of Beneficiary Pays. In most cases, PES 
and EC are interchangeable.  
Review of the existing SLCP studies found that: 1) updating case studies, 
especially in the overlooked province/regions, 2) better examination on the 
effect of the SLCP on participants’ livelihood and 3) further studies of 
farmers households’ preference for the design of SLCP are needed to 
overcome the limitations of the current SLCP studies. They have also 
inspired the design of this research. 
The Revealed Preference Methods and Stated Preference Methods are two 
major classes of economic valuation methods for estimating the monetary 
values of ecosystem services. This research chose the Contingent Valuation 
and Choice Experiments methods, which belong to the Stated Preference 
Methods, because water protection in the water supply area can hardly be 
reflected by any market behaviours of the residents in the northern cities. 
Lastly, the missing bridge between the non-market valuation and PES 
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studies in literature justifies the research aim and design of this study. 
Detailed explanation of the econometric model used in Contingent Valuation 
and Choice Experiments will be provided in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
The last chapter discusses the importance of Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) in tackling conservation issues like watershed protection and 
the necessity of bridging the gap between non-market valuation and PES 
studies. This chapter depicts the survey design and modelling methods used 
in this study to apply non-market valuation to develop PES for water 
protection from both the demand (consumer) and supply (provider) 
perspectives.  The contents of this chapter are arranged as follows: Section 
3.1 describes the survey design and implementation of the Contingent 
Valuation study in the four cities along the middle route project to investigate 
urban residents’ WTP for water protection. Section 3.2 explains the 
econometric models used in the Contingent Valuation study. Section 3.3 
describes the procedure designed in this study to integrate the automatic 
model selection techniques and manual adjustment for model construction 
and refinement in Contingent Valuation. Section 3.4 describes the design of 
the Choice Experiments survey in the water supply area to reveal farmer 
households’ preferences for the design of water protection programs. 
Section 3.5 explains the econometric models used in the choice experiments 
study. Lastly, Section 3.6 provides a summary of this chapter.    
3.1 Contingent Valuation Survey in Northern Cities 
3.1.1 Four Cities in the Contingent Valuation Survey 
Contingent Valuation is a non-market valuation method that uses surveys to 
elicit respondents’ WTP for specified public goods/services (Portney 1994; 
Carson 2000; Carson and Hanemann 2005). In this study, four cities along 
the middle route of the SNWTP, i.e. Beijing (the capital of China), Tianjin 
(one of the four municipalities of China), Shijiazhuang (the capital of Hebei 
Province) and Zhengzhou (the capital of Henan Province), were chosen to 
conduct the Contingent Valuation survey in order to investigate urban 
residents’ WTP for water protection (Figure 3.1). As four of the most 
important cities in the north of China, they will be the priority of the future 
supply of the transferred water. Among the four cities, Beijing has been 
supplied with transferred water since 2008 by a northern section of the 
middle route project which was completed before the whole middle route 
project in order to secure the water supply of the Beijing Olympic Games. 
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Tianjin has relied on transferred water from the adjacent Hebei Province 
through an earlier water transfer project since the 1980s. Shijiazhuang and 
Zhengzhou have not been supplied by any transferred water so far.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Four Cities in the Contingent Valuation Survey 
Map adapted from Wei et al. (2010a), P2501 
 
Table 3.1 presents the characteristics of the four cities. In general, there are 
considerable differences between the four cities. The disposable income per 
capita is highest in Beijing (32,903 yuan/year) and lowest in Shijiazhuang 
(20,534 yuan/year). The current domestic water price is highest in Tianjin 
(4.40 yuan/m3) and lowest in Zhengzhou (2.40 yuan/m3). The daily water 
consumption per capita is highest in Beijing (173 litre) and lowest in 
Zhengzhou (109 litre). While the industry sector accounts for 27.8% of the 
GDP of Beijing, they account for about half of the GDP of the other three 
cities. This heterogeneity of the four cities enabled them to represent a wide 
spectrum of cities along the middle route of SNWTP, so the results of this 
study could also have implications in a wider context for other cities. 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the Four Cities 
City Characteristic Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Zhengzhou 
Area (million hectare) 1.64 1.18 1.58 0.74 
Population (million)  17.55 12.28 9.77 7.52 
Disposal Income per Capita 
(yuan/year)  32,903 26,921 20,534 21,612 
Domestic Water Price (yuan/m3) 4.00 4.40 3.63 2.40 
Daily Water Consumption per 
Capita (litre) a 173 129 124 109 
Agriculture in % of GDP 1.3 2.7 12.7 3.8 
Industry in % of GDP 27.8 57.1 48.4 53.2 
Service in % of GDP 70.9 40.2 38.9 43.0 
Data source: the online database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China for 
the year 2012. GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
a Since the data of Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou are not available, the provincial 
data are presented here. 
 
3.1.2 Survey Sampling and Implementation 
There is no definite rule for the sample size of Contingent Valuation studies 
since it is subject to resources/budget and time constraints and the specific 
research questions and contexts. As a rule of thumb, it was suggested to 
have no less than 200 individuals or households to obtain reliable estimates 
of WTP (Loomis and Walsh 1997; Xu et al. 2003; Wei et al. 2007). A group 
of local undergraduate students were recruited in each city to conduct the 
survey as they were familiar with the city and spoke local dialects, which 
made it much easier to communicate with local residents and gain their trust 
and cooperation. The sample size for each city in this study aimed to follow 
the above-mentioned rule of thumb but was also subject to the number of 
interviewers that were successfully recruited for the survey. Accordingly, the 
final plan was to survey 200 questionnaires in Beijing, 250 in Tianjin, 100 in 
Shijiazhuang and 200 in Zhengzhou.   
This study was carefully prepared with two rounds of pilot surveys. A 
preliminary survey was conducted at the early stage of this study in August 
2010 with 50 questionnaires in each city in order to examine the feasibility of 
such a WTP study in these cities and the approximate range of the increase 
in water price that would be accepted by the residents. Then a pilot survey 
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was conducted in January 2011 to test the questionnaire, especially the 
design and phrasing of the WTP question. After careful refinement of the 
survey design, the final survey was conducted in January and February 
2012. In the end, a total of 755 questionnaires were successfully collected 
from the four cities, including 200 questionnaires in Beijing, 247 in Tianjin, 98 
in Shijiazhuang and 210 in Zhengzhou. The extra 10 questionnaires in 
Zhengzhou were collected in a recently developed urban district in this city 
taking the suggestion from the local interviewers.  
Person-to-Person interviews were conducted by the trained interviewers with 
the local residents. The survey was individual-based (but no more than one 
person was interviewed from the same household) rather than household-
based since the estimated mean WTP can be conveniently used to calculate 
the WTP at the household and city levels using the data of household size, 
the population of water users and water consumption per capita in each city. 
Additionally, the data of average household water consumption was not 
available for use in this study, and  it was extremely difficult in those cities to 
conduct in-house survey due to the entry control in many residential areas 
and the problem of distrust.     
Clustered random sampling was applied in this survey based on the 
population of different administrative districts of the four cities. The number 
of respondents in each district was proportionate to the population in the 
district. Sampling locations included, inter alia, public squares, parks and 
resting areas of shopping centres where the respondents were more likely to 
have the leisure to complete the interviews of 10-15 minutes. The specific 
sampling locations in each district were decided by the interviewers who are 
familiar with the local settings. In each sampling location, generally 6-12 
respondents21
 
 were randomly chosen. During the final survey in 2012, the 
interviewers reported the progress every day so that the sampling locations 
were marked onto maps and necessary adjustment could be made in time. 
The final distributions of sampling locations in the four cities are shown in 
Figure 3.2-3.5. A satellite map was used for Zhengzhou in order to better 
display the outline of its urban area, while the normal type of map was used 
for the other three cities.  
                                            
21
 There were 6 designed increments in water price in this survey to elicit 
residents’ WTP for water protection which will be explained in the next 
section.   
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Figure 3.2 Sampling Locations in Beijing (200 questionnaires) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Sampling Locations in Tianjin (249 questionnaires) 
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Figure 3.4 Sampling Locations in Shijiazhuang (98 questionnaires) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Sampling Locations in Zhengzhou (210 questionnaires) 
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3.1.3 Questionnaire Design of the Contingent Valuation Survey 
Following the suggestions on the design of Contingent Valuation surveys 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989; Arrow et al. 1993b; Carson 2000; Carson and 
Hanemann 2005; Whittington and Pagiola 2012), the questionnaire used in 
this survey was composed of three sections. The first section asked 
questions about the respondents’ environmental awareness, knowledge and 
opinions regarding the water transfer project, the idea of Ecological 
Compensation (i.e. paying for the service of water protection in the context 
of this survey) and other water-related issues (detailed questions can be 
referred to in Appendix 1). These questions provided useful information that 
helped to explain respondents’ answers to the policy scenario/proposal of 
levying a higher water price in the northern cities for funding the water 
protection of the water transfer project. 
In order to help the respondents to fully understand the Contingent Valuation 
scenario, background information of the water transfer project, the water 
quality protection of the Danjiangkou Reservoir and the funding problem of 
the governmental water protection plan (i.e. The Plan of Water Pollution 
Control and Soil Conservation in Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream 
Areas) was briefly introduced to the respondents with illustrative pictures 
(Appendix 1) after they completed the questions in the first section.  
The second section of the questionnaire contained two questions eliciting 
the respondents’ willingness to pay a higher water price for water protection 
(which will be referred to as the WTP question for simplicity). The first WTP 
question was carefully phrased as below. 
 
In order to overcome the funding problem in the long-term, it has been 
proposed to establish an Ecological Compensation scheme between the 
water supply areas and the cities which will benefit from the water quality 
protection, such as appropriately increasing the water price in those cities to 
supplement the funding for water quality protection. Some people think it is a 
good idea while others think it is not. Obviously, too much increase in water 
price will have impact on residents’ spending in other aspects, while too little 
increase offers very limited help to solve the problem. We would like to hear 
your opinion on this issue.  
If the water price increases (       ) yuan/m3 for funding the implementation of 
“The Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in Danjiangkou 
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Reservoir and Upstream Areas” to ensure the reservoir’s water quality 
maintaining at Class II, are you willing to pay? 
Reminder22
A. Yes         B. No       C. I am not sure     D. I don’t know  
: (1) the current water price in Beijing is 4 yuan/m3; (2) according 
to the data from the National Statistics Bureau, a resident in Beijing 
generally consumes approximately 70m3 of domestic water per year.  
 
Particular measures following the suggestion in the literature (Carson 2000; 
Carson and Hanemann 2005; Whittington and Pagiola 2012) were taken in 
phrasing the WTP question in order to reduce the survey bias. The 
statement “Some people think it is a good idea while others think it is not.” 
was to reduce the moral stress that the respondents might feel to show their 
reluctance to contribute to the water protection. The statement “too much 
increase in water price will have impact on residents’ spending in other 
aspects while too little increase offers very limited help to solve the problem” 
was to remind the respondents of the income constraints in case they inflate 
their WTP beyond their real capacities and, on the other hand, maintain 
neutrality by reminding the respondents about the possible consequence of 
understating their real WTP.  
The reminder in the WTP questions provided the respondents with the 
information of the current water price and the approximate average amount 
of water that an individual consumed each year so that the respondents 
could have a better idea about the implication of the proposed increase in 
water price. Moreover, the options C and D (“Not sure” and I don’t know), 
were used to distinguish respondents who were unable to make the decision 
at that moment from those who truly rejected the offered increase in water 
price. Responses to these two options were excluded from econometric 
analysis to ensure the reliability of WTP estimate 23
The specific increment of water price that was presented in the parenthesis 
in the WTP question was chosen by the interviewers from the following six 
values: 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 0.80, 1.00 and 1.50 yuan/m3. These values were 
determined based on the guidance in the literature, the result of the pilot 
survey and the recent increases in water price in the four cities.  
. 
                                            
22
  Contents of the reminder varied in the questionnaires for different cities.   
23
 As a result, although four options were provided in the WTP question, it 
could still be seen as a dichotomous (yes/no) question. 
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Firstly, it was suggested in the literature that four to six design values which 
cover the quartiles of the expected WTP distribution were usually preferred 
to produce efficient and robust WTP estimates (Alberini 1995; Carson and 
Hanemann 2005). Secondly, a similar Contingent Valuation study in 
Southeast China found that urban residents were willing to pay an increase 
of 0.21- 0.51 yuan/m3 in water price for reducing river pollution (Jiang, Jin 
and Lin 2011). Thirdly, the pilot survey showed that the mean WTP of 
residents in the four cities might range from 0.2 to 1.0 yuan/m3. Lastly, the 
recent rises in the water price of the four cities were 0.3 yuan/m3 in Beijing 
(in 2009) and 0.5 yuan/m3 in both Tianjin (in 2010) and Shijiazhuang (in 
2008) due to the rising cost of tap water and waste water treatment, while 
the water price of Zhengzhou has not changed since 2007. All this 
information provided the guidance and benchmark for determining the six 
increments of water price to elicit respondents’ WTP in this study.  
In the survey, each respondent was randomly offered with one of the six 
increments and each increment was randomly assigned to approximate 
equal number of respondents. The probabilities of respondents’ yes/no 
answers to different increments were later used to estimate their mean WTP 
for water resource protection by multiple econometric models that will be 
explained in the next section.  
The second WTP question was asked to the respondents depending on their 
answers to the first WTP question. If they answered yes, the second WTP 
question would offer them the immediately larger increment in the six values, 
otherwise the immediately smaller increment would be offered in the second 
WTP question. For the lower and upper bounds of the six increments, if the 
respondents refused the increase of 0.10 yuan/m3 in the first place, 0.05 
yuan/m3 would be offered in the second WTP question. And if the 
respondents accepted 1.5 yuan/m3 in the first WTP question, 2.00 yuan/m3 
would be offered in the following question. 
The final section of the questionnaire collected respondents’ demographic 
information such as age, income and education level. The demographic 
information, together with respondents’ environmental awareness, 
knowledge and opinions collected in the first section of the questionnaire, 
were treated as explanatory variables for modelling respondents’ answers to 
the WTP questions. Details of these explanatory variables will be introduced 
in Section 3.3.   
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3.2 Econometric Models for Contingent Valuation 
Econometric models used for Contingent Valuation surveys with 
dichotomous choices (yes/no) can be classified into parametric models and 
non-parametric models (Bateman, Willis and Arrow 2001; Haab and 
McConnell 2002; Carson and Hanemann 2005; Akram and Olmstead 2011). 
When parametric models are applied, the probability of yes answer is 
assumed to follow certain statistic distribution (e.g. logistic or normal 
distribution), and parameters (coefficients) of explanatory variables are 
estimated in order to calculate respondents’ mean WTP. When non-
parametric models are applied, no probability distribution assumption is 
needed and the mean WTP is calculated only with the information of the 
offered prices and respondents’ yes/no answers. The parametric models not 
only calculate the respondents’ mean WTP but also explore the explanatory 
variables’ influence on the WTP. But non-parametric models also exhibit the 
merit of simplicity (Haab and McConnell 2002). Since both of the two types 
of models have their merits, they are both applied in this study to estimate 
respondents’ mean WTP for water protection.  
3.2.1 Non-parametric Model for Contingent Valuation 
The non-parametric model used in this study followed the elaboration by 
Haab and McConnel (2002). Consider a random sample of T respondents in 
a dichotomous choice Contingent Valuation survey, each respondent is 
offered one of the M different prices indexed as tj | j = 1, 2, …, M. Denote 
WTPi as the ith respondent’s WTP, a yes answer to the offered price tj 
means WTPi ≥ tj, while a no answer means WTPi < tj. The respondent’s 
WTP cannot be directly observed in the dichotomous choice survey (since 
only yes/no answers are obtained), but can be treated as a random variable 
with an unknown cumulative distribution function FWTP(•), namely the 
probability that WTP is less than a certain value. Then the probability that 
respondent j has the WTP less than price tj (answering no to tj) is Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 < 𝑡𝑗� =  𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑡𝑗)                                                                         (3.1) 
Accordingly, the probability of yes answer is 1 - FWTP (tj). The M different 
prices divide the full sample T into M subsamples {𝑇 =  𝑇1, 𝑇2, … 𝑇𝑚}. The 
yes and no answers can be indexed as �𝑌 =  𝑌𝑗| 𝑗 = 1, 2, … ,𝑀� and �𝑁 = 𝑁𝑗| 𝑗 = 1, 2, … ,𝑀}, where Yj is the number of yes answers to the price tj and 
Nj is the number of no answers. As Haab and Mcconnell (2002) explained, if 
the sample is randomly chosen and the prices are randomly assigned, the 
probability of observing the number of Yj yes answers from the subsample Tj 
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can be interpreted as the probability of observing Yj success outcomes in the 
number of Tj Bernoulli trials24
 Pr�𝑌𝑗 � 𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃�𝑡𝑗�,𝑇𝑗) = � 𝑇𝑗𝑌𝑗�  𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃�𝑡𝑗�𝑁𝑗(1 −  𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑡𝑗))𝑌𝑗                            (3.2) 
 with the success probability of 1 - FWTP (tj). 
where � 𝑇𝑗𝑌𝑗� = 𝑇𝑗!𝑌𝑗!(𝑇𝑗−𝑌𝑗)! is the number of combinations (possible cases) that 
Yj yes answers can occur in the random sub-sample of Tj respondents. 
Denote FWTP (tj) as Fj for simplicity. It is this unknown distribution Fj that 
needs to be estimated to calculate respondents’ mean WTP. For doing this, 
Fj is considered as an unknown parameter of the likelihood (probability) 
function of observing Yj yes answers from the subsample Tj. And the aim is 
to find the value of Fj that maximizes the following likelihood function. 
𝐿(𝐹𝑗| 𝑌𝑗 ,𝑁𝑗 ,𝑇𝑗)  =  � 𝑇𝑗𝑌𝑗�  𝐹𝑗𝑁𝑗(1 −  𝐹𝑗)𝑌𝑗                                                        (3.3) 
The combination term has no unknown parameter to be estimated, and the 
likelihood function can be transformed into the log-likelihood function for 
simplicity.  ln L =  𝑁𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝐹𝑗 +  𝑌𝑗 𝑙𝑛(1 −  𝐹𝑗)                                                                    (3.4)  
The value of Fj that maximizes this log-likelihood function is the value that 
makes the derivative of Equation 3.4 equal to zero. 
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝐿
𝜕 𝐹𝑗 =  𝑁𝑗𝐹𝑗 −  𝑌𝑗(1− 𝐹𝑗) = 0                                                                            (3.5) 
Equation 3.5 yields the maximum likelihood estimate of Fj.  
𝐹𝑗 =  𝑁𝑗 𝑇𝑗⁄                                                                                                   (3.6)  
That is to say, the maximum likelihood estimate of the probability that a 
randomly chosen respondent has the WTP less than the given price just 
equals to the proportion of no answer in that subsample.        
In principal, the proportion of no answers should monotonically increase with 
the increase in prices, namely respondents are more likely to say no to 
higher prices (Fj ≤ Fj+1). However, this monotonicity may not hold in practice 
due to imperfect prices design and survey implementation, resulting in the 
situation of Fj > Fj+1. In this case, the violation of monotonicity needs to be 
“smoothed” to ensure the validity of the cumulative distribution function of 
                                            
24
 Bernoulli trials refer to random experiments with only two possible 
outcomes (success/failure) such as the experiment of coin flips (and see 
how many coins landed with the side of head). 
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the WTP. A conservative smoothing method is to combine the jth and (j+1)th 
subsamples into a pooled subsample 𝑇𝑗∗ and discard the (j+1)th price as 
shown below (Turnbull 1976; Haab and Hicks 1997; Haab and McConnell 
2002; Akram and Olmstead 2011). 
 𝐹𝑗
∗ =  𝑁𝑗+ 𝑁𝑗+1
𝑇𝑗+ 𝑇𝑗+1 =  𝑁𝑗∗ 𝑇𝑗∗⁄                                                                            (3.7) 
This pooling procedure is repeated until the monotonicity of 𝐹𝑗∗is ensured. 
Then the monotonic 𝐹𝑗∗ can be used to calculate the mean (expected value) 
of WTP according to the mathematic definition of expected values.  
𝐸(𝑊𝑇𝑃) =  ∫ 𝑊 𝑑𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃(∙)𝑈0                                                                          (3.8) 
where U is the upper bound of the range of WTP. The whole range of WTP 
is portioned into M*+1 sub-ranges {0~𝑡1, 𝑡1~𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑀∗~𝑈} by the M* offered 
prices (the superscription * means the monotonicity of the proportion of no 
responses has been ensured). Then Equation 3.8 can be rewritten as 
𝐸(𝑊𝑇𝑃) =  ∑ �∫ 𝑊 𝑑𝐹𝑊𝑇𝑃(∙)𝑡𝑗+1∗𝑡𝑗∗ �𝑀∗𝑗=0 .                                                      (3.9)          
This is the sum of the integral of WTP with respect to the probability that the 
WTP falls within each sub-range (𝑡𝑗∗~𝑡𝑗+1∗ ). By assuming that the WTP falls 
at the lower bound (𝑡𝑗∗) in each sub-range, a conservative estimate of the 
mean WTP is 
𝐸𝐿𝐵(𝑊𝑇𝑃) =  ∑ 𝑡𝑗(𝐹𝑗+1∗ −  𝐹𝑗∗)𝑀∗𝑗=0                                                            (3.10) 
where t0 = 0, 𝑡1 … 𝑡𝑀∗ are the M* offered prices after the smoothing 
procedure. In order to calculate Equation 3.10, it is reasonable to set  𝐹0∗ = 0 
and 𝐹𝑀∗+ 1∗ = 1, which means no respondent answers no to the price 0 and 
everyone answers no to the upper bound of WTP (𝑡𝑀∗+1 = 𝑈). This upper 
bound of WTP does not need to be specified because for the last sub-range 
of WTP 𝑡𝑀∗~𝑈, the lower bound value 𝑡𝑀∗(namely the highest offered price) 
is used for the conservative estimate. 
Moreover, as Haab and McConnell (2002) explained, the variance of this 
lower bound estimate of the mean WTP is 
𝑉�𝐸𝐿𝐵(𝑊𝑇𝑃)� = ∑ 𝐹𝑗∗�1−𝐹𝑗∗�𝑇𝑗∗𝑀∗𝑗=1 (𝑡𝑗∗ − 𝑡𝑗−1∗ )2                                            (3.11) 
The 95% confidence interval of the lower bound mean WTP can be readily 
calculated using the mean and variance calculated by Equation 3.10 and 
3.11.  
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3.2.2 Parametric Models for Contingent Valuation 
Unlike the non-parametric models which only use the proportions of yes/no 
answers to different offered prices to calculate the WTP, parametric models 
incorporate other explanatory variables such as respondents’ characteristics 
to model the probability of their yes answers to the WTP question and 
calculate the mean WTP with the estimated parameters (coefficients). 
Generally, there are two fundamental approaches of constructing parametric 
models for Contingent Valuation studies, namely the Random Utility Model 
elaborated by Hanemann (1984), and the Random WTP Model proposed by 
Cameron (1988).  Both of the two approaches are introduced as follows, and 
explanation is given on why the latter was preferred and adopted in this 
study.  
3.2.2.1 Random Utility Model 
The Random Utility Model interprets respondents’ answers to the WTP 
question as the result of their comparison of the underlying utility of two 
circumstances, i.e. the status quo and the valuation scenario of paying the 
offered price for the specified ecosystem service. The utility that respondent j 
derives from a specified circumstance Uij is assumed to consist of a 
deterministic, observable component Vij and a random, unobservable error 
component ɛij. 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                         (3.12) 
where i = 1 if the respondent answers yes to the offered price tj, and i = 0 if 
he/she answers no. It is reasonable to suppose that the respondent would 
answer yes only if U1j > U0j. So the probability of yes answer is P r�yesj� =  Pr�𝑉1𝑗 +  𝜀1𝑗 >  𝑉0𝑗 +  𝜀0𝑗�                                                      (3.13) 
which can be rewritten as  P r�yesj� = Pr�𝜀1𝑗 − 𝜀0𝑗 > −(𝑉1𝑗− 𝑉0𝑗)�                                                    (3.14)                                 
Define the difference between the two random components as ɛj = ɛ1j - ɛ0j, 
and denote the change in utility as ∆V = V1j – V0j. Equation 3.14 becomes 
 P r�yesj� = Pr(𝜀𝑗 > −∆𝑉) = 1 − Pr (𝜀𝑗 < −∆𝑉)                                        
(3.15) 
It can be noted that Pr�𝜀𝑗 < −∆𝑉� is the cumulative distribution function of ɛj 
with regard to -∆V. In order to construct a Random Utility Model, 
assumptions are needed to 1) specify the function of the deterministic utility 
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component Vij so that the utility change ∆V can be specified, and 2) to 
specify the statistic distribution of the random component ɛj. 
The most commonly used function for the deterministic utility component is 
the linear utility function (Hanemann 1984; Loomis et al. 2000; Haab and 
McConnell 2002; Moreno-Sanchez et al. 2012). 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑗 +  𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑗                                                                                      (3.16) 
where 𝑐𝑗 is a vector of m explanatory variables with respect to respondent j, 
𝑎𝑗 is the vector of m coefficients (i.e. 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑗 =  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑘=1  ), 𝑦𝑗 is the 
respondent’s income and βi is the coefficient of income. If the respondent 
answers no to the WTP question, 𝑉0𝑗 = 𝛼0𝑐𝑗 +  𝛽0𝑦𝑗; if the answers is yes, it 
means the respondent is willing to forgo a portion of income (the offered 
price 𝑡𝑗) in exchange for the ecosystem service specified in the valuation 
scenario, i.e. 𝑉1𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑐𝑗 +  𝛽1(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗). So the utility change is presented as 
∆𝑉 = 𝑉1𝑗 − 𝑉0𝑗 = (𝛼1 − 𝛼0)𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽1�𝑦𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗� − 𝛽0𝑦𝑗                                   (3.17) 
It is reasonable to assume that β1 = β0 (denoted as β for simplicity), i.e. the 
marginal utility effect of income is constant in the status quo (no answer) and 
valuation scenario (yes answer) unless the offered price could cause 
substantial change to the respondent’s income. Define α = α1 – α0, Equation 
3.17 becomes 
 ∆𝑉 = α𝑐𝑗 − 𝛽𝑡𝑗                                                                                        (3.18) 
Now Equation 3.15 becomes  P r�yesj� = 1 − Pr[𝜀𝑗 < −(α𝑐𝑗 − 𝛽𝑡𝑗)]                                                       (3.19) 
In order to estimate α and β, the statistic distribution of ɛj needs to be 
specified. It is usual to assume that ɛj is independently and identically 
distributed (IID) with the mean of 0. Accordingly, there are two widely used 
statistic distributions, i.e. the normal and logistic distributions, both of which 
are symmetric and exhibit the nature that 𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − 𝐹(−𝑥). So Equation 
3.19 can be simplified as P r�yesj� = Pr�𝜀𝑗 < 𝛼𝑐𝑗 − 𝛽𝑡𝑗�                                                                  (3.20)           
If ɛj follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2, this 
distribution of ɛj can be transformed into a standard normal distribution of 
𝜀𝑗 𝜎⁄  with mean 0 and variance 1. Then Equation 3.20 becomes P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜀𝑗𝜎 < α𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎 � = 𝛷 �α𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎 �                                                (3.21) 
where 𝛷( )is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal 
distribution. This is the standard probit model in statistics/econometrics. For 
- 51 - 
a sample of T respondents, define 𝐼𝑗 = 1 if respondent j answered yes and 
𝐼𝑗 = 0 if the answer is no, the log-likelihood function for the responses of the 
whole sample is ln 𝐿 (𝑦𝑒𝑠) = ∑ 𝐼𝑗 ln �𝛷 �α𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎 �� + (1 − 𝐼𝑗) ln �1 − 𝛷 �α𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎 ��𝑇𝑗=1               
(3.22) 
The model parameters, α 𝜎⁄  and −β 𝜎⁄ , can be readily estimated by 
standard probit regression procedure of statistics/econometrics software 
packages which utilise the Maximum Likelihood Estimation algorithm to find 
the parameters that maximize the log-likelihood of Equation 3.22. 
On the other hand, if ɛj follows a logistic distribution with mean 0 and 
variance 𝜋2𝜎𝐿2 3⁄ , this distribution of ɛj can be converted to a standard logistic 
distribution of 𝜀𝑗 𝜎𝐿⁄  with mean 0 and variance 𝜋2 3⁄ . Then Equation 3.20 
becomes P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜀𝑗𝜎𝐿 < α𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 � = [1 + exp �−𝛼𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 �]−1                             (3.23)                   
This is the standard logit model, and the log-likelihood function of the logit 
model is  ln 𝐿 (𝑦𝑒𝑠) = ∑ 𝐼𝑗 ln ��1 + exp �− 𝛼𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 ��−1�Tj=1   +  
                   �1 − 𝐼𝑗� ln �1 − �1 + exp �−𝛼𝑐𝑗−𝛽𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 ��−1�                                 (3.24)                                                                                                           
Likewise, the parameters, α 𝜎𝐿⁄  and −β 𝜎𝐿⁄ , can be estimated by standard 
logit regression procedure of statistic software packages to maximize the 
log-likelihood in Equation 3.24.  
So far, a Random Utility Model (probit or logit) based on the linear utility 
function in Equation 16 has been established to use respondents’ 
characteristics 𝑐𝑗 and the offered price 𝑡𝑗 to explain the probability of yes 
answer in a Contingent Valuation survey. The next step is to calculate 
respondents’ mean WTP for the ecosystem service under valuation.   
As a welfare measure of the monetary value of the ecosystem service, WTP 
is the amount of money/income that the respondent is willing to forgo in 
exchange for the environment service. In other words, WTP is the amount of 
money that makes U0 = U1, i.e. the loss of utility caused by forgoing that 
amount of money is equivalent to the utility that the respondent can derive 
from the environment service. For the Random Utility Model defined by 
Equations 3.12 and 3.16, U0 = U1 means 
𝛼0𝑐𝑗 +  𝛽0𝑦𝑗 + 𝜀0𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑐𝑗 +  𝛽1(𝑦𝑗 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗) + 𝜀1𝑗                                      (3.25)  
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As mentioned above, define α = α1 – α0, β = β1 = β2 and ɛj = ɛ1j - ɛ0j, Equation 
3.25 yields 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 = αβ 𝑐𝑗 + 1β 𝜀𝑗                                                                                     (3.26) 
In probit and logit models where 𝜀𝑗 is assumed to follow the normal and 
logistic distribution respectively, the mean of 𝜀𝑗 is 0. So the expected value 
(mean) of respondent j’s WTP is simply 
𝐸�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗� = 𝛼𝛽 𝑐𝑗                                                                                        (3.27) 
The ratio α/β can be easily calculated using the estimated parameters of the 
probit or logit model, thus the mean WTP of respondents in the whole 
sample is  
𝐸(𝑊𝑇𝑃) = α 𝜎⁄
β 𝜎⁄
𝑐𝑗  (probit model) 𝑜𝑟 α 𝜎𝐿⁄β 𝜎𝐿⁄ 𝑐𝑗  (logit model)                          (3.28) 
where 𝑐𝑗 is the sample mean of the explanatory variables.  
Equations 3.21, 3.23 and  3.28 construct the widely used linear random 
utility model (probit or logit) for the estimation of respondents’ mean WTP 
which adopts a linear function (Equation 3.16) to specify the deterministic 
utility component (Vij) in a random utility model (Equation 3.12) and assumes 
a normal or logistic distribution of the random component (ɛj).  
One drawback of the linear random utility model is that the variable of 
income, which may significantly influence respondents’ answers in 
Contingent Valuation surveys, is not included in the probability functions 
(Equations 3.21 and 3.23). This is because the income term is incorporated 
in the function of Vij in a linear form (Equation 3.16), and the marginal utility 
of income is assumed to be constant between the status quo and the 
valuation scenario (i.e. β0 = β1 in Equation 3.17). Thus when the utility 
difference ∆V between the two circumstances is specified, the income 
variable 𝑦𝑗 is removed and only the change in the income, i.e. the offered 
price 𝑡𝑗 is included in the probability functions. For relaxing the assumption of 
constant marginal utility of income and retaining the income variable in the 
probability functions, non-linear forms of income term, such as the log-linear 
form, can be used in specifying Vij  
 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽 ln(𝑦𝑗) + 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑗                                                                                (3.29) 
where the marginal utility of income is 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑗
= 𝛽
𝑦𝑗
, and the corresponding 
probability function is P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜀𝑗 < α𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽ln (𝑦𝑗−𝑡𝑗𝑦𝑗 )�                                                       (3.30) 
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An even more complicated form of the income term is the Box-Cox 
Transformation 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽 ln 𝑦𝑗𝜆−1𝜆 + 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑗                                                                                 
(3.31)   
 where the marginal utility of income is 𝜕𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑗
= 𝛽𝑦𝑗𝜆−1, λ is the transformation 
parameter which can be flexibly chosen by researchers, and the 
corresponding probability function is P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜀𝑗 < α𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽 (𝑦𝑗−𝑡𝑗)𝜆 − 𝑦𝑗𝜆𝜆 �                                                    (3.32) 
Probit and logit models can be constructed depending on the normal or 
logistic distribution assumption about ɛj in Equation 3.20 and 3.32 (Bateman, 
Willis and Arrow 2001; Haab and McConnell 2002; Carson and Hanemann 
2005). 
In practice, the models with complicated, non-linear income terms are rarely 
used in empirical Contingent Valuation studies because of the consequent 
complication in WTP calculation. In fact, as the offered prices in Contingent 
Valuation surveys usually account for a very small portion of respondents’ 
income, it is not necessary to suppose the marginal utility of income to vary 
with this small change (Haab and McConnell 2002). Moreover, since the 
offered price 𝑡𝑗 in Equation 3.30 and 3.32 is no longer a separate 
independent variable but a component in the complicated income term, the 
effect of the offered price on the probability of yes answer, which is important 
to researchers and policy makers, can no longer be clearly revealed by the 
model estimation. Additionally, income information is usually prone to a great 
deal of measure error and often collected in the categorical form (income 
groups/ranges) rather than exact values in real surveys, which further 
weakens the rationale of using the models with complicated non-linear 
income terms.  
However, the problem of removing the income variable from the probability 
function remains if the linear random utility model is preferred to the non-
linear models. A more critical but rarely mentioned problem regarding the 
linear random utility model is that if the assumption of constant marginal 
utility of the income variable is plausible because the offered price would 
merely cause a small change to respondents’ income, why the same 
assumption is not made for other explanatory variables such as 
respondents’ age and education level given these variables are unchanged 
at all between the status quo and the evaluation scenario? If such 
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assumption is made (i.e. α0=α1 in Equation 3.17), all the explanatory 
variables should be excluded from the probability functions just like the 
income variable when the utility difference is specified, then the offered price 
(the change in income) would be the only explanatory variable in the 
probability functions. This was indeed the case in Hanemann’s original paper 
where the variables of respondents’ characteristics were “suppressed” and 
represented by a constant term in his random utility model (Hanemann 
1984). However, Contingent Valuation studies following Hanemann (1984)’s 
approach, such as Loomis et al. (2000)’s highly cited paper, just added other 
explanatory variables in their models without addressing why the assumption 
of constant marginal utility is made only for the income variable. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Hanemann (1984)’s original univariate 
model is satisfactory because it cannot reveal the effects of respondents’ 
characteristics on their answers to the WTP question, and more 
problematically from the statistical aspect, the univariate model is likely to 
exhibit poor goodness of fit in practice.  
The discussion above indicates that the random utility model exhibit a 
contradiction between the necessity for retaining income and other 
explanatory variables in the probability function and the illogicality of 
assuming inconstant marginal utility of these variables in order to retain them 
in the probability function. The Random Willingness to Pay Model, an 
alternative approach of constructing parametric models for Contingent 
Valuation studies, can avoid this contradiction and thus was adopted by this 
study. 
3.2.2.2 Random Willingness to Pay Model 
Researchers in favour of the random WTP model argued that it was an 
unnecessary “roundabout route” to introduce the utility interpretation for 
estimating the WTP as the random utility model did, and the respondent’s 
yes/no answer could be simply interpreted as whether the WTP was larger 
than the offered price (Cameron 1988; Haab and McConnell 2002). 
Accordingly, the probability of yes answer can be defined as  P r�yesj� =  Pr (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗)                                                                      (3.33) 
The random WTP model assumes that respondent j’s WTP is a linear 
function of his/her characteristics (explanatory variables) and a random error 
term.   
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 = 𝛾𝐶𝑗 + 𝜂𝑗                                                                                       (3.34) 
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where 𝐶𝑗 is the vector of characteristic, γ is the vector of parameters 
(coefficients) to be estimated (i.e. 𝛾𝐶𝑗 =  ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑘=1 ), and 𝜂𝑗 is the random 
error term which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
and symmetric with mean 0. The remaining steps of constructing random 
WTP model are similar to aforementioned steps of constructing random 
utility model.  Substituting Equation 3.34 into Equation 3.33, the probability 
function becomes P r�yesj� = P r�𝛾𝐶𝑗 + 𝜂𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗� = Pr �𝜂𝑗 > −(𝛾𝐶𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗)�                              
(3.35) 
Since 𝜂𝑗 is assumed to be symmetric, Equation 3.35 can be rewritten as 
𝑃 𝑟�𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗� = 𝑃𝑟 (𝜂𝑗 < 𝛾𝐶𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗)  
If 𝜂𝑗 is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2, 
this general normal distribution of 𝜂𝑗  can be converted to the standard 
normal distribution of 𝜂𝑗 𝜎⁄  with  mean 0 and variance 1, then the probit 
model is  P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜂𝑗𝜎 < 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗𝜎 � = 𝛷 �𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗𝜎 �                                                   (3.36) 
Likewise, If 𝜂𝑗 is assumed to follow a logistic distribution with mean 0 and 
variance 𝜋2𝜎𝐿2 3⁄ , this general logistic distribution of 𝜂𝑗   can be converted the 
standard logistic distribution of 𝜀𝑗 𝜎𝐿⁄  with mean 0 and variance 𝜋2 3⁄ , then 
the logit model is P r�yesj� = Pr �𝜂𝑗𝜎𝐿 < 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 � = [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗𝜎𝐿 �]−1                                 (3.37) 
Parameters (coefficients) of the probit and logit models in Equations 3.36 
and 3.37, (𝛾
𝜎
,− 1
𝜎
) and ( 𝛾
𝜎𝐿
,− 1
𝜎𝐿
), can be estimated by standard probit and logit 
regression procedures. 
Since 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 is directly defined in Equation 3.34, and the random term 𝜂𝑗 has 
mean 0 in both normal and logistic distribution, so the expected value 
(mean) of respondent j’s WTP is simply  𝐸(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗) = 𝛾𝐶𝑗                                                                                        (3.38) 
The vector of the unstandardized coefficients γ is simple the vector of the 
estimated coefficients of explanatory variables divided by the coefficient of 
the offered price in Equations 3.36 and 3.37.   
𝐸(𝑊𝑇𝑃) = 𝛾 𝜎⁄
1 𝜎⁄
𝐶𝑗  (probit model) or 𝛾 𝜎𝐿⁄1 𝜎𝐿⁄ 𝐶𝑗(logit model)                           (3.39) 
where 𝐶𝑗   is the vector of the sample mean of explanatory variables.  
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It can be noticed that the expression of the mean WTP derived from the 
random WTP model (Equation 3.39) is similar to the expression of the linear 
random utility model (Equation 3.28). However, since the WTP function is 
directly defined in the random WTP model, there is no problem of removing 
income or other explanatory variables from the probability function as 
occurred in the random utility model. 
3.2.2.3 The Choice between the Probit and the Logit Model 
As explained in preceding sections, parametric models for Contingent 
Valuation can be classified into the probit and logit (regression) models 
depending on what distribution (normal or logistic) the random term in the 
estimation function is assumed to follow. In fact, as the difference between 
the two distributions is slight, the probit and logit models usually yield similar 
results (Haab and McConnell 2002). The literature of Contingent Valuation 
studies usually applied one of the two models and the choice of model is 
basically the authors’ personal preferences without explicit explanation. This 
study adopted the logit model because it provides a more straightforward 
and intuitive interpretation of the estimated coefficients. 
For the convenience of explanation, the probability function of the probit 
model (Equation 3.36) can be simplified as Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠) = Φ(𝛫𝑋), where X 
represents the explanatory variables and K represents the coefficients. As 
introduced before, Φ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution. That is to say, the estimated coefficients K of the probit 
model represent the change in the z-value25
Comparatively, the probability function of the logit model (Equation 3.37) 
which can be simplified as Pr(𝑦𝑒𝑠) = [1+ exp�-KX� ]-1 has a useful and 
widely applied transformed expression 
 caused by each unit change in 
the explanatory variables X. This z-value interpretation of the coefficients is 
not so straightforward and intuitive to indicate what the coefficients means in 
terms of the probability of respondents’ yes answer to the WTP question.  
ln � Pr(yes)1- Pr(yes)�=KX                                                                                       (3.39) 
where Pr(yes)1- Pr(yes) is the odds of respondents’ yes answer. The left side of 
Equation 3.39, namely the logarithm of odds (log-odds), is called logit. So 
the coefficients K in the logit model represent the change in the logit caused 
                                            
25
 Z-value is the number of standard deviations that a value deviates from 
the mean of a normal distribution. 
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by every unit change in the explanatory variables X. A more straightforward 
interpretation can be derived in terms of odds ratio. For the convenience of 
explanation, suppose a simple univariate logit model ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠) = 𝑘𝑥, the logit 
of yes answer when the explanatory variable x is at the reference level 
is ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠0) = 𝑘𝑥0. When x increases by one, the logit becomes ln(𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠1) =
𝑘(𝑥 + 1). The ratio of the two odds is odds ratio = odds1
odds0
= 𝑒𝑘(𝑥+1) 𝑒𝑘𝑥⁄ = 𝑒𝑘                                                      (3.40) 
That is to say, the coefficient k in the logit model means that for each unit 
change in the explanatory variable x, the odds of respondents’ yes answer 
becomes 𝑒𝑘 times of the odds at the reference level. This odds-ratio 
interpretation of the logit model is more straightforward and intuitive than the 
z-value interpretation in the probit model.  
3.2.2.4 Simulated Confidence Interval of Parametric Models  
The 95% confidence interval of the estimate of mean WTP indicates the 
uncertainty in the estimation results. However, estimating the confidence 
interval for parametric models is not as convenient as the non-parametric 
model. The WTP expression of parametric models is the ration of estimated 
coefficients (Equation 3.39) which are treated as random variables that 
asymptotically follow a multivariate normal distribution26
In order to overcome this difficulty, a Monte Carlo Simulation approach (also 
known as the Krinsky-Robb procedure) was applied in this study to 
approximate the empirical distribution of the WTP and construct the 95% 
confidence interval (Krinsky and Robb 1986; Park, Loomis and Creel 1991; 
Haab and McConnell 2002). This simulation approach consisted of three 
steps. Firstly, repeated random draws were taken to simulate the 
multivariate normal distribution of coefficients with the same mean and 
associated variance-covariance matrix as the maximum likelihood estimation 
result. Secondly, each draw of coefficients was used to calculate a mean 
value of WTP so that an approximate distribution of the WTP estimates was 
approximated by all the simulated mean values of WTP. Lastly, the 95% 
 in the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure. As there is no exact formula to calculate the 
variance of the ratio of random variables, it is difficult to construct the 
confidence interval of the WTP (Park, Loomis and Creel 1991).  
                                            
26
 The model estimates of the coefficients are actually the means of these 
random variables. 
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confidence interval of the mean WTP is determined by 2.5% and 97.5% 
quantile values in the approximate distribution.  
With regard to the number of repeated random draws, Krinsky and Robb 
(1986) suggested that 1000 draws was adequate to produce sufficiently 
accurate WTP distribution. While in the example presented by Haab and 
McConnell (2002), 5000 random draws were taken. In this study, the effect 
of the number of random draws on the simulation results of the confidence 
interval was investigated in detail. The results will be introduced in the next 
chapter (Section 4.5). 
3.2.2.5 Double Bound Dichotomous Choice Model 
The econometric models explained in the preceding sections are based on 
one dichotomous (yes/no) choice WTP question. Each respondent is offered 
one price which serves as a threshold (bound) of his/her WTP. A yes answer 
from the respondents means his/her WTP is larger than the offered price 
and a no answer means the opposite. These models can be classified as the 
Single Bound Dichotomous Choice Model. An improvement on the single 
bound model is to introduce the second WTP question in the survey. If the 
respondent answers yes to the first WTP question, a larger price is offered in 
the second WTP question; otherwise a smaller price is offered. By doing 
this, two thresholds are used to provide more precise information of 
respondents’ WTP and thus improve the model estimation. Such 
econometric model for Contingent Valuation is called the Double Bound 
Dichotomous Choice Model (Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen 1991; 
Carson and Hanemann 2005; Veronesi, Alberini and Cooper 2011). 
Suppose respondent j is offered price 𝑡𝑗1 in the first WTP question and price 
𝑡𝑗2 in the second WTP question. There are four possible situations of the 
answers to the two WTP questions. Firstly, if the respondent answers yes to 
both WTP questions, his/her WTP is larger than the second offered price 𝑡𝑗2 
(the larger one in the two offered prices). So the probability of the situation of 
yes-yes answers is P r�𝑦𝑒𝑠,𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗� =  Pr(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗2)                                                             (3.41) 
According to the probability function of the logit random WTP model 
(Equation 3.37), Equation 3.41 becomes P r�𝑦𝑒𝑠,𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗� = [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2𝜎𝐿 �]−1                                                    (3.42) 
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Secondly, if the respondent answers yes to the first WTP question but 
answers no to the second one, his/her WTP is larger than 𝑡𝑗1but lower 
than 𝑡𝑗2. So the probability of the situation of yes-no answers is P r�𝑦𝑒𝑠,𝑛𝑜𝑗� = P r�𝑡𝑗2 > 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗1�                         =  Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 < 𝑡𝑗2� − Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 < 𝑡𝑗1� 
                   = [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�]−1 − [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗1
𝜎𝐿
�]−1                (3.43) 
Thirdly, if the respondent answers no to the first WTP question but answers 
yes to the second one, his/her WTP is lower than 𝑡𝑗1 but larger than 𝑡𝑗2. So 
the probability of the situation of no-yes answers is  P r�𝑛𝑜,𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗� = P r�𝑡𝑗1 > 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗2�                         =  Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 < 𝑡𝑗1� − Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 < 𝑡𝑗2� 
                   = [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗1
𝜎𝐿
�]−1 − [1 + exp �− 𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�]−1                (3.44) 
Lastly, if the respondent answers no to both WTP questions, his/her WTP is 
lower the 𝑡𝑗2(the lower one in the two offered prices). So the probability of 
the situation of no-no answers is P r�𝑛𝑜,𝑛𝑜𝑗� =  Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 <  𝑡𝑗2�                            = 1 − Pr�𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗 >  𝑡𝑗2�  
                     = 1 − [1 + exp �− γCj−tj2
σL
�]−1                                               (3.45) 
The log-likelihood function for the answers (to the two WTP questions) of all 
respondents in the sample T is ln 𝐿 =  ∑ {𝑇𝑗=1 𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑦𝑒𝑠 ln�𝑃 𝑟�𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗�� + 𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑛𝑜 ln�𝑃 𝑟�𝑦𝑒𝑠,𝑛𝑜𝑗��    
                  +𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑦𝑒𝑠 ln�𝑃 𝑟�𝑛𝑜, 𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑗�� + 𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑛𝑜 ln�𝑃 𝑟�𝑛𝑜,𝑛𝑜𝑗��}               (3.46) 
where 𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑛𝑜, 𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑦𝑒𝑠 and 𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑛𝑜 are binary indicators which equal 
to 1 if the respondent provides the corresponding answers, otherwise they 
equal to 0. Substitute Equations 3.42, 3.43, 3.44 and 3.45 into Equation 
3.46, the log-likelihood function of the double bound model is ln 𝐿 =  ∑ {𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑗=1 � 1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�
�  
                +𝐼𝑦𝑒𝑠−𝑛𝑜 � 1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�
−
1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗1
𝜎𝐿
�
�  
                +𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑦𝑒𝑠 � 1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗1
𝜎𝐿
�
−
1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�
� 
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                    +𝐼𝑛𝑜−𝑛𝑜 �1 − 1
1+exp�−𝛾𝐶𝑗−𝑡𝑗2
𝜎𝐿
�
�}                                                     (3.47) 
This complicate log-likelihood function cannot be estimated by the standard 
logit regression procedure in statistical/econometric software packages. 
Therefore, ad hoc computing codes for the statistical program R (R-Core-
Team 2013) were written to conduct the maximum likelihood estimation with 
the special package “maxLik” (Henningsen and Toomet 2011). The 
estimated coefficients in Equation 3.47 can be used to calculate the mean 
WTP and construct the 95% confidence interval following the same method 
explained above for the single bound random WTP (logit) model.   
3.3 Implementation of Contingent Valuation Models 
As explained in Section 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.6, both non-parametric 
and parametric models were used in this study. Within the parametric 
models, the random WTP model was preferred to the random utility model, 
and within the random WTP model, the logit model was preferred to the 
probit model.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Econometric Models in Contingent Valuation 
Models highlighted in red were applied in this study.  
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Implementation of the non-parametric model was quite straightforward as it 
only needed the information of the percentages of respondents’ no answer 
to different increments in water price. Comparatively, implementation of the 
parametric model (the logit random WTP model) entailed more efforts in 
model building, evaluation and selection as it utilized a group of explanatory 
variables to explain the probability of respondents’ yes answer to the WTP 
question and then calculated the mean WTP with the coefficients. A crucial 
question arose when implementing the logit random WTP model, i.e. what 
explanatory variables should be included in the model? 
3.3.1 The Initial Full Model 
Understandably, it is important not to overlook any variables that may 
significantly influence respondents’ answers to the WTP question. Thus it is 
reasonable to build an initial full model that includes all the potentially 
important explanatory variables at the outset of the modelling procedure. 
Generally, explanatory variables in Contingent Valuations studies include 
respondents’ environmental awareness, knowledge and attitudes, their 
experiences/behaviours related to the valued ecosystem services and their 
demographic characteristics (Spash et al. 2009; Vasquez et al. 2009; 
Ramajo-Hernandez and del Saz-Salazar 2012; Wang et al. 2013b). 
Accordingly, a total of 21 potential explanatory variables were considered for 
the initial full model of this study (Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Potential Explanatory Variables in the Initial Full Model 
Variable Description and Coding 
Perceive-
shortage 
Perception of the water shortage in the city:  
1 to 3 (from Abundant  to Scarce) a 
Opinion-service Opinions about the current tap water service:  1 to 3 (from Satisfactory to Dissatisfactory) b 
Know-bill Know their water bills: No = 0; Yes = 1 
Know-price Know the current water price: No = 0; Yes = 1 
Heard-SNWTP Have heard about the South-to-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP): No= 1 c; Yes = 0 
Know-benefits Know the potential benefits of the SNWTP: 0 to 4 d 
Heard-mid-route Have heard the specific Middle Route of the SNWTP: No = 0; Yes = 1 
Know-reservoir Know the Danjingkou Reservoir as the water supply area of the middle route project: No = 0; Yes = 1 
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Heard-EC Have heard about Ecological Compensation (EC): No = 0; Yes = 1 
Understand-EC e Can correctly describe the general idea of EC: No = 0; Yes = 1 
Opinion-EC Opinion about the general idea of EC 
f:  
1 to 5 (from Highly agree to Highly disagree) 
Price-increase  The proposed increase in water price in the WTP question: 0.1; 0.2; 0.5; 0.8; 1.0; 1.5 (yuan/m3) 
Household-size Number of family members living with the respondents 
Gender Female = 0; Male = 1 
Age 30 and below = 1; 31 to 40 = 2; 41 to 50 = 3;  51 to 60 = 4; Above 60 = 5 
Education  College or higher = 1; High school = 2;  Middle, primary school or below = 3 g 
Income  Monthly gross income (in Chinese Yuan)
 h: 
Below 2500 = 1; 2500 to 4000 = 2; Above 4000 = 3 
Job 
Public Sector (government departments, state-owned 
companies and institutes) = 1; Private Sector (private 
companies, businessmen, freelancer) = 2; Retired = 
3; Unemployed = 4; 
Residence Length of stay in the city (in years) 
i:  
Over 20 = 1; 10 to 20 = 2; 5 to 10 = 3; Below 5 = 4 
Visit Visited the water supply areas before: No = 0; Yes =1 
Relatives Have relatives or close friends living in the water supply areas: No = 0; Yes =1 
 
a The original options of “Very abundant” and “Abundant” were merged into 
“Abundant”, “Very scarce” and “Scarce” were merged into “Scarce” in order to 
assure that there are enough number of answers in each category for the 
regression modelling. 
b Similarly, the original options of “Very satisfactory” and “Satisfactory” were merged 
into “Satisfied”, “Very dissatisfactory” and “Dissatisfactory” were merged into 
“Dissatisfied”. 
c Since most respondents have heard of the project before, the no answer was 
coded as 1, and the yes answer was coded as 0 (the reference level). For 
regression analysis with categorical variable, it is better to take the category that 
has a fairly large number of observations as the reference level. 
d A multiple-option question including four major benefits of the water transfer 
project and an “I Don’t know” option was asked to the respondents. Choosing 
each benefit scored 1 and choosing “I Don’t know” scored 0. 
e This variable is different from the preceding one (Heard-EC) as respondents who 
have heard about EC did not necessarily understand its idea correctly.  
f A brief description of the general idea of EC was given to the respondents before 
asking their opinions (but after the preceding question about whether they 
understand the general idea of EC). 
g Primary and middle schooling are legally compulsory and free in China. A fairly 
large number of respondents have received college or higher education, so this 
category is coded with the smallest number as the reference level.  
h The starting income level of the personal income tax in China was 2000 
yuan/month before 1st September 2011 and rose to 3500 yuan/month thereafter. 
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Some original income ranges in the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) were merged 
into these three ranges so that each range contains enough number of 
observations for the modelling analysis. 
i The longest residence was coded with the smallest number (as the reference 
category) due to the fairly larger number of respondents in this category. 
 
The initial full model was not the best-fit model because not all the assumed 
important variables turned out to be truly important variables in the modelling 
results. Moreover, the Principle of Parsimony27
Interestingly, while the importance of including all possibly important 
variables in the full model is generally well attended, the Principle of 
Parsimony and the necessity of model simplification and improvement 
seemed largely neglected in the Contingent Valuation literature. It is 
common to see logit/probit models with a number of variables in the 
literature and only some of them are significant, but it is not known whether 
the models can be further simplified and improved by removing some or all 
of the insignificant variables (Vasquez et al. 2009; Ramajo-Hernandez and 
del Saz-Salazar 2012; Wang et al. 2013b). This study introduced two 
powerful automatic model selection techniques, i.e. the Stepwise Regression 
and the Best Subset Regression in Contingent Valuation, and integrated 
them with manual adjustment for model construction and improvement.   
 means that statistic models 
should be simplified to have as few parameters as possible until removal of 
any variable would considerably reduce the model fit (Crawley 2007).  
Therefore, variables in the initial full model should be screened in order to 
obtain the improved model in terms of goodness of fit and simplicity.  
3.3.2 Stepwise Regression and Best Subset Regression 
Stepwise Regression and Best Subset Regression are two powerful 
automatic variable selection techniques which have been widely used in 
statistical modelling (Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant 2013) but not 
applied in Contingent Valuation studies. Stepwise Regression is an iterative 
selection procedure which starts from the full model and removes one 
variable (the least significant one) at a time until the model cannot be further 
improved28
                                            
27
 This principle is also known as Occam’s Razor which emphasizes paring 
down the complication of explanations (to research issues) to the bare 
minimum. 
. The criterion used for evaluating models in the stepwise 
28
 Strictly speaking, this is called the backward stepwise regression, while 
the forward procedure starts from the null model (the model with no 
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regression is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which is defined as 
(Akaike 1974; Crawley 2012)   AIC = −2 × 𝐿 + 2(𝑝 + 1)                                                                          (3.48) 
where L is the log-likelihood of the model and p is the number of parameters 
(coefficients) in that model. The smaller the AIC, the better the model is. So 
AIC not only takes account of the goodness of fit of the evaluated model 
(through L) but also its simplicity (through p). The stepwise regression 
iteration ends up with the model with the smallest AIC, i.e. the model 
exhibiting best goodness of fit with fewest variables. The statistic computing 
program R (R-Core-Team 2013) was used in this study to conduct the 
stepwise regression iteration.  
Best Subset Regression (also called All Subset Regression) is another 
powerful automatic selection technique which can assess all the possible 
models that contain a subset of variables in the full model and selects the 
best model with the smallest AIC. That is to say, for a full model with 21 
variables, the best subset regression procedure can assess all the 221 = 
2,097,152 possible subset models of the full model29
3.3.3 Integration of Automatic Model Selection Procedures and 
Manual Adjustment 
. This is an exhaustive 
assessment procedure that can take hours for computation (depending on 
the working computer’s speed). In this study, the up-to-date, special 
package “glmulti” for the R program was used to conduct the best subset 
regression procedure (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010; Calcagno 2013). 
The two automatic variable (model) selection techniques are sufficiently 
useful to determine the best model for ideal survey data with no missing 
values, but problems arose when applying them onto the real survey data. In 
the real survey, some respondents did not answer the questions regarding 
their private information such as income or their opinions about 
environmental issues, which caused a number of missing values in the 
                                                                                                                           
variable but a constant) and adds one variable at a time until the model 
cannot be further improved. 
29
 The total number of subset models of a full model with n variables equals 
to the sum of all possible combinations of n elements, i.e.∑ �𝑛𝑘� =0≤𝑘≤𝑛 2𝑛. 
This total number includes two extreme cases, i.e. the null model (with no 
variable but a constant) and the full model itself.   
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survey data30. Since incomplete observations31
The stepwise regression and best subset regression techniques can select 
the model with the smallest AIC from numerous possible models based on 
the initial full model, but they cannot take account of whether a variable 
should be retained despite the related reduction of observations. Moreover, 
as shown in Equation 3.48, the AIC is dependent on -2 × log-likelihood and 
the number of variables in the model. Since more observations could lead to 
larger value of -2 × log-likelihood
 with missing values were 
omitted in regression, the more variables (each variable corresponded to a 
question in the survey) included in a model, the more missing values there 
could be, and thus the fewer observations the model could contain. 
Obviously, a model with more observations could make better use of the 
survey data. However, some variables such as income were too important to 
be excluded from the model even if it could cause substantial reduction of 
observations.   
32
The first stage of this integrated procedure was to construct the initial full 
model to obtain a general view of all explanatory variables’ influence on 
respondents’ answers to the WTP question. The second stage was to apply 
the best subset regression and stepwise regression techniques onto the 
initial full model in order to find which variables were removed by the two 
automatic selection procedures (due to insignificance) and caused 
substantial reduction of the observations (due to missing values). The third 
, the two automatic selection procedures 
are likely to select a model with relatively few observations. That is to say, 
for datasets with missing values, the final model selected by the two 
automatic procedures may neither make good use of the survey data nor 
retain some important variables. In order to amend the drawbacks of the 
automatic model selection techniques in tackling data with missing values, 
manual adjustment was integrated with the automatic selection techniques in 
this study for model selection and improvement (illustrated in Figure 3.7).  
                                            
30
 The option of “No opinion” or “I don’t want to answer” was provided for the 
respondents in this survey, which helped to ensure the reliability of the 
survey data.     
31
 Each observation is a dataset that contains a respondent’s answers to all 
the questions. 
32
 For example, two additional observations (respondents) with the 
probability of 0.5 to answer yes to the WTP question would add -2 × 
log(0.5) = 1.38 to the AIC.   
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stage introduced the manual adjustment which removed those variables 
identified in the second stage and constructed a new (intermediate) full 
model  that contained less variables and more observations than the initial 
full model. But variables like income were retained in this stage in spite of 
the resultant reduction of observations. Then the automatic stepwise 
regression technique was applied again onto the new full model to select the 
new (intermediate) stepwise regression model with the smallest AIC. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Integrated Model Selection and Improvement Procedure  
Models highlighted in red were reported in this study (Chapter 4). Explanation of 
models in the figure was in the following texts. 
 
It should be noted that variables identified in the second stage (insignificant 
and with missing values) were not all removed from the initial full model at 
the same time to construct the new full model. This is because even the 
removal of one variable from the initial full model could lead to substantial 
differences between the new stepwise model and the initial one (i.e. the 
stepwise model based on the initial full model).  Variables not included in the 
initial stepwise model might become significant and thus retained in the new 
stepwise model, and vice versa. As a result, a trial-and-error method was 
used to remove redundant variables, which made the third stage an 
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exhaustive and iterative selection process until the final stepwise regression 
model was determined to achieve the balance between best model fit 
(preciseness), most observations (fully use of the survey data) and fewest 
explanatory variables (simplicity)33
In addition to the AIC, two other criteria were also used in this study to 
evaluate numerous models in the integrated selection procedure, i.e. the 
overall model significance and the prediction error rate. 
. 
The overall model significance indicates whether the tested model is 
significantly better than the null model, i.e. the model with no explanatory 
variables but the intercept/constant. The Likelihood Ratio Test is generally 
used to the evaluate models’ overall significance (Hosmer, Lemeshow and 
Sturdivant 2013). 
𝐺 =  −2ln ( 𝐿
𝐿0
)                                                                                           
(3.49) 
where L is the likelihood of the tested model, L0 is the likelihood of the null 
model, and G is the log-likelihood ratio statistic which approximately follows 
the chi-square distribution with k degree of freedom where k is the number of 
explanatory variables in the test model. The P-value calculated based on G 
indicates the overall significance of the tested model. 
The prediction error rate (the same test with a different presentation form is 
called classification table) is an intuitive criterion to indicate models’ ability to 
explain/predict respondents’ answers to the WTP question (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow and Sturdivant 2013). After the coefficients of the tested model 
are estimated, each respondent’s probability of answering yes to the WTP 
question can be calculated by the probability function of the logit model 
(Equation 3.37). Setting 0.5 as the cut-off point, the respondent is predicted 
34
Prediction Error Rate =  𝑁 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑒𝑠) > 0.5 |𝑁𝑜 + 𝑁 𝑃(𝑌𝑒𝑠) ≤ 0.5 | 𝑌𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
                               (3.50) 
 to answer yes if the calculated probability is larger than 0.5, otherwise 
he/she is predicted to answer no. Then the prediction error rate of the tested 
model is 
                                            
33
 It should be noted that the stepwise regression itself was also an iterative 
selection procedure. Moreover, the best subset regression technique was 
not applied in the third stage because it was far too time-consuming for 
the exhaustive and iterative examination.  
34
 Strictly speaking, this is a posterior estimation as the “prediction” is 
actually made after the survey.    
- 68 - 
where 𝑁 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑒𝑠) > 0.5 |𝑁𝑜 is the number of respondents who are predicted to 
answer yes (as the calculated probability is larger than 0.5) but actually 
answer no in the survey, 𝑁 𝑃(𝑌𝑒𝑠) ≤ 0.5 | 𝑌𝑒𝑠 is the number of respondents who 
are predicted to answer no but actually answer yes, and  𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total 
number of respondents. 
The integrated model selection procedure explained above focuses on the 
single bound dichotomous choice model because the automatic model 
selection techniques for the complicated probability function (Equation 3.47) 
of the double bound dichotomous choice model are not available so far.  As 
a result, this study applied the integrated model selection procedure (Figure 
3.7) to determine what variables should be included in the final stepwise 
regression model (single bound model). Then the double bound model was 
constructed with the same variables of the single bound model but a more 
complicated probability function. The integrated model selection procedure 
of this study has not been reported in the literature, it could be a 
methodological contribution of improving the model construction and 
selection in Contingent Valuation studies.    
3.4 Choice Experiment Survey in the Water Supply Area 
The previous three sections introduce the Continent Valuation survey and 
models for investigating urban residents’ WTP for water protection, which 
focuses on the demand (consumer) side of PES schemes. This section and 
the following one introduce the Choice Experiment survey and models for 
revealing farmer households’ preferences for the design of two water 
protection programs in the water supply area, i.e. the existing Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP) for reforestation and a hypothetical program for 
reducing the use of fertilizer on flat land that is not currently covered by the 
SLCP. This choice experiments study provides information and suggestions 
on how to improve and develop PES schemes from the supply (provider) 
side.   
3.4.1 Study Area and Survey Sampling and Implementation 
The Danjiangkou Reservoir will provide water for the middle route of the 
South-to-North Water Transfer Project. In order to ensure the water quality 
of the reservoir is at a relatively high level (Grade II in the national 
environmental standards for surface water), the central government of China 
designated 40 counties in three provinces which cover 88,100 km2 around 
the reservoir and in its upstream watershed as the water supply area (Figure 
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3.1) to implement water protection measures both in urban and rural 
districts. This study focused on the rural districts because the point-source 
water pollution in urban districts such as effluents from factories are 
relatively easy to identify and treat by waste water treatment plants and 
facilities, but the non-point source agricultural pollution in the rural districts is 
dispersed and more difficult to monitor and control (Smith, Inman and 
Cherrington 2012).  
Due to limited resources and time, it was unrealistic to conduct a survey in 
the whole water supply area. Hence, this study focused on villages around 
the Danjiangkou Reservoir because agriculture activities in these villages 
are likely to cause the most direct impact to the water quality of the reservoir. 
The choice of the specific villages was dependent on the locations of the 
villages and the availability of local informants/interviewers to help with the 
survey. A group of undergraduate students whose families are living in these 
villages were recruited and trained to conduct this survey.  
A preparatory survey was conducted in one village with 5 farmer households 
at the early stage of this study in 2010 to assess the feasibility of such a 
choice experiment survey and obtain the general information of farmer 
households’ opinions about water protection programs. Further contacts of 
local interviewers in multiple villages were established in 2011 and the 
information of their own households was also used to refine the design of the 
survey questionnaire. The final survey was conducted in August and 
September of 2012 in 7 villages around the Danjiangkou Reservoir (Figure 
3.8). In-house interviews were conducted with the heads of the farmer 
households by the recruited and trained local interviewers. 
A total of 246 questionnaires were successfully collected in this survey. 161 
of them were collected from households who had participated in the Sloping 
Land Conversion Program (SLCP) and 94 of them were collected from 
households who had qualified sloping land for the SLCP but did not 
participate in the program. The interviewed SLCP-participant households 
accounted for about 10% of the total number of participant households in 
their villages. As no information about the non-participant households was 
available prior to the survey, the interviewers had to consult with the heads 
of villages and adopted the Snowball Sampling strategy to find this kind of 
households.  
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Figure 3.8 Surveyed Villages around the Danjiangkou Reservoir  
Satellite images are adapted from the Google Map. The red bubble in the small 
graph indicates the location of the Danjiangkou Reservoir. Blue bubbles in the main 
graph represent the villages surveyed in this study. 
 
3.4.2 Questionnaire Design of the Choice Experiment Survey 
Two slightly different questionnaires (see Appendices 2 and 3) were used in 
this study for the two groups of farmer households, i.e. the SLCP-participant 
households and the non-participant households. For the participant 
households, the questionnaire was composed of four parts. The first part 
contained questions regarding the households’ participation in the SLCP 
(e.g. their most important reasons to participate, the area of their enrolled 
land, the reason why some of them only enrolled part of their qualified land) 
and their land use decisions after the expiration of their SLCP contracts (e.g. 
had/will they convert the enrolled forestland back to farmland).   
The second part of the questionnaire aimed to investigate the effect of the 
SLCP on the livelihood of the participant households. Detailed questions 
were asked about: 1) the trees planted on the enrolled sloping forestland 
- 71 - 
after the SLCP and the annual gross income per mu 35
The third part of the questionnaire contained two sets of choice experiments 
questions for revealing farmer households’ preferences for the design of the 
SLCP and a hypothetical fertilizer reduction program. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, choice experiments disaggregate respondents’ preferences for 
services/goods/projects into their preferences and trade-offs for defined 
attributes at different levels. In this survey, farmer households’ preferences 
for the design of the SLCP were modelled as their preferences and trade-
offs for three attributes (Table 3.3), and each attribute had three levels that  
were equally spaced in order to reveal the linear effects of the attributes 
(Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005). No more than three levels were adopted 
because the increase in the attributes’ levels could exponentially increase 
the choice questions that households needed to consider and answer, which 
could burden them with tedious questions and reduce the reliability of their 
answers.    
 from each species of 
tree, 2) the crops planted on those sloping land before the SLCP and their 
annual gross incomes per mu, 3) the crops planted on the households’ 
remaining farmland and their annual gross incomes per mu, and 4) other 
income sources of the households and the annual gross income from each 
source. The gross income was chosen (instead of the net income) because, 
as suggested by some local informants at the preparatory stages of the 
survey, some farmer households did not actually make detailed calculation 
of net income and the information of gross income was much less sensitive 
for the households to tell.    
 
Table 3.3 Defined Attributes of the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
Attributes Levels 
Annual Payment 200; 300; 400 (yuan/mu) 
Contract-length 5, 10, 15 (years) 
P-com-trees a 0%, 50%, 100% 
a The maximum percentage of commercial trees allowed to be planted on the 
enrolled land.  
 
                                            
35
 Mu is the commonly used unit of land in China which equals to 1/15 
hectare. 
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The three levels of the attribute of annual payment were 200, 300 and 400 
yuan/mu. Two similar choice modelling studies on the SLCP adopted the 
range of 100-300 yuan/mu (Chen et al. 2009a) and 100-800 yuan/mu 
(Grosjean and Kontoleon 2009) respectively36
The current contract length of SLCP is 3 years for converting the sloping 
farmland to grassland
. The three levels adopted in 
this study were neither too low nor too high to make the policy scenarios 
overwhelmingly unattractive or attractive to the farmer households, in which 
case it would be difficult to reveal their trade-offs between multiple attributes.  
37, 5 years for conversion to commercial forests and 8 
years for conversion to ecological forests 38
The last defined attribute of the SLCP was the maximum percentage of 
commercial trees farmer households were allowed to plant on the enrolled 
land, which helped to reveal households’ trade-off between the flexibility of 
land use activities and other attributes. As mentioned above, the two types 
of the current SLCP contracts were at the two ends of this attribute, i.e. the 
full flexibility of planting commercial trees (100%) and complete restriction on 
commercial trees (0%). This study added the midpoint (50%) to the whole 
spectrum of this attribute. The same design was also adopted by (Grosjean 
and Kontoleon 2009). 
. In Chen et al.’s (2006) study, 
the levels of contract length were set as 3, 6 and 10 years without 
discriminating commercial and ecological forests. In this survey, the three 
levels of contract length were 5, 10 and 15 years. Since long-term programs 
are more likely to generate long-term ecological benefits, this study set the 
longest contract length as 15 years in order to reveal the feasibility of 
extending the duration of SCLP to a larger extent.  
After defining the attributes of the SLCP and the levels of the attributes, 
Orthogonal Fractional Factorial Design (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005) 
was used to design the policy scenarios, i.e. different combinations of the 
three attributes at different levels, and produce choice cards (with those 
                                            
36
 The current SLCP annual payment was 230 yuan/mu. 
37
 This type of SLCP contract is mainly for farmer households in the north 
and northwest of China where precipitations are not enough for forests. 
38 “Commercial Forests/Trees" and “Ecological Forests/Trees” are two terms 
used in the implementation of the SLCP. The former refers to trees that 
are more profitable but can generate less ecological benefits (such as fruit 
trees) while the latter means the opposite. The species of trees within the 
two categories are designated by the National Forestry Bureau. 
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policy scenarios) presented to the farmer households. Such an orthogonal 
design method ensured that there was no correlation between the attribute 
levels so that the main effects of the attributes can be independently 
estimated (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2005). In the survey, each farmer 
household was presented with three choice cards regarding the design of 
the SLCP and each choice card contained three policy scenarios (Table 
3.4). Each farmer household was asked to choose the most preferred policy 
scenario from each choice card. The chosen policy scenario was coded as 1 
and the other two scenarios in the choice card were coded as 0, which 
means nine choice observations were collected from each household 
regarding their preferences for the design of the SLCP. 
 
Table 3.4 Choice Cards of the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
In the survey, the three choice cards were separately presented to each 
respondent in random order.  
Annual Payment 
(yuan/year) 
Contract Length 
(year) P-com-trees 
a 
Choice Card A 
200 5 0 
300 10 100% 
400 15 50% 
 Choice Card B 
200 10 50% 
300 15 0% 
400 5 100% 
 Choice Card C 
200 15 100% 
300 5 50% 
400 10 0% 
a The maximum percentage of commercial trees allowed to be planted on the 
enrolled land.  
 
In some choice experiment studies, a choice card was composed of two 
designed policy scenarios and an additional option of “Choose neither” or 
“Status quo”. The inclusion of such options might avoid compelling 
respondents to choose from the presented policy scenarios. However, it 
could cause the loss of the orthogonality in the experiment design (Hoyos 
2010). As Hensher et al. (2005) suggested, when the main objective of the 
study is to reveal respondent’s trade-offs between multiple attributes, it is 
better to exclude the “Choose neither” option in order to obtain all 
respondents’ preference information. Moreover, putting three designed 
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policy scenarios in a choice card reduced the number of choice questions 
the respondents needed to answer in case they felt bored about the survey 
and provided unreliable answers. This was particularly necessary for this 
study because the farmer households still needed to answer the other set of 
choice questions about the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program. 
The three defined attributes of the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program 
are presented in Table 3.5. As no program has been implemented in China 
to pay farmers for reducing the use of fertilizers nor have studies on such 
programs been found in literature, the attributes and levels of the fertilizer 
reduction program in this study were largely defined by taking the attributes 
and levels of the SLCP as the benchmarks. Since the profitability of flat 
cropland is generally higher than sloping land, the three levels of the annual 
payment were set as 300, 400 and 500 yuan/mu. Given this hypothetical 
program is unfamiliar to the farmer households, long contracts like 10 and 15 
years could be overwhelmingly risky for them. Therefore, the three levels of 
contract length were set as 2, 5 and 8 years, which were the lengths of the 
current three types of SLCP contracts. While a complete cut of the use of 
fertilizers could be too radical for the farmer households, a small percentage 
of reduction is unlikely to generate substantial environmental benefits. As a 
result, the three levels of the reduction percentage of fertilizer use were set 
as 25%, 50%, 75%. The two kinds of fertilizers (nitrogen and phosphate) 
were bound up in this attribute because they are both important causes of 
agricultural non-point source pollution and eutrophication in surface water 
and farmer households’ trade-off between these two kinds of fertilizers is not 
the focus of this study.  
 
Table 3.5 Defined Attributes of the Hypothetical Fertilizer Reduction 
Program 
Attributes Levels 
Annual Payment 300; 400; 500 (yuan/mu) 
Contract-length 2, 5, 8 (years) 
P-fert-reduce a 25%, 50%, 75% 
a The percentage of reduction in the use of nitrogen and phosphate 
fertilizers.  
 
Using the same method of designing the choice cards for the SLCP, three 
choice cards were designed for the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program 
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and each of them consisted of three policy scenarios (Table 3.6). Each 
farmer household was asked to choose the most preferred scenario from 
each choice card in the survey.   
 
Table 3.6 Choice Cards of the Fertilizer Reduction Program 
Annual Payment 
(yuan/mu) 
Contract Length 
(year) P-fert-reduce 
a 
Choice Card A   
300 2 25% 
400 5 75% 
500 8 50% 
Choice Card B   300 8 75% 
400 2 50% 
500 5 25% 
Choice Card C   300 5 50% 
400 8 25% 
500 2 75% 
a The percentage of reduction in the use of nitrogen and phosphate 
fertilizers.  
 
The two sets of choice questions regarding the two water protection 
programs comprised the third part of the questionnaire used in the choice 
experiments survey. The last part of the questionnaire collected the 
demographic characteristics of the farmer households. These characteristics 
were later used to compare the SLCP-participant households and the non-
participant households and help to reveal the heterogeneity in farmer 
households’ preferences for the design of water protection programs. 
The questionnaire used for the non-participant households was slightly 
different from the one used for the SLCP-participant households. No 
questions regarding households’ participation in the SLCP were asked in the 
first part of the questionnaire. Instead, questions were asked about how 
much land held by the non-participant households qualified for the SLCP 
and why they did not participate in the program. In the second part of the 
questionnaire regarding households’ livelihood, questions were asked about 
the crops/trees planted on the households’ land and the gross incomes per 
mu from the crops/trees without differentiating the enrolled forestland and 
the remaining farmland as the case of the SLCP-participant households. The 
remaining two parts of the questionnaire, i.e. the choice questions and the 
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demographic information questions were the same with the questionnaire for 
the SLCP participant households.  
3.5 Econometric Models for Choice Experiment 
3.5.1 The Classic Conditional Logit Model 
Choice Experiment is based on the characteristic theory of consumption 
which supposes that utility is derived from characteristics (attributes) of 
goods/services (Lancaster 1966) and the random utility theory which 
supposes that people make decisions to maximize the utility they derive from 
goods/services (McFadden 1974). The Conditional Logit Model (CLM), 
developed by McFadden (1974) who was rewarded the Nobel Prize of 
economics in 2000 for his contribution in choice modelling, is the classic and 
most widely used model for choice experiments studies. Assume that an 
individual is given a choice set (card) C to choose one of its alternatives, the 
utility of alternative i is supposed to be composed of a deterministic and 
observable component Vi and a random and unobservable error component 
ɛi. 
𝑈𝑖 =  𝑉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                              (3.51)        
When the individual compares alternative i with alternative j in the choice set 
C, he/she would choose alternative i if and only if larger utility can be derived 
from this alternative. So the probability of choosing alternative i is Pr (𝑖 | 𝐶)  =  Prob (𝑉𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 >  𝑉𝑗  +  𝜀𝑗;  𝑖 ≠  𝑗;  ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶)                            (3.52) 
When the random error terms 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜀𝑗are independently and identically 
distributed following the Gumbel distribution, the probability of choosing i is 
(McFadden 1974; Hanley, Wright and Adamowicz 1998; Louviere, Hensher 
and Swait 2000): Pr(𝑖)  =  exp (𝜇𝑉𝑖)
∑ exp (𝜇𝑉𝑗)𝑗∈𝐶                                                                                   
(3.53) 
where μ is a scale parameter which is assumed to 1, implying the constant 
error variance. The deterministic component Vi is usually presented as a 
linear function of the attributes vector Xi and the coefficients vector β’. 
𝑉𝑖 =  𝛽′𝑋𝑖                                                                                                  (3.54) 
Accordingly, Equation 3.53 can be rewritten as: 
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Pr(𝑖)  =  exp (𝛽′𝑋𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛽′𝑋𝑗)𝑗∈𝐶                                                                                  
(3.55)  
Under the assumption of Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which 
implies that the ratio of choice probability between two alternatives is not 
influenced by the introduction or removal of other alternatives, the 
coefficients vector β’ in Equation 3.55 can be estimated by conditional logit 
regression procedures in statistical software packages. In this study, the 
special package “mlogit” of the statistical program R was used to conduct 
the conditional logit regression procedure (Croissant 2013).  
The estimated coefficients in CLM do not have straightforward 
interpretations of the choice probabilities of any specific alternatives since 
the probability of choosing an alternative is conditional on the other 
alternatives in the choice set (represented by the denominator in Equation 
3.55). Instead, the coefficients of CLM represent the changes in 
respondents’ utility caused by a unit change in the attributes.  A positive 
coefficient means the respondents prefer higher levels of the corresponding 
attribute and vice versa. Another useful interpretation of the coefficients is 
the marginal value, how much are the respondents willing to forgo for a unit 
increase in the non-monetary attributes. 
Denote the coefficient of the monetary attribute as βm, and the coefficients of 
non-monetary attributes as βnm, the marginal value of non-monetary 
attributes can be calculated as (Hanley, Wright and Alvarez-Farizo 2006):  
𝑀𝑉 =  𝛽𝑛𝑚
𝛽𝑚
                                                                                                (3.56) 
3.5.2 The Random Parameters Logit Model for Revealing the 
Heterogeneity in Respondents’ Preferences  
Despite its usefulness and wide application, the classic CLM has its 
limitations.  Firstly, the CLM is restricted by the IIA assumption which does 
not always hold in real life. Secondly, the CLM assumes that the 
parameters/coefficients which represent respondents’ preferences for the 
attributes are uniform for all people, so it is unable to account for the 
heterogeneity in respondents’ preferences in choice experiments studies 
(Train 1998; Hanley, Wright and Alvarez-Farizo 2006; Ruto and Garrod 
2009). The Random Parameter Logit Model (RPL) is an advanced model to 
overcome these limitations by allowing the parameters/coefficients of 
attributes in choice models to randomly vary over respondents but follow 
certain statistic distributions (Train 1998; McFadden and Train 2000; Greene 
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and Hensher 2003; Hanley, Wright and Alvarez-Farizo 2006; Ruto and 
Garrod 2009; Hoyos 2010). The most adopted statistic distribution is the 
normal distribution which can be described by the mean and standard 
deviation. Therefore, instead of estimating one fixed coefficient for each 
attribute like the CLM, the RPL estimates two coefficients for each attribute, 
i.e. the mean coefficient and the standard deviation coefficient which 
together describe the distribution of the respondents’ heterogeneous 
preferences for this attribute.  
Following Train’s (1998) study, Equation 3.55 is the probability of choosing 
alternative i when the coefficients vector β’ is assumed to be homogenous 
for all respondents. Adding the subscripts n and t to represent the nth 
respondent and the tth choice set respectively, Equation 3.55 can be 
rewritten as: 
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡  =  exp (𝛽′𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡)∑ exp (𝛽′𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡)𝑗∈𝐶                                                                                 (3.57)  
The probability of the nth respondent’s sequence of choices from all the 
choice sets is the product of the choice probability: 
 𝑆𝑛 =  ∏ 𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝛽′)𝑡                                                                                       (3.58) 
In the RPL, β’ is not fixed but follows the normal distribution θ* characterized 
by the mean and standard deviation. Denote the probability density of the 
coefficients as f (β’|θ*), the probability of the choice sequence which 
accounts for respondent’s heterogeneous preferences is the integral of 
Equation 3.58 over all possible values of β’ weighted by its probability 
density: 
𝑃𝑛(𝜃∗) =  ∫ 𝑆𝑛  𝑓 (𝛽′|𝜃∗)𝑑𝛽                                                                       (3.59) 
The integral of Equation 3.59 does not have a closed form to be analytically 
calculated. Thus a simulated maximum likelihood estimate can be used to 
determine the coefficients distribution θ* (Train 1998; Ruto and Garrod 
2009). Specifically, a number of values of β’ are randomly drawn from a 
given distribution θ, and the probability of the choice sequence of the nth 
respondent, i.e. Pn (θ*), is approximated by averaging all the simulated 
probabilities: 
𝑃𝑛
′(𝜃∗) = 1
𝑅
 ∑ 𝑃𝑛(𝛽𝑟|θ)𝑅𝑟=1                                                                            (3.60) 
where R is the number of repetitions (draws), βr|θ is the rth draw of β from 
the given distribution θ. Then the simulated log-likelihood of the choice 
sequences of all respondents under the coefficients distribution θ is:  
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𝑆𝐿𝐿(𝜃) =  ∑ 𝑙𝑛[𝑃𝑛′(𝜃)]𝑛                                                                              (3.61) 
Substitute Equations 3.57, 3.60 into Equation 3.61,  
𝑆𝐿𝐿(𝜃) =  ∑ 𝑙𝑛 �1
𝑅
 ∑ ∏  exp(𝛽𝑟|𝜃𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛽𝑟|𝜃𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡)𝑗∈𝐶𝑡𝑅𝑟=1 �𝑛                                              
(3.62) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimate is applied to find the mean and standard 
deviation of the coefficients distribution θ* that maximize the simulated log-
likelihood of respondents’ choice sequences. If the estimated standard 
deviation coefficient is significant, there is significant heterogeneity in 
respondents’ preferences for the attribute. In this study, the estimation of 
RPL was also conducted by the special package “mlogit” of the statistical 
program R (Croissant 2013).  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter explains and elaborates the research design, method and 
models used in this study. Non-market valuation was used to develop PES 
schemes for the water protection of the middle route of the South-to-North 
Water Transfer Project from both supply and demand perspectives. On the 
demand (consumer) perspective, a Contingent Valuation survey was 
conducted in four cities along the middle route project in order to investigate 
urban residents’ willingness to pay higher water prices for water protection. 
The non-parametric model, the Single Bound Dichotomous Choice Model 
and the Double Bound Dichotomous Choice Model were applied to estimate 
respondents’ mean WTP. An integrated procedure to combine the automatic 
stepwise regression and best subset regression techniques and manual 
adjustment was designed and developed in Contingent Valuation for model 
construction and refinement.  
On the supply (provider) side of PES, a Choice Experiments survey was 
conducted in seven villages at the water supply area (around the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir) to reveal farmer households’ preferences for the 
design of two water protection programs, namely the existing Sloping Land 
Conversion Program for reforestation and a hypothetical program for 
fertilizer reduction. In addition to the classic Conditional Logit Model, the 
advanced Random Parameters Logit Model was also applied in this study to 
further reveal the heterogeneity in farmer households’ preferences. 
Furthermore, auxiliary questions were also asked in the choice experiments 
survey to investigate the effect of the SLCP on the livelihoods of the 
- 80 - 
participant households. The results from the surveys and model estimation 
are discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Public Willingness to Pay for Water Protection 
The successful design of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes 
requires knowledge and information from both the demand and supply sides. 
On the demand side, it is important to know whether the service users are 
willing to pay for the target service and factors that might influence their 
willingness to pay (WTP). This chapter presents the results of the Contingent 
Valuation survey in four cities along the middle route of the South-to-North 
Water Transfer Project (SNWTP) on urban residents’ WTP for water 
protection.  
The contents of this chapter are arranged as follows: Section 4.1 describes 
respondents’ characteristics, environmental awareness, knowledge and 
opinions which help to explain their answers to the WTP question, i.e. 
whether they are willing to pay a proposed higher water price for water 
protection of the middle route of the SNWTP. Section 4.2 applies the 
relatively simple non-parametric model to provide preliminary estimates of 
respondents’ mean WTP for water protection. Section 4.3 applies more 
sophisticated parametric models for each city to explain the probability of 
respondents’ acceptance to a higher water price. Section 4.4 conducts a 
comparative analysis on the final parametric models of the four cities. 
Section 4.5 compares the WTP estimates of both parametric and non-
parametric models and explores the effect of income disparity on the WTP 
for water protection. Lastly, Section 4.6 summarizes the major findings of 
this chapter. 
4.1 Respondents’ Characteristics, Environmental Awareness, 
Knowledge and Opinions 
A total of 755 questionnaires were collected from the four cities, with 200 
from Beijing, 247 from Tianjin, 98 from Shijiazhuang and 210 from 
Zhengzhou. Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of respondents in each 
city and a significance test of difference between them. The results show 
that significant differences were found in all characteristics except gender. 
This great heterogeneity in respondents indicates the necessity of 
conducting individual modelling analyses for each of the four cities.   
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of Respondents in Four Cities 
Dif.: significance level of difference between the four cities, 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Characteristic Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Zhengzhou Dif. 
Gender a (Male) 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.43  
Age 
30 and Below 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
Above 60 
No Answer 
 
35.5% 
21.5% 
24.5% 
8.5% 
9% 
1% 
 
34.0% 
22.3% 
23.5% 
13.8% 
6.1% 
0.4% 
 
34.7% 
24.5% 
16.3% 
9.2% 
14.3% 
1% 
 
34.8% 
32.9% 
21.0% 
7.6% 
1.4% 
2.4% 
 
*** 
Education 
Middle School and Below 
High School 
College and Higher 
No Answer 
 
6.0% 
21.0% 
71.0% 
2.0% 
 
15.4% 
28.7% 
50.6% 
2.3% 
 
13.3% 
29.6% 
55.1% 
2.0% 
 
12.9% 
26.7% 
55.2% 
5.2% 
 
** 
Income (yuan/month) b 
Below 2500 
2500-4000 
Above 4000 
No Answer 
 
30.5% 
26.0% 
35.0% 
8.5% 
 
49.0% 
26.3% 
9.7% 
15% 
 
76.5% 
11.2% 
7.1% 
5.1% 
 
50.5% 
20.0% 
16.7% 
12.9% 
 
*** 
Household Size 3.15 3.05 3.55 3.42 *** 
Job 
Public Sectors 
Private Sectors 
Retired 
Unemployed 
No Answer 
 
40.5% 
35.5% 
10.5% 
6.5% 
7% 
 
27.9% 
42.5% 
12.6% 
10.1% 
6.9% 
 
19.4% 
53.1% 
15.3% 
2.0% 
10.2% 
 
36.2% 
35.2% 
4.8% 
4.8% 
19% 
 
*** 
Residence (year) 
  Below 5 
5-10 
 10-20 
Over 20 
No Answer 
 
13.5% 
26.5% 
16.5% 
42.5% 
1.0% 
 
4.0% 
5.3% 
13.8% 
75.3% 
2.0% 
 
14.3% 
16.3% 
18.4% 
49.0% 
2.0% 
 
12.9% 
21.4% 
28.1% 
30.0% 
7.6% 
 
*** 
Visit c 0.24 0.11 0.10 0.09 *** 
Relatives d 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.10 * 
a Gender is represented by a binary variable whereby female=0 and male=1. 
b This variable refers to respondents’ personal gross monthly income. 
c This variable refers to whether the respondents had visited the water supply areas 
of the middle-route water transfer project. No=0, Yes=1 
d This variable refers to whether the respondents have relatives or close friends in 
the water supply areas. No=0, Yes=1 
 
Particular attention is paid to the difference in the income of respondents in 
the four cities. As shown in Table 4.1, while respondents at the lowest 
income level (Below 2500 yuan/month) accounted for the highest 
percentage in Shijiazhuang (77%), those at the highest level (Above 4000 
- 83 - 
yuan/month) accounted for the highest percentage in Beijing (35%). This is 
consistent with the fact that the annual disposal income per capita is lowest 
in Shijiazhuang and highest in Beijing (Table 3.1). The income levels shown 
in Table 4.1 were chosen because preliminary analysis found these levels 
helpful to produce better modelling results. The original income levels in the 
survey questionnaire (Appendix 1) ranged from “Below 1500 yuan/month” to 
“Over 20,000 yuan/month”. 
Further assessment of the representativeness of the sample of residents is 
difficult due to the lack of comparable reference data. The available census 
data, without mentioning its lack of detailed categorization of respondents’ 
characteristics, include residents in both urban and rural areas under the 
administration of the city governments, but this study focused on urban 
residents since the water transfer project mainly aimed to provide drinking 
water for the urban areas in the north. So this survey actually targeted at 
different population to the census. Nevertheless, some extent of similarity 
can be found between the results of this survey and the census data. For 
example, the percentage of male residents in Tianjin was 52% in the census 
and 53% in this survey. The percentage of residents at high school 
education level in Beijing was 21% in both the census and this survey, and 
the average household size was 3.47 in Shijiazhuang and 3.55 in this 
survey. Additionally, some similar results of respondents’ characteristics can 
also be found between this survey and the literature (Du and Mendelsohn 
2011; Guo et al. 2014). In general, it is fair to say that this survey has at 
least modestly represented the targeted urban residents in the four cities. 
In addition to the respondents’ characteristics, other information was also 
collected in the survey regarding respondents’ environmental awareness, 
knowledge, their opinions about the water transfer project, the policy 
instrument of Ecological Compensation (EC) 39
 
 and other water-related 
issues (Table 4.2). This information, together with respondents’ 
characteristics and the proposed increments in water price, was treated as 
explanatory variables which help to understand respondents’ answers to the 
WTP questions.   
                                            
39
 As explained in the literature review chapter, EC was treated as an 
interchangeable term with PES in this study. EC was use in the survey 
questionnaire of this study because it was the indigenous term used by 
the governments and mass media in China. 
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Table 4.2 Explanatory Variables of Respondents’ Environmental 
Awareness, Knowledge and Opinions 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Perceive-shortage: perception of water supply in the city. Opinion-service: 
opinion about the current tap water service. Know-bill: know their own water bills 
Yes=1, No=0. Know-price: know the current water price, Yes=1, No=0. Heard-
SNWTP: have heard about the water transfer project, Yes=1, No=0. Know-
benefits: know the potential benefits of the SNWTP, from 0 (know nothing) to 4 
(know all the four major benefits). Heard-mid-route: have heard about the specific 
middle rout project, Yes=1, No=0. Know-reservoir: know the Danjiangkou 
Reservoir as the start of the middle route project, Yes=1, No=0. Heard-EC: have 
heard the policy of Ecological Compensation, Understand-EC: can correctly tell the 
general idea of EC, Yes=1, No=0. Opinion-EC: opinion about the idea of EC. 
 
Explanatory Variable  Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Zhengzhou Dif. 
Perceive-shortage 
Abundant 
Moderate 
Scarce 
No Answer 
 
35.5% 
27.5% 
33.5% 
3.5% 
 
47.4% 
30.8% 
19.8% 
2.0% 
 
29.6% 
45.9% 
21.4% 
3.1% 
 
34.3% 
39.0% 
19.0% 
7.7% 
*** 
Opinion-service 
Satisfactory 
Acceptable 
Dissatisfactory 
No Answer 
 
38.5% 
43.0% 
16.5% 
2.0% 
 
47.4% 
42.1% 
9.3% 
1.2% 
 
28.6% 
50.0% 
21.4% 
0.0% 
 
32.9% 
41.9% 
22.4% 
2.9% 
 
*** 
Know-bill 0.48 0.55 0.62 0.43 ** 
Know-price 0.33 0.44 0.41 0.35  
Heard-SNWTP 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.92  
Know-benefits 1.87 1.87 1.39 1.59 *** 
Heard-mid-route 0.37 0.25 0.33 0.43 *** 
Know-reservoir 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.14 *** 
Heard-EC 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.26 * 
Understand-EC 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 ** 
Opinion-EC 
Highly Agree 
Agree 
Not Sure 
Disagree 
Highly Disagree 
No Answer 
 
20.5% 
49.5% 
16.0% 
7.5% 
2.0% 
4.5% 
 
13.4% 
37.7% 
19.4% 
3.6% 
2.8% 
23.1% 
 
18.4% 
60.2% 
8.2% 
5.1% 
1.0% 
7.1% 
 
12.9% 
33.3% 
20.5% 
15.2% 
7.1% 
11.0% 
 
*** 
 
In fact, apart from serving as the explanatory variables for modelling 
analysis, the information of respondents’ environmental awareness, 
knowledge and opinions itself also provides useful and interesting findings. 
The survey results show that only 19%-34% of respondents in the four cities 
thought the water supply in their cities was scarce despite the severe water 
shortage in all the four cities. On the other hand, 75%-89% of respondents in 
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the four cities felt that the current tap water service was satisfactory or 
acceptable. This interesting contrast of low awareness of water shortage and 
high satisfaction of water service implies that the city governments’ 
endeavour to secure water supply may have overprotected the residents 
from realizing the severe water shortage problem of the four cities.  
Furthermore, about half of the respondents in the four cities (43%-62%) 
knew approximately how much their water bills were, and only 33%-44% 
could tell the current water price, which indicate the necessity of providing 
the relevant information before asking the WTP questions to ensure that the 
respondents knew the implication of their answers to the proposed 
increments in water price.  
Over 90% of respondents in the four cities had heard about the SNWTP 
before the survey, but substantially fewer respondents (25%-43%) had 
heard about the specific middle route of the SNWTP. Even fewer (1-14%) of 
them knew the Danjiangkou Reservoir as the major water supply area of the 
middle route project. With regard to the knowledge and opinions about EC, 
only 13%-26% of respondents in the four cities had heard about the EC 
policy, and very few of them (1%-9%) could correctly describe its general 
idea. After a brief introduction of EC by the interviewers in the survey, the 
minority of the respondents (6%-22%) showed clearly opposing attitudes 
(Disagree or Highly Disagree) while 46%-78% of them showed clearly 
supportive attitudes (Agree or Highly Agree).  
The results above show that respondents in the four cities generally had 
quite limited knowledge about the middle route project and the EC policy. 
Implications of this finding will be discussed after the modelling analysis 
revealed the effect of this knowledge on respondents’ WTP for water 
protection. Additionally, similar to the case of respondents’ characteristics, 
significant differences were found in all the aforementioned awareness, 
knowledge and opinions (except Know-price and Heard-SNWTP) between 
respondents in different cities, which again implies the need of building 
individual models for respondents in each city.  
4.2 Non-parametric Model Estimates of WTP for Water 
protection 
As explained in the Methodology chapter, a non-parametric model (Haab 
and McConnell 2002; Carson and Hanemann 2005; Akram and Olmstead 
2011) was used in this study to estimate the lower bound of respondents’ 
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mean WTP. The only information needed for this estimation was the 
percentages of no answer to different offered prices (i.e. increments in water 
price) 40
Figure 4.1 shows the original percentages of no answer in four cities. The 
data of Tianjin and Zhengzhou behaved very well in terms of monotonicity, 
thus no smoothing procedure was needed. When the offered price increased 
from 0.1 to 1.5 yuan/m3, the percentage of no answer increased from 42% to 
85% in Tianjin and from 48% to 93% in Zhengzhou. In general, respondents 
in Shijiazhuang did give more no answers to larger increments in water 
price, but the data was not perfectly monotonically distributed, which may be 
attributed to the relatively small number of respondents in this city. 
. This estimation also required a monotonic distribution of the 
percentages of no answer. When the original percentages of no answer from 
the survey results were not monotonically increasing with the offered price, a 
merging and smoothing procedure was applied to impose the restriction of 
monotonicity.   
  
 
Figure 4.1 Original Percentages of No Answer in Four Cities 
                                            
40
 A no answer meant that the respondent’s WTP was less than the 
proposed increment in water price, thus the percentages of no answer to 
a series of increments in water price helped to construct the cumulative 
density function of WTP whereby the mean WTP was estimated. 
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The data of Beijing exhibited more violation of monotonicity when the offered 
price exceeded 0.5 yuan/m3. However, this non-monotonicity does not 
necessarily imply that the data of Beijing was poor in quality. A possible 
explanation is that the increase in water price alone could not well explain 
the percentage of no answer in this city and there were other variables that 
strongly influenced respondents’ answers. These influential variables cannot 
be revealed by the non-parametric model, but they will be investigated in the 
parametric models in the next section. To proceed with the non-parametric 
model, the non-monotonicity of the data of Shijiazhuang and Beijing was 
overcome by the smoothing procedure explained in Section 3.2.1.  
Figure 4.2 shows the data of Shijiazhuang and Beijing before and after 
imposing the monotonicity. For Shijiazhuang, the original data points at the 
increments of 0.1 and 0.2 yuan/m3 were merged as a new data point at 0.1 
yuan/m3, and the original data points at 0.8 and 1.0 yuan/m3 were merged at 
a new data point at 0.8 yuan/m3. For Beijing, the original data points at 0.5, 
0.8, 1.0 and 1.5 yuan/m3 were all merged at a new data point at 0.5 yuan/m3. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Imposing Monotonicity on the Data of Shijiazhuang and 
Beijing for Non-parametric Estimation 
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After ensuring the monotonicity of the datasets of all the four cities, the lower 
bound of respondents’ mean WTP, its variance and 95% confidence 
intervals were estimated by the non-parametric model. The results are 
presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 WTP Estimates of the Non-parametric Model (yuan/m3) 
Number of respondents: Beijing (200), Tianjin (247), Shijiazhuang (98) and 
Zhengzhou (210) 
City Mean WTP a Variance CI (L) b CI (U) 
Tianjin 0.44 (10.1%) 0.0027 0.44 0.45 
Shijiazhuang 0.37 (10.1%) 0.0086 0.35 0.38 
Zhengzhou 0.35 (14.5%) 0.0025 0.34 0.36 
Beijing 0.29 (7.20%) 0.0003 0.29 0.29 
a Values in the parentheses are the proportions of the mean WTP to the current 
water prices in the four cities. 
b CI (L) and CI (U) are the lower and upper endpoints of the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
      
The estimation results of the non-parametric model show that, on average, 
respondents in Tianjin were willing to pay the largest increase in water price 
(0.44 yuan/m3) for water protection, while those in Beijing were willing to pay 
the lowest increase (0.29 yuan/m3). Respondents in Shijiazhuang and 
Zhengzhou had similar mean WTP of 0.37 and 0.35 yuan/m3, respectively. 
The variances of the estimation results were very trivial. Even the largest 
variance was only 0.0086 yuan/m3 for the estimates of Shijiazhuang, where 
the number of respondents was smallest in the four cities.  
Estimation of the non-parametric model was simple and direct. But cautioun 
is needed in using the results for further analysis, since this model did not 
take account of factors like respondents’ income and their environmental 
knowledge which might strongly influence their WTP, and the smoothing 
procedure for imposing the monotonicity might also introduce bias in the 
WTP estimates. As a result, more sophisticated parametric logit models 
were applied in Section 4.3 to investigate respondents’ WTP for water 
protection with influential factors. The WTP estimates of both non-parametric 
and parametric models are compared in Section 4.5.   
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4.3 Parametric Models for Estimating Public WTP for Water 
protection  
This section focuses on individual analysis of parametric logit models for 
respondents in each of the four cities. For each city, three logit models, i.e. 
the initial full model containing all the explanatory variables, the best subset 
model determined by the automatic best subset regression procedure and 
the final stepwise regression model determined by the integrated procedure 
of automatic stepwise regression and manual adjustment, are compared to 
justify the choice of the final stepwise regression model for further analysis. 
Then the explanatory variables in the final stepwise model of each city are 
discussed in detail regarding their influence on respondents’ answers to the 
WTP question.  
4.3.1 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Beijing 
Table 4.4 presents the estimation results of three models for respondents in 
Beijing. The initial full model with all the 20 explanatory variables41
The best subset regression model was determined by comparing all the 220 = 
1,048,576 regression models which included a subset of the 20 explanatory 
variables in the initial full model and choosing the model with the smallest 
AIC. Compared with the initial full model, the best subset model with 11 
explanatory variables substantially reduced the AIC from 176.13 to 152.99 
and improved the overall model significance from 0.02 to 4.34×10-5, but the 
prediction error rate increased from 0.24 to 0.28. Despite these superiorities 
over the initial full model, the best subset model only contained slightly more 
observations (128) and 5 out of its 11 explanatory variables were still 
insignificant.  
 had a 
prediction error rate of 0.24. Its overall model significance was 0.02, which 
indicates that this model is significantly better than the null model (the 
regression model with no variable but only a constant). However, the 
majority of the 20 explanatory variables in the initial full model were not 
significant even at the 0.1 level, and the model contained only 124 
observations (respondents) while a total of 200 observations were collected 
in the survey of Beijing.  
                                            
41
 The variable Heard-SNWTP was removed from the initial full model 
because only 8 respondents had not heard about the water transfer 
project before the survey, and this number was too small for regression 
analysis. 
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Table 4.4 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Beijing 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error)  
Initial Full Model Best Subset Model 
Final Stepwise 
Model 
(Intercept) 4.01  (1.68) * 3.76  (1.22) ** 2.49  (0.92) ** 
Perceive-shortage 
Moderate 
Scarce 
 
-0.55 (0.76)  
-0.87 (0.76) 
 
-0.32 (0.57) 
-0.66 (0.59)  
 
Opinion-service 
Acceptable 
Dissatisfactory 
 
0.09  (0.55) 
-0.15 (0.90) 
  
Know-bill 1.14  (0.66) ○ 0.68  (0.46)  
Know-price 0.24  (0.80)    
Know-benefits 0.34  (0.27) 0.33  (0.22) 0.33  (0.19) ○ 
Heard-mid-route 0.88  (0.64)   
Know-reservoir 0.75  (0.93)   
Heard-EC -3.07 (1.18) ** -1.44 (0.80) ○  
Understand-EC 3.30  (1.42) * 2.09  (1.10) ○ 1.43  (0.81) ○ 
Opinion-EC -1.31 (0.36) *** -0.92 (0.29) ** -0.71 (0.23) ** 
Price-increase -1.60 (0.67) * -1.25 (0.56) * -0.92 (0.47) ○ 
Household-size -0.46 (0.21) * -0.44 (0.17) * -0.48 (0.16) ** 
Income (yuan/month) 
2500-4000 
Above 4000 
 
0.68  (0.79) 
0.15  (0.86) 
 
  Above 2500 
0.53  (0.52) 
 
Above 2500 
1.13  (0.44) ** 
Gender (Male) 0.09  (0.50)   
Age  
31-40 
41-50 
50-60 
Above 60 
 
0.08  (0.73) 
0.36  (0.70) 
3.30  (1.71) ○ 
2.92  (2.23) 
  Above 50 
 2.30 (1.17) *  
Education  
High School 
Middle School or Below 
 
0.73  (0.91) 
-1.94 (1.75) 
  
Job 
Private Sectors 
Retired & Unemployed 
 
-0.36 (0.63) 
-1.93 (1.64) 
 
  Without Job 
-2.12 (1.21) ○ 
 
Residence (year) 
10-20 
  5-10 
 Below 5 
 
1.19  (0.89) 
-0.24 (0.68) 
1.22  (0.95) 
  
Visit 1.04  (0.75)   
Relatives -0.48 (0.74)   
     Model Evaluation Indicator 
AIC 176.13  152.99 170.93 
Prediction Error Rate 0.24  (124) a 0.27 (128) 0.24 (149) 
Overall  Significance 0.02 4.34×10-5 5.34×10-8 
a Number in the parentheses is the number of observations (respondents) included 
in this model. 
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The final stepwise regression model selected six explanatory variables from 
the initial full model and increased the observations to 148. The 200-148=52 
omitted observations were mainly caused by missing values of the response 
variable (26 respondents did not give a clear yes/no answer to the WTP 
question) and the explanatory variables of Income and Opinion-EC (17 
respondents refused to give information about their income and 9 
respondents chose to give no opinion about the idea of Ecological 
Compensation). Compared with the best subset model, the final stepwise 
regression model had a larger AIC due to the larger number of observations, 
but it had a smaller prediction error rate (0.24 versus 0.28) and considerably 
higher overall model significance (5.34×10-8 versus 4.34×10-5). As a result, 
this final stepwise regression model was used as the final model for further 
analysis.  
The improvement of model fitting from the initial full model to the best subset 
model and the final stepwise regression model justifies the model building 
and selection procedure adopted by this study. Moreover, it can be noted 
that the variables of Understand-EC, Opinion-EC, Price-increase and 
Household Size were all significant at least at the 0.1 level in all the three 
models, which reflects the consistency between them. 
It is noteworthy that the variable Income in the initial full model was 
categorized into three levels, i.e. the reference level of “below 2500 
yuan/month” (omitted in Table 4.4 for saving space) and the other two levels 
of 2500-4000 and above 4000 yuan/month, and neither of the two levels was 
significant in the initial full model. However, after merging the two levels, the 
new income level of “above 2500 yuan/month” became significant at the 
0.01 level in the final stepwise model. This is an example of adjusting the 
categorization of explanatory variables for better revealing their effects on 
respondents’ yes answer to the WTP question. It can also be noticed that 
although the same adjustment of categorization was applied, the variable 
Income in the best subset model was not significant, which may be 
explained by the different number of observations in the two models. The 
same reason may also apply to other variables that showed different levels 
of significance in different models.  
Figure 4.3 provides an intuitive visualization of the estimated coefficients of 
the six explanatory variables in the final stepwise regression model (the last 
column in Table 4.4). As explained in the Methodology chapter, the 
coefficients in logit models represent the changes in the logit (log-odds) of 
the yes answer that are caused by a unit change in the explanatory 
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variables. And the exponents of the coefficients represent the odds ratios of 
yes answer between two groups of respondents who have a unit difference 
in the explanatory variables. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Explanatory Variables in the Final Model of Beijing 
Colour bars represent the estimated coefficients in terms of logit (log-odds) of the 
probability of yes answer to the WTP question. Thin lines represent the estimated 
values ± standard errors. 
 
The variables Understand-EC, Income and Know-benefits were found to 
have positive coefficients of 1.43, 1.13 and 0.33 respectively. That is to say, 
the odds of answering yes to the WTP question (i.e. accepting the proposed 
increase in water price) by respondents who could correctly describe the 
general idea of Ecological Compensation were e1.43 = 4.18 times larger than 
the odds of respondents who could not. And the odds of respondents who 
received gross income of more than 2500 yuan/month in Beijing were 
e1.13=3.10 times larger than those below that income level. Moreover, 
knowing each additional benefit of the SNWTP would make the odds of 
respondents’ yes answer e0.33=1.39 times larger. In other words, the odds of 
accepting a higher price by respondents who knew all the four major 
potential benefits of the water transfer project were e0.33×4=3.74 times larger 
than those who knew none of them. Among the three positive variables, 
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Income (above 2500 yuan/month) was significant at the 0.01 level while the 
other two were only significant at the 0.1 level.  
On the other hand, the variables Price-increase, Opinion-EC and 
Household-size were found to have negative coefficients of -0.92, -0.71 and 
-0.48 respectively. This indicates that an increase of 1 yuan/m3 in the water 
price would cause a decline in the odds of yes answer by 60% (1-e-0.92 
=0.60). With regard to respondents’ opinion about the idea of Ecological 
Compensation (Opinion-EC), for the coding numbers from 1 to 5 which 
represent the opinion from Highly Agree to Highly Disagree, each increase in 
the number (i.e. being more opposed against EC) would decrease the odds 
by 49% (1-e-0.71= 0.51). That is to say, respondents who highly disagreed 
with the idea of EC only had 5.8% (e-0.71×4=0.058) of the odds of accepting a 
higher price as those who highly agreed with EC had. Furthermore, each 
additional household member would lead to a decline in the odds of yes 
answer by 38% (1-e-0.48=0.38). Among the three negative variables, Opinion-
EC and Household Size were both significant at the 0.01 level while Price-
increase was only significant at the 0.1 level ( in fact, the exact p-value was 
0.0503, which was very close to the 0.05 significance level). 
Remembering that in the preceding section of the non-parametric model, the 
proportion of no answer to the WTP question in the survey of Beijing was not 
monotonically increasing with the rise in water price (Figure 4.1). The results 
of the estimated coefficients and significance levels  of the six explanatory 
variables in this final model confirms the earlier explanation that the increase 
in water price alone could not well explain the percentage of no answer of 
respondents in Beijing and there were other variables that strongly 
influenced respondents’ answers to the WTP question.  
4.3.2 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Tianjin 
Table 4.5 presents the estimation results of the initial full model, the best 
subset regression model and the final stepwise regression model for 
respondents in Tianjin. 
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Table 4.5 Parametric WTP Models for Respondent in Tianjin 
 Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Initial Full Model Best Subset Model 
Final Stepwise 
Model 
(Intercept) 2.12  (2.13)  0.79  (1.14)  0.11 (0.80) 
Perceive-shortage 
Moderate 
Scarce 
 
1.62  (0.81) *  
1.11  (1.07) 
Not Abundant 
0.81  (0.56) 
   
   
Opinion-service 
Acceptable 
Dissatisfactory 
 
-1.87 (1.01) ○ 
-4.10 (1.71) * 
 
-1.31 (0.70) ○ 
-2.68 (1.22) * 
 
Numeric a 
-1.01 (0.34) ** 
Know-bill -0.03 (0.79)    
Know-price 0.73  (0.74)  0.81  (0.52)  
Know-benefits 0.24  (0.30) 0.32  (0.22)  
Heard-mid-route 0.60  (0.71)  0.84  (0.46) ○ 
Heard-EC 1.95  (1.04) ○ 1.49  (0.66) * 1.37  (0.59) * 
Understand-EC 0.28  (1.49)    
Opinion-EC     -0.70 (0.47)  -0.57 (0.35)  
Price-increase     -1.86 (0.75) * -1.50 (0.58) ** -1.80 (0.50) *** 
Household-size     -0.37 (0.34)    
Income (yuan/month) 
2500-4000 
Above 4000 
 
0.79  (0.83) 
2.28  (1.23) ○ 
 
0.49  (0.58) 
2.15  (0.85) * 
  
 Numeric 
0.91  (0.33) ** 
Gender (Male) -0.44 (0.68) -0.73 (0.51)   
Age  
31-40 
41-50 
50-60 & Above 60 
 
0.85  (0.81) 
   -0.84 (1.20) 
    1.96  (1.39)  
 
  
Above 50 
    1.62  (0.71) * 
Job 
Private Sectors 
Retired 
Unemployed 
 
   -0.42 (0.69) 
   -3.57 (1.71) * 
   -0.34 (1.65) 
 
Without Job 
-1.18 (0.88) 
 
Without Job 
   -2.67 (0.84) ** 
Education  
High School 
Middle School or Below 
 
   -0.37 (0.81) 
  -1.09 (1.38) 
  
Residence 
10-20 
  5-10 
 Below 5 
 
 -1.33 (1.04) 
 -0.27 (1.38) 
 -1.14 (2.13) 
Less than 20 
-0.76 (0.67)  
Visit  -1.39 (1.17)   
Relatives   1.36  (1.07)  1.03  (0.57) ○ 
   Model Evaluation Indicator 
AIC 149.77  129.99 161.90 
Prediction Error Rate b 0.18 (109) 0.26 (111) 0.24 (155) 
Overall Significance 0.13×10-2 9.35×10-6 1.20×10-10 
a Numeric refers to numeric variable with linear effect. 
b Number in the parentheses is the number of observations (respondents). 
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Respondents in Tianjin seemed more reluctant to give their opinions and 
information in the survey, which caused a large number of missing values in 
the dataset. For example, 57 (23.2%) respondents chose to give no opinion 
about the general idea of Ecological Compensation (Opinion-EC) whereas 
only 9 (4.5%) respondents in Beijing did so. As a result, the initial full model 
with all the 19 explanatory variables42
The final stepwise model selected 8 out of the 19 explanatory variables of 
the initial full model and substantially increased the observations from 109 to 
155. The 92 omitted observations were caused by missing values of the 
response variable (48 respondents did not give a clear yes/no answer to the 
WTP question) and explanatory variables that showed significant effects on 
respondents’ answers to the WTP question but involved private information 
that some respondents refused to give such as Income (37 missing values) 
and Job (17 missing values). Despite having a larger AIC (161.90) than the 
other two models due to the substantial increase in observations, the final 
stepwise model maintained a moderate prediction error rate of 0.24. This 
means that the final stepwise model could correctly predicted 155 × (1-0.24) 
=118 respondents’ answers to the WTP question whereas the initial full 
model could only provide 109 × (1-0.18) = 89 correct predictions. More 
importantly, the overall model significance of the final stepwise model was 
much higher than the other two models (1.20×10-10). In spite of the 
considerable difference in the goodness of fit, the variables Opinion-service, 
Heard-EC, Price-increase, Income, and Job were significant at least at the 
0.1 level in all the three models, which reflects the underlying consistency 
between the three models.  
 contained only 109 observations while 
the survey actually collected a total of 247 observations. Nevertheless, the 
initial full model still exhibited some extent of ability to explain respondents’ 
answers to the WTP question given its prediction error rate of 0.18 and 
overall model significance of 1.30×10-3. In comparison, the best subset 
model of the Tianjin survey with 11 explanatory variables and similar 
observations (111) reduced the AIC from 149.77 to 129.99 and raised the 
overall model significance from 1.30×10-3 to 9.35×10-6, but the prediction 
error rate rose from 0.18 to 0.26.  
Noticing that the Income variable was categorized into three levels (the 
reference level of below 2500 yuan/month is not listed in Table 4.5) in the 
                                            
42
 The variable of Heard-SNWTP and Understand-EC were removed for a 
similar reason explained in Footnote 41. 
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initial full model but only one of the levels (above 4000 yuan/month) was 
significant at the 0.1 level. In the best subset model which had less 
explanatory variables and better goodness of fit, the income level of “above 
4000 yuan/month” became significant at the 0.05 level. Then in the final 
stepwise regression model with even less variables, better goodness of fit 
and more observations, the variable Income was treated as a numeric 
variable (with linear effects) and became significant at the 0.01 level. This is 
an example of improving model fitting and better revealing variables’ effects 
on respondents’ answers to the WTP question by removing unnecessary 
explanatory variables and adjusting the coding of variables. More examples 
can be easily found on other variables (such as Price-increase, of which the 
significance level was 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively in the three models) 
and in the results of other cities. Similar justification will not be repeated in 
later discussion.  
Figure 4.4 illustrates the eight explanatory variables in the final stepwise 
model for the respondents in Tianjin. The variables Age (above 50), Heard-
EC, Relatives, Income and Heard-mid-route were found to be positively 
influential on respondents’ yes answer to the WTP question with the 
coefficients of 1.62, 1.37, 1.03, 0.91 and 0.84 respectively. That is to say, 
the odds of accepting an increase in water price by respondents older than 
50 were 5.05 (e1.62) times larger than the odds of younger respondents. 
Those who had heard about Ecological Compensation were more likely to 
accept an increase in water price and the odds of yes answer were 3.94 
(e1.37) times larger.  
Respondents who had relatives or close friends living in the water source 
area had the acceptance odds 2.8 (e1.03) times larger. Compared with 
respondents whose gross income was below 2500 yuan/month, the 
acceptance odds of respondents who earned 2500-4000 yuan/month and 
more than 4000 yuan/month were 2.48 (e0.91) and 6.17 (e0.91×2) times larger 
respectively. Additionally, respondents who had heard about the specific 
middle route of the SNWTP had the acceptance odds 2.32(e0.84) times 
larger. For the five positive variables, Income was at the highest significance 
level of 0.01, Age (above 50) and Heard-EC were both at the 0.05 
significance level while Relatives and Heard-mid-route were only significant 
at the 0.1 level. 
- 97 - 
 
Figure 4.4 Explanatory Variables in the Final Model of Tianjin 
Without Job is the merged category of the variable of Job, referring to respondents 
who were retired or unemployed.  
 
The variable Job (retired & unemployed, i.e. “Without Job” in Figure 4.4), 
Price-increase and Opinion-service were found to be negatively influential on 
respondents’ yes answer to the WTP question with the coefficients of -2.67, -
1.80 and -1.01 respectively. This means that the odds of accepting a higher 
water price by respondents in retirement or unemployment were only 6.9% 
(e-2.67) of the odds of respondents who had a job. For an increase of 1 
yuan/m3 in the water price, the acceptance odds would decline by 83% (1 - 
e-1.80). Compared with respondents who felt satisfied about the current tap 
water service, those who thought it acceptable and dissatisfactory were less 
likely to accept an increase in water price and the odds of yes answer 
declined by 64% (1-e-1.01) and 87% (1-e-1.01*2) respectively.  
The finding of smaller odds of accepting a higher water price by respondents 
who were less satisfied about the current tap water service seems 
unexpected in the first place since the water transfer project is assumed to 
improve the tap water quality in the northern cities, so respondents should 
be more willing to pay a higher water price if they were not satisfied about 
the current tap water service. However, further analysis of the survey results 
found that among the 30 respondents in Tianjin who had given the reasons 
for their dissatisfaction about the tap water service, 25 of them mentioned 
water quality issues (turbidity, odour and taste), but 28 of them did not know 
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the water transfer project could improve tap water quality in the northern 
cities. In other words, these respondents were less willing to pay a higher 
water price probably because they did not want to pay additional money for 
a service that (they thought) could not solve their water quality problem. 
Lastly, among the three negative variables, Job and Opinion-service were 
both significant at the 0.01 level, and Price-increase was highly significant at 
the 0.001 level, which corresponds with the findings in the section of non-
parametric model that the data of Tianjin survey behaved quite well in terms 
of monotonicity (Figure 4.1). 
4.3.3 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Shijiazhuang 
Only 98 questionnaires were collected in Shijiazhuang because only two 
interviewers were successfully recruited to conduct the survey in this city. As 
shown below, less substantial improvement was achieved in model fitting for 
the dataset of this city compared with Beijing and Tianjin, yet the modelling 
analysis revealed some useful and interesting results.  
Table 4.6 presents the estimation results of the three models for 
respondents in Shijiazhuang. In spite of having a decent prediction error rate 
of 0.17, the initial full model of the Shijiazhuang survey with all the 19 
explanatory variables43
                                            
43
 The variable of Heard-SNWTP and Understand-EC were removed for 
similar reason explained in Footnote 41. 
 contained only 60 observations and the overall 
model significance was merely 0.04. In comparison, the best subset model 
with 12 variables reduced the AIC from 96.06 to 77.05 and improved the 
overall model significance to 7.45×10-4, but the prediction error rate rose to 
0.23 with slightly more observations (62). The final stepwise model selected 
7 out of the 19 explanatory variables in the initial full model and increased 
the observations from 60 to 72. The 26 omitted observations were mainly 
caused by missing values of the response variable (13 respondents did not 
give a clear yes/no answer to the WTP question) and the explanatory 
variables of Opinion-EC (7 missing values) and Income (5 missing values). 
Due to the increase in the total observations, the AIC of the final stepwise 
model was larger than the best subset model but still smaller than the initial 
final model. The overall model significance of the final stepwise model 
(1.27×10-3) was also between that of the other two models.   
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Table 4.6 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Shijiazhuang 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Initial Full Model Best Subset Model 
Final Stepwise 
Model 
(Intercept) 3.98  (3.86)  1.86  (2.47)  0.99  (1.22) 
Perceive-shortage 
Moderate 
Scarce 
 
5.69  (2.81) * 
5.99  (3.37) ○ 
 Not Abundant 
4.14  (1.71) * 
 
 Not Abundant 
 0.59  (0.66) 
Opinion-service 
Acceptable 
Dissatisfactory 
 
-0.13 (1.42)  
-2.13 (2.18) 
 
  
Know-bill 1.17 (1.32)  1.63 (1.03)  
Know-price 0.39  (1.85)    
Know-benefits -0.90  (1.01) -0.31 (0.63)  
Heard-mid-route -3.54 (2.22) -3.20 (1.36) * -1.75 (0.87) * 
Know-reservoir 5.50  (2.74) ○ 4.00  (1.94) * 2.46  (1.13) * 
Heard-EC -0.31  (2.20)    
Opinion-EC -2.53 (1.87)   -1.70 (1.03) ○    -0.58 (0.47)  
Price-increase -2.72 (1.45) ○ -2.57 (1.18) * -2.20 (0.86) * 
Household-size 0.28  (0.52)    
Income (yuan/month) 
Above 2500 
 
-1.92 (1.93)  
 
-0.35 (1.22) 
 
1.52  (0.79) ○ 
Gender (Male) -0.88 (1.32)   
Age  
31-40 
41-50 
50-60 & Above 60 
 
0.78  (1.41) 
-1.25 (1.88) 
0.41  (2.80)  
  
Job 
Private Sectors 
Retired & Unemployed 
 
-1.95 (2.05) 
-3.74 (2.51) 
 
-2.12 (1.35) 
-2.01 (1.65) 
 
Education  
High School 
Middle School or Below 
 
-0.80 (1.61) 
1.30  (2.23) 
  
  
Residence 
10-20 
  5-10 
 Below 5  
 
-2.69 (2.00) 
1.46  (1.93) 
-3.54 (2.74) 
 
-1.84 (1.30) 
1.40  (1.24) 
-1.50 (1.82) 
  
 5-10 year 
   2.34  (1.03) * 
Visit 4.10  (2.84) 3.09  (1.77) ○  
Relatives 2.94  (1.59) ○ 2.26  (1.14) *  
   Model Evaluation Indicator 
AIC 96.06  77.05 87.53 
Prediction Error Rate a 0.17 (60) 0.23 (62) 0.21 (72) 
Overall Significance 0.04 7.45×10-4 1.27×10-3 
a Number in the parentheses is the number of observations (respondents). 
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As mentioned above, the improvement in model fitting from the initial full 
model to the final stepwise model was less substantial for the dataset of 
Shijiazhuang than the case of Beijing and Tianjin. This could be attributed to 
the relatively small number of the total observations in this city. 
Nevertheless, the prediction error rate (0.21) of the final stepwise model 
indicates that it could make 57 correct predictions of respondents’ answer to 
the WTP question, while the initial full model and the best subset model 
could just make 50 and 48 correct predictions respectively. Since the final 
stepwise model better accorded with the Principle of Parsimony (i.e. 
achieving satisfactory model fitting with fewest variables), it was adopted as 
the final model for further analysis. On the other hand, a certain degree of 
consistency did exist in the three models as the variables Know-reservoir 
and Price-increase were both significant at least at the 0.1 level in all the 
three models. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the seven explanatory variables in the final stepwise 
model for respondents in Shijiazhuang. The variables Know-reservoir, 
Residence (5-10), Income (above 2500 yuan/month) and Perceive-shortage 
(perception of water shortage) were found to have positive coefficients of 
2.46, 2.34, 1.52 and 0.59 respectively. This indicates that respondents who 
knew the Danjiangkou Reservoir as the start (and major water supply area) 
of the middle route project were more likely to accept the increase in water 
price and their acceptance odds were 11.70 (e2.46) times larger than the 
odds of respondents who did not know.  
Interestingly, respondents who had lived in Shijiazhuang for 5-10 years had 
the odds (e2.34) of accepting a higher price 10.38 times larger than the odds 
of respondents who had lived in the city for either a shorter or longer time. 
Perhaps this was because those short-term and temporary (less than 5 year) 
residents were less interested in paying a higher water price for future 
benefits of the water resource protection, while those who had lived in the 
city for more than 10 years had witnessed the substantial increase in water 
price during the past two decades 44
 
, so they were more averse to any 
further increase.  
                                            
44
 The water price in Shijiazhuang was 1.03 yuan/m3 in 2000, 2.93 yuan/m3 
in 2007 and 3.63 yuan/m3 at present. 
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Figure 4.5 Explanatory Variables in the Final Model of Shijiazhuang 
The error bar of the variable P-shortage stretches across the boundary line of x=0, 
which means that within the range of the estimated mean ± standard error, the 
coefficient of this variable is possible to be a minus value. This is an intuitive 
visualization of the low significance level of this variable
45
 
. 
Compared with respondents whose income was less than 2500 yuan/month, 
those with higher income were more willing to accept a higher water price 
with the odds 4.57 (e1.52) times larger. While the variables Know-reservoir 
and Residence were both significant at the 0.05 level, Income was 
significant at the 0.1 level (in fact, the exact p-value of Income was 0.055, 
which was much closer to 0.05 than to 0.1). The variable Perceive-shortage 
was below the 0.1 significance level but still retained in the model for its 
contribution to the overall model fitting. Its positive coefficient and low 
significance level means that compared with respondents who thought the 
water supply in Shijiazhuang was Abundant (the reference level which is not 
shown in Table 4.6), respondents who thought it was Moderate or Scarce 
might be more likely to give a yes answer to the WTP question and the odds 
                                            
45
 The variable Opinion-EC was also below the 0.1 significance level but its 
error bar does not stretch across the boundary of x=0. This is because it 
has a smaller p-value than the variable of Perceive-shortage (0.22 versus 
0.37).  
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could be 1.80 (e0.59) times larger, but the difference would not be statistically 
significant. 
With regard to the negative variables to respondents’ acceptance to a higher 
water price, Price-increase had the coefficient of -2.20 at the 0.05 
significance level, indicating that an increase of 1 yuan/m3 in the water price 
led to a decrease in the odds of yes answer by 89% (1-e-2.20). The variable 
Heard-mid-route was found to have a negative coefficient of -1.75 at the 
0.05 significance level, which implies that respondents who had heard about 
the middle route project had smaller odds (17%, i.e. e-1.75) of accepting a 
higher water price. This is an unexpected result since it would be more 
reasonable to assume that more knowledge about the water transfer project 
would make respondents more supportive to the proposal of paying a higher 
water price for protecting water resources. A fact that may explain this 
unexpected result is that the northernmost part of the middle route project 
was completed in 2008 in order to transfer water from Shijiazhuang to 
Beijing for securing the water supply for the 2008 Olympic Games and later 
for drought in the summer of the following years. That is to say, instead of 
benefiting (receiving water) from the middle route project, Shijiazhuang was 
actually contributing water to the project when the survey was conducted. 
Respondents who knew this information might therefore be more averse to 
the increase in water price. 
Additionally, the variable Opinion-EC had the coefficient of -0.58 with low 
significance level (the exact p-value was 0.22), which indicates that for the 
coding numbers from 1 to 5 which represent the opinions from Highly Agree 
to Highly Disagree with the idea of Ecological Compensation, each increase 
in the coding number might led to a decline in the odds of yes answer by 
44% (1-e-0.58), but the difference was not statistically significant. Similar to 
the variable Perceive-shortage, this variable was not significant but retained 
in the model because of its contribute to the overall model fitting for the 
dataset of Shijiazhuang with relatively small number of respondents. 
4.3.4 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Zhengzhou 
Table 4.7 presents the estimation results of the three models for 
respondents in Zhengzhou. The initial full model with all the 19 explanatory 
variables had a decent prediction error rate of 0.17 and overall model 
significance of 1.96×10-4, but it contained only 104 complete observations 
though 210 questionnaires were actually collected in this city. The best 
subset model which contained 7 variables and similar observations (108) 
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reduced the AIC from 137.79 to 108.55 and raised the overall model 
significance to 2.29×10-9 with slightly higher prediction error rate of 0.18.  
 
Table 4.7 Parametric WTP Models for Respondents in Zhengzhou 
 Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Initial Full Model Best Subset Model 
Final Stepwise 
Model 
(Intercept) 2.62  (2.22)  1.87  (1.31)  0.34  (0.96) 
Perceive-shortage 
Moderate 
Scarce 
 
-1.19 (0.97)  
-0.22 (1.38) 
 Not Abundant 
-1.17  (0.61) ○ 
 
Opinion-service 
Acceptable 
Dissatisfactory 
 
-0.14 (0.89)  
-0.36 (1.34) 
 
  
Know-bill -0.37 (0.80)    
Know-price -0.90 (0.92)    
Know-benefits 0.54  (0.35) 0.35  (0.24) 0.52  (0.22) * 
Heard-mid-route -0.09 (0.81)   
Know-reservoir 1.83  (1.09) ○   
Heard-EC 0.28  (0.84)    
Opinion-EC -0.93 (0.42) *  -0.59 (0.28) *  -0.49 (0.22) * 
Price-increase -3.88 (1.09) *** -3.30 (0.73) *** -2.86 (0.64) *** 
Household-size 0.18  (0.29)    
Income (yuan/month) 
2500-4000 
Above 4000 
 
1.03  (0.99) 
1.40  (1.05)  
 
 Numeric 
   0.78  (0.38) * 
 
 Numeric 
   1.04  (0.34) ** 
Gender (Male) -0.91 (0.79)   -0.98 (0.52) ○ 
Age  
31-40 
41-50 
50-60 & Above 60 
 
0.14  (0.90) 
1,32 (1.22) 
3.37  (2.81)  
  
Job 
Private Sectors 
Retired 
Unemployed 
 
1.09  (1.04) 
-1.96 (3.04) 
1.46  (1.77) 
 
0.65  (0.69) 
0.55  (1.39) 
0.75  (1.46) 
 
Education  
High School 
Middle School or Below 
 
-0.36 (1.07) 
-0.49 (1.48) 
 No college 
-0.33 (0.73)  
Residence 
10-20 
  5-10 
 Below 5 
 
0.22  (0.93) 
0.48  (0.94) 
1.04  (1.33) 
  
Visit -0.29 (1.56)   
Relatives -1.39 (1.37)   
   Model Evaluation Indicator 
AIC 137.79  108.55 120.68 
Prediction Error Rate a 0.17 (104) 0.18 (108) 0.18 (130) 
Overall Significance 1.96×10-4 2.29×10-9 1.41×10-12 
a Number in the parentheses is the number of observations (respondents). 
- 104 - 
 
The final stepwise model selected 5 out of the 19 explanatory variables from 
the initial full model and included 130 observations. The 80 omitted 
observations were largely caused by missing values in the response variable 
(43 respondents did not give a clear yes/no answer to the WTP question) 
and the explanatory variables of Income (27 missing values) and Opinion-
EC (23 missing values).  As a results of the increase in total observations, 
the final stepwise model had a larger AIC (120.68) than the best subset 
model (yet still smaller than the initial full model). However, the final stepwise 
model maintained the prediction error rate at 0.18, which means it could 
correctly predict 108 respondents’ answers to the WTP question while the 
other two models could only provide 86 and 89 correct predictions 
respectively. More importantly, the overall model significance of the final 
stepwise model was as impressively high as 1.41×10-12. Meanwhile, the 
variables Opinion-EC and Price-increase were significant in all the three 
models at the 0.05 and 0.001 level respectively, reflecting the consistency 
between the three models.  
Figure 4.6 illustrates the five explanatory variables in the final stepwise 
model for respondents in Zhengzhou. Two of the five variables, Income and 
Know-benefits were found to have positive coefficients of 1.04 and 0.52 at 
the significance levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively. That is to say, 
compared with respondents who earned less than 2500 yuan/month, those 
who earned 2500-4000 yuan/month had 2.83 (e1.04) times larger odds of 
accepting a higher water price, and those who earned more than 4000 
yuan/month had 8.00 (e1.04×2) times larger odds to do so.  
Moreover, knowing each additional benefit of the SNWTP would make the 
respondents’ odds of accepting the increase in water price 1.68 (e0.52) times 
larger. In other words, respondents who knew all the four benefits of the 
SNWTP had (e0.52×4) 8.00 times larger odds to accept a higher water price 
than respondents who knew nothing about it at all. Interestingly, the positive 
effect of knowing all the four benefits of the SNWTP was equivalent to the 
effect of earning over 4000 yuan/month, which would both make the odds of 
yes answer (to the WTP question) 8 times larger. This result reflects the 
important role of non-economic factors such as environmental knowledge in 
shaping respondents’ WTP for water protection. 
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Figure 4.6 Explanatory Variables of the Final Model of Zhengzhou 
 
On the other hand, three of the five variables in the final stepwise model, 
Price-increase, Gender (male) and Opinion-EC, were found to have negative 
coefficients of -2.86, -0.98 and -0.49 at the significance levels of 0.001, 0.1 
and 0.05  respectively. This means for an increase of 1 yuan/m3 in the water 
price, the odds of respondents’ yes answer to the WTP question would 
significantly decline by 94% (1-e-2.86). Male respondents seemed less likely 
to accept a higher water price and the odds of their yes answer could be as 
low as 38% of the odds of female respondents, but this difference was just 
significant at the 0.1 level. With regard to the variable Opinion-EC, for the 
coding numbers from 1 to 5 which represent the opinions from Highly Agree 
to Highly Disagree with the idea of Ecological Compensation, each increase 
in the coding number would lead to a decline in the odds of yes answer by 
39% (1-e-0.49). In other words, the odds of accepting a higher price by 
respondents who highly disagreed with the idea of EC would be as low as 
14% (e-0.49×4) of the odds of respondents who highly agreed with it.  
It can be noted that the variable Price-increase played a dominant role in the 
final stepwise model of Zhengzhou both in terms of the magnitude (the 
absolute value, represented by the length of the colour bar in Figure 4.6) and 
the significance level (the exact p-value was as high as 8.37×10-6) of its 
coefficient. This was the only case in all the four cities, which implies that 
respondents in Zhengzhou seemed most sensitive to the increase in water 
- 106 - 
price. Additionally, the dominant effect of Price-increase in this parametric 
model (i.e. the final stepwise model) was also in agreement with the result of 
the non-parametric model that the proportion of no answer to the WTP 
questions exhibited a high degree of monotonicity with the increase in water 
price (see Figure 4.1). 
4.4 Comparison of the Final Parametric Models of Four Cities 
After detailed analysis and discussion on the parametric models of each city 
in the preceding section, this section conducts a comparative analysis of the 
final parametric models (i.e. the final stepwise regression models) of the four 
cities (Table 4.8) in order to provide a holistic view of factors (variables) that 
influenced respondents’ acceptance to paying a higher water price for water 
protection.  
Firstly, money-related factors were respondents’ concerns in all the four 
cities. The proposed increase in water price and respondents’ monthly gross 
income (highlighted in purple shaded cells in Table 4.8) were the only two 
explanatory variables that were included in the final models of all the four 
cities. Respondents in Beijing were least sensitive to the increase in water 
price while respondents in Zhengzhou were most sensitive to it. For an 
increase of 1 yuan/m3 in the water price, the odds of accepting a higher 
water price would decline by 60% at the 0.1 significance level in Beijing 
whilst the odds would decline by 94% at the 0.001 significance level in 
Zhengzhou.  
Moreover, significant differences in the odds of accepting a higher water 
price were found between respondents at the three income levels (below 
2500, 2500-4000 and above 4000 yuan/month) in Tianjin and Zhengzhou, 
but no significant difference was found between respondents receiving 2500-
4000 yuan/month and those receiving more than 4000 yuan/month in Beijing 
and Shijiazhuang. The difference in the odds of accepting a higher water 
price between respondents earning more than 4000 yuan/month and those 
earning less than 2500 yuan/month was 8.00 times in Zhengzhou (the 
largest) and 3.10 times in Beijing (the smallest), which again indicates that 
respondents in Zhengzhou showed the highest sensitiveness to money-
related factors when answering the WTP question.  
The policy implication here is that applying differentiated increments in water 
price to respondents at different income levels may be a feasible way to 
raise funds for water resource protection. Furthermore, since the current 
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minimum threshold of personal income tax in China (3500 yuan/month) is 
just within the range of the medium income level in this study (2500-4000 
yuan/month), it may serve as a sensible cut point for differentiated increase 
in water price which nicely fits the model estimation results of this study and 
the current socio-economic and policy settings in China. 
 
Table 4.8 Final Parametric WTP Models of Four Cities 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variables 
Coefficients 
Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Zhengzhou 
(Intercept)  2.49 **      0.11         0.99       0.34 
Price-increase -0.92 ○ -1.80 *** -2.20 * -2.86 *** 
Income Above 2500 
1.13 **  
Numeric 
0.91 **  
Above 2500 
1.52 ○  
Numeric  
1.04 **  
Know-benefits 0.33 ○   0.52 * 
Heard-mid-route  0.84 ○  -1.75 *  
Know-reservoir   2.46 *  
Heard-EC  1.37 *   
Understand-EC 1.43 ○    
Opinion-EC -0.71 **  -0.58 -0.49* 
Household-size -0.48 **    
Job (without job)  -2.67 **   
Age (above 50)  1.62 *   
Gender (male)    -0.98 ○ 
Residence (5-10)   2.34 *  
Relatives  1.03 ○   
Opinion-service  -1.01 **   
Perceive-shortage           0.59  
       Model Evaluation Indicator a 
Prediction ER b 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.18 
Overall Significance 5.34×10-8 1.20×10-10 1.27×10-3 1.41×10-12 
a AIC is not included here since it is not applicable to compare models for entirely 
different populations (i.e. respondents in different cities)   
b Prediction error rate 
 
Secondly, respondents with more knowledge of the water transfer project 
(variables highlighted in blue shaded cells of Table 4.8) were more likely to 
accept a higher water price, though the specific influential variables differed 
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in the four cities. While more knowledge of the benefits of the SNWTP led to 
larger odds of accepting a higher water price in Beijing and Zhengzhou, 
knowledge of the specific middle route project and the Danjiangkou 
Reservoir exhibited significantly positive influence in Tianjin and 
Shijiazhuang. An exception was the variable Heard-mid-route in the final 
model of Shijiazhuang which had a negative coefficient. As explained in 
Section 4.3.3, this might be attributed to the fact that Shijiazhuang was 
providing water to Beijing rather than receiving water from the middle route 
project when this survey was conducted. In other words, respondents were 
less likely to accept a higher water price if they felt no benefits gained from 
the water transfer project. This is a reasonable finding and it supports the 
argument that respondents’ perception/knowledge of the water transfer 
project played an important role in forming their attitudes to the proposed 
PES scheme for water protection. 
Linking the findings of modelling analysis and the descriptive analysis results 
of respondents’ environmental knowledge provides even more insights for 
policy makers. Only 34% of the 755 respondents in the four cities had heard 
about the specific middle route of the SNWTP, and even fewer (9.2%) of 
them knew the Danjiangkou Reservoir. As many as 44% respondents did 
not know that the SNWTP would provide water to their cities and 66% of 
them were unaware that the project could also improve the tap water quality. 
Obviously, respondents in the four cities in general had very limited 
knowledge about the water transfer project. If policy makers and advocators 
of the PES scheme for water protection make better efforts to disseminate 
relevant knowledge and information, they should have better chance to gain 
more support from residents in the northern cities.  
Thirdly, respondents’ understanding and attitudes to the idea of Ecological 
Compensation (variables highlighted in green shaded cells in Table 4.8) 
were also important factors that influenced their answers to the WTP 
question. In Beijing and Zhengzhou, the decline in the odds of yes answer 
caused by highly opposed attitude to the idea of EC could offset the effect of 
earning more than 2500 yuan/month. In Beijing, the positive effect of correct 
understanding of EC (coefficient: 1.43) on respondents’ yes answer to the 
WTP question could even offset the negative effect of an increase of 1 
yuan/m3 in the water price (coefficient: -0.92). In fact, Beijing is the only city 
where the number of respondents who could correctly describe the general 
idea of EC was large enough to include the variable Understand-EC in 
regression models. In Tianjin, respondents who had heard about EC (not 
- 109 - 
necessarily able to correctly describe its meaning) already showed 
significantly larger odds of accepting a higher water price.  
Furthermore, descriptive analysis shows that respondents in the four cities 
were still unfamiliar with the EC as only 21% of them had heard about EC 
and as few as 5% of them could correctly describe its general idea. 
Encouragingly, however, 58% of them expressed clear supportive attitude 
after a brief introduction of EC in the survey. These descriptive results and 
the modelling results above suggest that more efforts from policy makers 
and PES advocators are needed to promote the concept and idea of EC 
among residents in the northern cities, which can be promising to increase 
public WTP for water protection.  
Interestingly, a multi-option question was asked in the survey (before 
introducing the idea of EC) about who should undertake the cost of water 
protection. About 17% of respondents included water users in the northern 
cities in their answers (and 2% of respondents chose this option as the only 
answer). In contrast, 60% of respondents believed the central government 
should undertake at least part of the cost, 34% of them included local 
governments of the northern cities in their answers and 38% of them 
included local governments in the water source area. That is to say, 
respondents placed high expectation on “the government”, especially the 
central government, to play the leading role in funding the water protection. 
Accordingly, a multi-source funding (PES) scheme may be more feasible 
and acceptable to residents in the northern cities. It should be noted that 
34% of respondents actually answered yes to the WTP question in the later 
stage of the survey, which is double the abovementioned percentage of 
respondents who believed that water users should undertake at least part of 
the water protection cost 46
Lastly, demographic variables other than income (highlighted in tan shaded 
cells in Table 4.8) did not show universal influence on respondents’ answers 
to the WTP question as none of them appeared in two or more final models 
. It seems even a brief introduction of EC during 
the survey had changed some respondents’ attitudes to the idea of paying 
for water protection. 
                                            
46
 Not to mention that another 17% respondents just answered “not sure” 
instead of clear “no” to the WTP question, and some respondents 
answered “no” not because they refused to pay anything but because the 
proposed increment in water price was too high for them. Therefore, the 
actual percentage of respondents who were willing to contribute to water 
protection should be larger than 34%. 
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of the four cities. In fact, some of those demographic variables were money-
related issues. In Beijing, respondents with larger household sizes were less 
likely to accept an increase in water price, which could be attributed to 
higher living cost of larger households. In Tianjin, respondents without jobs 
(retired or unemployed) were less willing to pay a higher water price, which 
could reasonably relate to their economic conditions. In Zhengzhou, male 
respondents were also less likely to give a yes answer to the WTP question, 
perhaps due to generally heavier responsibilities of males in supporting their 
households’ living. It can be noted that the demographic variable Education 
did not exhibit significant influence on respondents’ answers to the WTP 
questions in any of the four cities (thus it is not listed in Table 4.8). Additional 
correlation analysis also found there was little correlation between 
respondents’ education level and their knowledge/attitudes about the 
SNWTP and EC 47
4.5 Respondents’ Mean WTP for Water Resource Protection 
. These results implies that environmental campaigns or 
other public education efforts are needed to disseminate knowledge of the 
water transfer project and the idea of paying for water protection to which the 
current school education seemed little helpful. 
After determining the final parametric models for each city, the estimated 
model coefficients (parameters) and the sample means of the explanatory 
variables in the final models were used to calculate respondents’ mean WTP 
for water protection. In order to explore the uncertainty of the calculation 
results 48
                                            
47
 The correlation was between 0.05-0.2. In fact, correlation analysis was 
conducted between all the explanatory variables and no strong correlation 
was found. So modelling analysis in this study focused on the main 
effects of those variables and excluded the interaction effect.  
, the 95% confidence interval of the mean WTP was determined by 
a Monte Carlo simulation method which randomly drew N arrays of 
coefficient values to simulate the multivariate normal distribution of the 
estimated model coefficients. Then a simulated mean WTP was calculated 
with each array of coefficients, so N simulated mean WTP generated from 
the N random draws constructed a distribution of the mean WTP whereby 
the 95% confidence interval was located by the 2.5% and 97.5% quantile 
values. Due to the randomness of draws, each simulation would actually 
48
 The model coefficients used for calculating the mean WTP are estimated 
values with standard errors which will consequently cause uncertainty 
(variance) in the calculation of the mean WTP.    
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generate a different confidence interval. If the number of random draws N is 
not sufficiently large, the simulation results could be substantially different 
between each random draw. In order to obtain stable simulation results of 
the confidence intervals, a wide range of random draws from 1000 to 
1,000,000 were tested in this study. Figure 4.7 illustrate the effect of the 
number of random draws on the simulation results.  
 
 
Figure 4.7  Effect of Random Draws on Simulated Confidence 
Intervals of the Mean WTP 
100 times of simulation were performed for each number of random draws, and a 
colour bar in 1% transparency was plotted for each simulation result. Thus more 
solid colour indicates more overlaps between the simulation results, namely more 
stability of the simulation. The cross marks (also in 1% transparency) indicate the 
medians in the distribution of simulated mean WTP.  
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In general, the simulation results of the four cities all become quite stable 
when the number of random draws reached 500,000 and over, though 
100,000 random draws were already sufficient for Zhengzhou. The mean 
WTP of respondents in Beijing had much larger confidence interval than the 
other cities (the horizontal axis of the sub-graph of Beijing in Figure 4.7 is 
about ten times larger in scale), which might be largely attributed to the 
earlier finding that Beijing was the only city where the variable of Price-
increase in the final model was less significant than the 0.05 level (Table 
4.8) 49. In contrast, the mean WTP of respondents in Zhengzhou had the 
narrowest confidence interval, which could be explained by the highest 
model fitting and the highest significance level of the variable of Price-
increase in the final model of Zhengzhou (Table 4.8) 50
As explained in the Methodology chapter, parametric models that use one 
dichotomous (yes/no) question to elicit respondents’ WTP (as discussed in 
the previous section) is usually called Single Bound Dichotomous Choice 
Model. An improvement on the single bound model is the Double Bound 
Dichotomous Choice Model. For applying the double bound model, a follow-
up dichotomous choice question was asked in the survey. If the respondents 
answered yes to the first WTP question, a higher increment of water price 
was offered to them in the second WTP question, otherwise a lower 
increment was offered. In this way, more precise information could be 
obtained about respondents’ WTP and thus refinement could be achieved in 
the model estimates. Table 4.9 presents the estimation results of double 
bound parametric models of the four cities. For the convenience of 
comparison, the estimation results of the single bound models (i.e. the same 
results presented in Table 4.8 but in a more compact form) are also 
presented in this table.  
. Based on the testing 
results, the final 95% confidence intervals of respondents’ mean WTP were 
determined by the average 2.5% and 97.5% quantile values of 100 times of 
simulation with 1,000,000 random draws.  
 
                                            
49
 The coefficient of Price-increase is the only denominator in the calculation 
function of the mean WTP, thus the low significance of this variable 
(which means large standard error) is prone to cause large variance in the 
estimates of the mean WTP.    
50
 Although Price-increase was both significant at the 0.001 level in the final 
models of Tianjin and Zhengzhou, the exact p-value of the variable was 
3.55×10-4 and 8.37×10-6 respectively in the two cities.  
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Table 4.9 Comparison of Single Bound and Double Bound Models 
 Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
 
The double bound and single bound models were similar regarding the signs 
(positive/negative) of variable coefficients, but the double bound models 
generated different estimates of the magnitudes of coefficients and 
substantially improved the significance level of some variables’ coefficients, 
especially for the proposed increase in water price. For example, the 
variable Price-increase was only significant at the 0.1 level in the single 
City/Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Single Bound Model Double Bound Model 
Beijing 
 (Intercept) 2.49  (0.92) ** 2.55  (0.75) *** 
Price-increase -0.92 (0.47) ◦ -2.20 (0.26) *** 
Opinion-EC -0.71 (0.23) ** -0.72 (0.20) *** 
Household-size -0.48 (0.16) ** -0.33 (0.12) ** 
Know-benefits 0.33  (0.19) ◦ 0.39  (0.17) * 
Income 1.13  (0.44) ** 1.11  (0.39) ** 
Understand-EC 1.43  (0.81) ◦ 0.64  (0.60) 
Tianjin 
 (Intercept)  0.11  (0.80)  0.11  (0.79) 
Job -2.67 (0.84) ** -2.11 (0.75) ** 
Price-increase -1.80 (0.50) *** -1.95 (0.32) *** 
Opinion-service -1.01 (0.34) ** -0.90 (0.34) ** 
Know-mid-route 0.84  (0.46) ◦ 0.84  (0.43) ◦ 
Income 0.91  (0.33) ** 0.80  (0.30) ** 
Relatives 1.03  (0.57) ◦ 1.59  (0.53) ** 
Heard-EC 1.37  (0.59) * 1.08  (0.55) * 
Age 1.62  (0.71) * 1.33  (0.66) * 
Shijiazhuang 
(Intercept) 0.99  (1.22) 2.78  (1.18) * 
Price-increase -2.20 (0.86) * -3.12 (0.57) *** 
Know-mid-route -1.75 (0.87) * -1.34 (0.69) ◦ 
Opinion-EC -0.58 (0.47) -1.09 (0.51) * 
Perceive-shortage 0.59  (0.66) 0.49  (0.58) 
Income 1.52  (0.79) ◦ 0.94  (0.68) 
Residence 2.34  (1.03) * 2.28 (0.91) * 
Know-reservoir 2.46  (1.13) * 1.43  (0.87) 
Zhengzhou  
  (Intercept) 0.34  (0.96) 0.31  (0.83) 
Price-increase -2.86 (0.64) *** -1.95 (0.40) *** 
Gender (male) -0.98 (0.52) ◦ -0.35 (0.44) 
Opinion-EC -0.49 (0.22) * -0.44 (0.19) * 
Know-benefits 0.52  (0.22) * 0.20  (0.18) 
Income 1.04 (0.34) ** 0.73  (0.28) ** 
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bound model in Beijing but was at the 0.001 significance level in the double 
bound model. This is understandable since the double bound model actually 
doubled the observations of residents’ responses to the increase in water 
price by introducing the second WTP question. As a result of the higher 
significance level of the estimated coefficients, the double bound model was 
able to generate stable simulation results of confidence intervals with 
100,000 random draws (illustrated in Figure 4.8). 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Simulated Confidence Intervals of the Mean WTP (Double 
Bound Parametric Model)  
 
Table 4.10 presents the estimates of respondents’ mean WTP by the single 
bound parametric model, double bound parametric model and the non-
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parametric model. One merit of the parametric models is that they are 
convenient to calculate the mean WTP of specific groups of respondents 
with regard to particular explanatory variables. Therefore, in addition to the 
mean WTP of the whole sample of respondents in each city, this study also 
conducts disaggregate analysis of the mean WTP of respondents at different 
income levels in order to investigate the effect of income disparity on the 
WTP for water protection.  
 
Table 4.10 Estimates of Respondents’ Mean WTP by Different Models                                                                                                    
Values in parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals of the mean WTP 
(yuan/m3). Results highlighted in olive green shaded cells are the estimates of the 
sample of respondents in each city. As no significant differences were found 
between respondents earning 2500-4000 yuan/month and those earning more 
than 4000 yuan/month in their answers to the WTP question, respondents in 
Beijing and Shijiazhuang were only divided into two groups.   
 
City Single Bound Parametric Model  
Double Bound 
Parametric Model 
Non-parametric 
Model 
Beijing 1.13 (0.28, 3.90) 
0.71 
(0.56, 0.88) 
0.29 
(0.29, 0.29) 
Below 2500 0.27 (-2.07, 1.65) 
0.36 
(0.06, 0.65)  
Above 2500 1.51 (0.14, 6.10) 
0.86 
(0.68, 1.06)  
Tianjin 0.26 (-0.25, 0.50) 
0.25 
(-0.01, 0.45) 
0.44 
(0.44, 0.45) 
Below 2500 -0.01 (-0.81, 0.33) 
0.04 
(-0.32, 0.30)  
2500-4000 0.50 (0.10, 0.78) 
0.45 
(0.18, 0.69)  
Above 4000 1.00 (0.44, 1.80) 
0.86 
(0.37, 1.37)  
Shijiazhuang 0.25 (-0.48, 0.53) 
0.39 
(0.21, 0.57) 
0.37 
(0.35-0.38) 
Below 2500 0.12 (-0.90, 0.43) 
0.33 
(0.11, 0.53)  
Above 2500 0.81 (0.09, 2.25) 
0.63 
(0.25, 1.05)  
Zhengzhou 0.36 (0.13, 0.53) 
0.20 
(-0.12, 0.42) 
0.35 
(0.34-0.36) 
Below 2500 0.14 (-0.23, 0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.49, 0.28)  
2500-4000 0.50 (0.28, 0.70) 
0.36 
(0.07, 0.60)  
Above 4000 0.87 (0.52, 1.32) 
0.73 
(0.29, 1.25)  
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For the respondents in Beijing, the estimation of the single bound model 
shows that, on average, they were willing to pay an increase of 1.13 yuan/m3 
in water price for protecting the water resources of the middle route of the 
SNWTP and the confidence interval of this mean WTP was 0.28-3.90 
yuan/m3. This was an excessively large interval and the upper bound 
estimate was unreliable since 3.90 yuan/m3 was far beyond the highest 
increase that was proposed to respondents in the survey (1.50 yuan/m3). 
In contrast, the double bound model of Beijing substantially narrowed down 
the confidence interval of the WTP estimate to 0.56-0.88 yuan/m3 and 
provided a smaller estimated mean WTP of 0.71 yuan/m3, which was the 
largest mean WTP in the four cities. This was quite different from the result 
of the non-parametric model that the mean WTP of respondents in Beijing 
was 0.29 yuan/m3 as the smallest in the four cities. An explanation to this 
difference is that the non-parametric model was applied onto the dataset of 
Beijing after a smoothing procedure in order to overcome the non-
monotonicity of the original data (illustrated in Figure 4.2), which caused 
considerable underestimate of the mean WTP 51
Additionally, disaggregate analysis with the double bound model also shows 
that respondents receiving less than 2500 yuan/month in Beijing had the 
mean WTP of 0.36 (0.06, 0.65) yuan/m3 while those above that income level 
had the mean WTP of 0.86 (0.68, 1.06) yuan/m3. The difference in the mean 
WTP was statistically significant since there was no overlap between the 
95% confidence intervals of these two estimates.  
.  
For the respondents in Tianjin, the estimated mean WTP of the single bound 
model was 0.26 (-0.25, 0.50) yuan/m3, and the double bound model 
provided a similar result with a narrower confidence interval, 0.25 (-0.01, 
0.45) yuan/m3. This similarity is consistent with the result that the 
significance levels of coefficients in the double bound model of Tianjin did 
not improve much from the single bound model (Table 4.9). On the other 
hand, the estimated mean WTP of the non-parametric model (0.44 yuan/m3) 
was close to the upper bound of the confidence intervals of the estimated 
WTP by the two parametric models, which reflects some degree of 
                                            
51
 The non-parametric model calculated the mean WTP with the sum of the 
products of the increments in water price and the differences between the 
percentages of no answer to two consecutive increments. The smoothing 
procedure merged data points where non-monotonicity occurred, which 
reduced the number of products in the summation function and thus 
provided an underestimate of the mean WTP.  
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consistency in parametric and non-parametric models. But the non-
parametric model made an overestimate here probably because it did not 
take account of influential variables of respondents’ WTP except for the 
proposed increase in water price. 
Interestingly, the lower bound of the confidence intervals of mean WTP in 
Tianjin was below zero, indicating that some respondents actually looked 
forward to a decrease in the water price instead of paying a higher water 
price for water protection. Disaggregated analysis with the double bound 
model revealed that on average respondents receiving less than 2500 
yuan/month in Tianjin were only willing to pay a trivial increase of 0.04 (-
0.32, 0.30) yuan/m3. In comparison, the mean WTP of respondents at the 
other two income levels (2500-4000 and above 4000 yuan/month) were 0.45 
(0.18, 0.69) and 0.86 (0.37, 1.37) yuan/m3 respectively. That is to say, 
respondents who desired a decrease in water price all understandably fell in 
the lowest income group. The income disparity did cause significant 
difference in respondents’ mean WTP for water protection at least between 
those receiving less than 2500 yuan/month and those receiving more than 
4000 yuan/month as the confidence intervals of the mean WTP did not 
overlap with each other 52
For respondents in Shijiazhuang, the mean WTP estimated by the single 
bound model was 0.25 (-0.48, 0.53) yuan/m3. The double bound model 
considerably narrowed down the confidence interval on the lower bound and 
provided a larger estimate of the mean WTP as 0.39 (0.21, 0.57) yuan/m3, 
which was close to the estimate of the non-parametric model (0.37 yuan/m3). 
Disaggregated analysis with the double bound model found that respondents 
with less than 2500 yuan/month in Shijiazhuang had the mean WTP of 0.33 
(0.11, 0.53) yuan/m3 while those above that income level had a mean WTP 
of 0.63 (0.25, 1.05) yuan/m3. But the difference between two income levels 
might not be statistically significant because there was some extent of 
overlap between the two confidence intervals.  
.  
                                            
52
 It should be noted that although no overlap between two confidence 
intervals means there was significant difference between the two 
estimated WTP, the presence of overlap does not necessarily mean the 
opposite. If the estimated WTP follows a normal distribution, the 
significance of difference can be tested by standard statistical test. 
However, this is not the case for the parametric models. Therefore, the 
significance of difference in the mean WTP of respondents at the low 
(less than 2500) and medium (2500-4000) income levels cannot be tested 
here.  
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For the respondents in Zhengzhou, the single bound model provided an 
estimate of the mean WTP as 0.36 (0.13, 0.53) yuan/m3, which was close to 
the estimate of the non-parametric model (0.35 yuan/m3) This is consistent 
with the previous finding that Zhengzhou was the only city where the 
variable Price-increase played a dominate role in the single bound models in 
terms of both the magnitude and significance (Table 4.8) 53
Unlike the case of the other three cities, the WTP estimate of the double 
bound model of Zhengzhou, 0.20 (-0.12, 0.42) yuan/m3, did not show the 
superiority over the estimate of the single bound model given its wider 
confidence interval. This can be attributed to the result that explanatory 
variables in the double bound model of Zhengzhou did not exhibit higher 
significance than the single bound model (Table 4.9). On the contrary, the 
variables of Gender and Know-benefits become insignificant in the double 
bound model. A possible explanation is that when the respondents of 
Zhengzhou considered the second WTP question, the influence of the two 
variables became much weaker than the other three variables in the model, 
i.e. Price-increase, Opinion-EC and Income since the proposed increase in 
water price and income were directly related to respondents’ financial 
conditions and their opinions about the idea of Ecological Compensation 
directly justified their answers to the WTP question.  
.  
Given the narrower confidence interval and greater consistence with the 
result of the non-parametric model, the estimate of the single bound model 
was adopted for further analysis of the dataset of Zhengzhou.  
Disaggregated analysis with the single bound model found that the mean 
WTP of respondents at the three income levels (less than 2500, 2500-4000 
and more than 4000 yuan/month) in Zhengzhou were 0.14 (-0.23, 0.36), 
0.50 (0.28, 0.70) and 0.87 (0.52, 1.32) yuan/m3 respectively. That is to say, 
some respondents at the lowest income level in Zhengzhou actually desire a 
decrease in the water price, and the effect of income disparity on the mean 
WTP was at least significant between respondents earning less than 2500 
yuan/month and those earning more than 4000 yuan/month according to the 
confidence intervals of the estimation results.  
Comparatively, the mean WTP of respondents in Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou were 0.71 (0.56, 0.88), 0.25 (-0.01, 0.45), 0.39 
                                            
53
 Since Price-increase was the only variable used in the non-parametric 
model, the parametric models would be more likely to produce a similar 
estimate to the non-parametric model when the variable of Price-increase 
was overwhelmingly influential.  
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(0.21, 0.57) and 0.36 (0.13, 0.53) yuan/m3 respectively 54
It is also informative to compare the mean WTP of respondents at the same 
income level in different cities. As Table 4.10 shows, respondents earning 
less than 2500 yuan/month in Beijing showed a larger mean WTP than their 
counterparts in other cities, but there were considerable overlaps between 
the estimated confidence intervals. Interestingly, respondents earning more 
than 4000 yuan/month in Beijing, Tianjin and Zhengzhou had similar mean 
WTP around 0.86 yuan/m3, which were all significantly larger than the mean 
WTP of respondents earning less than 2500 yuan/month in these cities. In 
other words, respondents’ WTP was more related to their income level than 
which city they were in. The policy implication here is that instead of 
adopting a uniform increment of water price in each city according to the 
estimated mean WTP of all respondents in each city, it might be better to 
adopt differentiated increments for respondents at different income levels 
which applied to all cities (or with minor adjustment in each city). Such a 
fundraising mechanism would resemble the current personal income tax in 
China.  
. The confidence 
intervals of these estimates indicated that respondents in Beijing had a 
significantly larger mean WTP than respondents in the other three cities. 
This may largely be attributed to the previous finding that there were fewer 
respondents at relatively low income level and more respondents at 
relatively higher level Beijing (Table 4.1). 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the research results of the Contingent Valuation 
surveys in four cities on public WTP for water protection. The final stepwise 
regression model showed considerable superiority than the initial full model 
and best subset regression model in terms of goodness of fit and model 
simplicity, thus it was adopted as the final model to explain respondents’ 
answers to the WTP question. In general, respondents’ willingness to pay a 
higher water price was significantly influenced by money-related factors (the 
proposed increments in water price and income), respondents’ knowledge 
about the water transfer project, their understanding and attitudes to the idea 
of Ecological Compensation. Demographic variables such as household size 
                                            
54
 As explained above, the estimate of the single bound model was adopted 
as the final result for Zhengzhou whereas the estimates of the double 
bound model were adopted for the other three cities. 
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were also influential in individual cities, but they did not exhibit universal 
influence in the four cities. 
Respondents’ mean WTP for water protection was calculated by the single 
bound parametric model, the double bound parametric model and the non-
parametric model. The estimation results of different models showed some 
degree of consistency given the overlaps of their estimated confidence 
intervals. Generally, the double bound parametric model exhibited the 
superiority of less uncertainty (narrower confidence interval) in the 
estimation results than the single bound parametric model for all the four 
cities except Zhengzhou. And the two parametric models surpassed the non-
parametric model in the ability of taking account of more influential factors of 
respondents’ WTP and exploring the effect of income disparity on the WTP. 
But when the proposed increase in water price was the dominant variable in 
the parametric models (like the case of Zhengzhou), parametric and non-
parametric models could generate close results.  
On average, respondents in Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou 
were willing to pay the increase of 0.71, 0.25, 0.39 and 0.36 yuan/m3 in the 
water price respectively for water protection. In each city except for 
Shijiazhuang, respondents receiving more than 4000 yuan/month had 
significantly larger mean WTP than those receiving less than 2500 
yuan/month. In Tianjin and Zhengzhou, some respondents receiving less 
than 2500 yuan/month actually look forward to a decrease in water price. 
Major policy suggestions that can be offered based on the results of this 
chapter are as follows. Firstly, if policy makers and PES practitioners make 
better efforts to disseminate knowledge about the water transfer project and 
promote the idea of Ecological Compensation among residents in the 
northern cities, they may have better chance to raise more funds for water 
protection. Secondly, a multi-source funding scheme involving both the 
government and water users should be more feasible since respondents in 
the four cities placed high expectation on the government, especially the 
central government, to play the leading role in funding the water protection. 
Thirdly, compared with a uniform increment of water price in each city, 
differentiated increments in water price for respondents at different income 
levels could be better given the significant higher mean WTP of respondents 
at the relatively high income level.  Moreover, the current start point of the 
personal income tax in China (3500 yuan/month) could be a useful 
benchmark for a water protection PES scheme with differentiated payment 
levels.   
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Chapter 5 
Farmer Households’ Preferences for the Design of Water 
Protection Programs  
The previous chapter investigates urban residents’ WTP for water protection 
from the consumer perspective of PES. This chapter focuses on the supply 
side of PES and presents the research results of the Choice Experiment 
survey in seven villages around the Danjiangkou Reservoir (i.e. the water 
supply area of the middle route of the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project) on farmer households’ preferences for the design of water 
protection programs. Two water protection programs are discussed in this 
chapter, i.e. the existing Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) for 
reforestation on sloping farmland and a hypothetical program for reducing 
the use of Nitrogen and Phosphate fertilizers in flat farmland that is not 
currently covered by the SLCP 55
The contents of this chapter are arranged as follows: Section 5.1 describes 
the characteristics of the interviewed farmer households. Section 5.2 
presents survey results regarding households’ participation in the SLCP, 
Section 5.3 examines the effect of SLCP on livelihoods of farmer 
households. Section 5.4 discusses the choice modelling results of farmer 
households’ preferences for the design of water protection programs. 
Section 5.5 further explores the heterogeneity in farmer households 
preferences and Section 5.6 summarizes major findings of this chapter.       
.  
5.1 Characteristics of Farmer Households 
A total of 246 farmer households in two groups were interviewed in this 
survey, i.e. those who have participated in the SLCP (161 households) and 
those who have qualified sloping land for the SLCP but did not participate 
(85 households). Table 5.1 presents the demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the two groups of households.  
 
                                            
55 The SLCP only enrols land with gradient larger than 25 degrees which is 
vulnerable to soil erosion. 
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Table 5.1  Characteristics of Farmer Households 
Gender, Age and Education Level refer to the characteristics of the heads of 
households. Total Land and Enrolled/Qualified Land were recorded in mu 56
Characteristics 
, 
Household Income refers to gross income (yuan/year). The P-value indicates the 
significance of the difference between the two groups of households in terms of 
the corresponding characteristic. 
Participants 
of SLCP 
Non-
participants P-value 
Gender 
 Male 
Female 
 
71% 
29% 
 
73% 
27% 
0.83 
Age 
Below 30 
30 - 40 
40 - 50 
50 - 60 
Above 60 
No answer 
 
6.8% 
18.6% 
45.3% 
18.6% 
9.9% 
0.6% 
 
1.2% 
12.9% 
50.6% 
23.5% 
11.8% 
0 
0.27 
Education Level 
Below Primary School 
Primary School 
Middle School 
High School 
College or above 
No answer 
 
13.0% 
23.0% 
42.9% 
18.0% 
1.2% 
1.9% 
 
5.9% 
34.1% 
47.1% 
11.8% 
1.2% 
0.0% 
0.08 
Household Size 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
 
4.5 
1.5 
 
4.3 
1.4 
0.37 
Members in village 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
 
2.5 
1.2 
 
2.7 
1.2 
0.23 
Total Land  
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
 
15.8 
19.8 
 
16.5 
15.6 
0.03 
Enrolled/Qualified Land 57
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
12.0 
16.9 
 
11.4 
14.0 
0.70 
Household Income 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
 
23,430 
24,784 
 
26,510 
27,468 
0.53 
                                            
56
 “mu” is the unit of land commonly used in China which is equal to 1/15 
hectare. 
57
 It should be noted that several households in both groups were holding 
much larger land (around 100 mu) than most households and thus 
substantially enlarged the average enrolled/qualified land. The medians of 
enrolled/qualified land were both 7 mu for the two groups of households.  
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5.1.1 The Difference between SLCP Participant and Non-
participant Households 
In general, the two groups of households had similar characteristics. In both 
groups, over 70% of the heads of households were male, about half of them 
aged 40-50 and nearly half of them attended middle school as the highest 
education. On average, households in both groups had 4-5 family members, 
and 2-3 of them were living in the villages while the others were working or 
studying outside the villages.  
The average land held by the SLCP participating households was 15.8 mu 
(1.05 hectare) 58, which was slightly less than the average land held by the 
non-participating households, 16.5 mu (1.10 hectare). Interestingly, the 
average sloping land enrolled in the SLCP by the participating households 
and the average qualified sloping land held by the non-participating 
households were close, i.e. 12.0 and 11.4 mu respectively. This implied that 
the two groups of households were also similar in terms of the topographic 
characteristics (e.g. gradient) of their land. The average gross household 
income 59
Particular attention was paid to whether there was significant difference 
between the two groups of households that may cause systematic biases in 
later comparative analyses of this chapter. For the three characteristics 
recorded as categorical variables (gender, age and education level),  the 
Chi-square test was applied to examine whether the distributions of these 
characteristics of the heads of households were dependent on which group 
 of the SCLP participants was 23,430 yuan/year, which is smaller 
than the income of the non-participating households, 26,510 yuan/year. It 
should be noted that, in both groups of households, the standard deviations 
of total land, enrolled/qualified land and household income were quite large 
compared with the mean values, which indicates large disparities in 
landholding and income within each group.   
                                            
58
 In China, land is state or community-owned, but is usually contracted to 
farmers. According to the national law on land contracting, the tenure is 
30 years for farmland, 30-50 years for grassland and 30-70 years for 
forestland. Thus the SLCP which converts sloping farmland to forests 
actually provides an opportunity to extend the tenure of farmers’ land 
contracts.   
59
 The data of household income here are calculated results of households’ 
income from multiple sources. Detailed discussion on household income 
is conducted in Section 5.3. 
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they belonged to. For the rest of the characteristics recorded as numeric 
variables,  the Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test (Verzani 2004) showed that they 
did not follow normal distributions in both groups, thus the commonly used t-
test was not applicable here. Instead, the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test 60
As Table 5.1 shows, no significant difference was found in the 
characteristics of households in the two groups, except for the total land (P-
value=0.03). Nevertheless, the difference in the means of total land between 
the  two groups of households was rather slight in magnitude ( 0.7 mu) 
despite its significance in statistics. In contrast, the difference in the means 
of household income in the two groups seemed not negligible (3,080 
yuan/year), yet was still insignificant in statistics due to the large standard 
deviations in each group. The similarity in the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics is helpful to the comparability of the two groups of 
households and hence, any difference found in later analyses between the 
two groups is more likely to be attributed to their participation (or not) in the 
SLCP instead of the characteristics of the households themselves. 
 
(Dalgaard 2008) was applied to test the significance of difference in the 
means of the characteristics between the two groups of households.  
5.1.2 Representativeness of the Sample Households 
Another important issue is the representativeness of the sample households. 
Assessing this representativeness is difficult due to the lack of census data 
of the surveyed villages or the water source areas 61. In fact, even if the 
census data is available, it may not be a proper reference to be compared 
with the survey results as this survey has been targeted at a specific 
population of farmer households, i.e. those who have sloping land qualified 
for the SLCP (either participants or non-participants). It is also difficult to find 
comparable information of farmer households’ characteristics from literature 
since existing SLCP studies have overlooked many regions implementing 
the program, such as the water source areas of the middle-route water 
transfer project 62
                                            
60
 This is a non-parametric test assuming no normal distribution of two 
independent samples (i.e. two groups of farmer households). 
. Nevertheless, the following information has been found to 
61
 The access to census data is very limited in China. Generally, only a few  
data at the provincial or municipality level are published which do not 
differentiate urban and rural residents. 
62  A detailed literature review on existing SLCP studies can be referred to in 
Section 2.3. 
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give some hints of the representativeness of the sample households of this 
study.   
As reported in the official news website of Danjiangkou City (named after the 
reservoir) where the surveyed villages in this study were located 63
5.2 Farmer Households’ Participation in Sloping Land 
Conversion Program 
, the 
statistic department of the city sampled 100 SCLP participating households 
in ten villages (names and locations not specified) in 2012 which is the same 
year of the survey of this study (Chen 2013). In that sample of 100 
households, the average household size was 4.3, which is close to the result 
of this study (4.5); the average enrolled land of households was 6.9 mu, 
which is similar to the median of households’ enrolled land in this study (see 
Footnote 57); and the net income per capita was 5021 yuan/year. Multiplying 
the net income per capita by the average household size of 4.3 yields an 
estimate of the average net household income of 21,590 yuan/year, which is 
moderately below the survey result of the average gross household income 
of this study (23,430 yuan/year).  Speaking overall, the sample households 
in this study exhibited similar characteristics to the sample households in the 
survey of the statistic department of Danjingkou City, which probably implies 
a decent representativeness of the farmer households in villages around the 
Danjiangkou Reservoir.   
Some qualitative questions were asked in this survey before the quantitative 
choice modelling questions in order to provide information of farmer 
households’ participation in the SLCP, their land use decisions after the 
expiration of their SLCP contracts and the reasons why some farmer 
households had sloping land qualified for the SLCP but did not participate in 
the program. 
5.2.1 What was the most important reason for farmer households’ 
participation in the SLCP? 
161 farmer households who have participated in the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP) were interviewed in this study. The earliest 
year of the farmers’ participation in the SLCP was 2000, when the program 
extended its pilot project from three province to 17 provinces, and the latest 
                                            
63
  In China, “city” usually refers to an administrative region that includes 
both  urban and rural areas.   
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year of participation was 2012 when this survey was conducted. Most of the 
enrolled farmers were long-term participants as 90% of them entered the 
program before 2005. 82% of these participant households enrolled at least 
half of their total land in the SLCP. 
A critical and interesting question is what was the most important reason for 
the households to participate in the SLCP. In the survey, a question 
including the following options was presented to the respondents 64
 
. 
A. The payment of the program is higher than the income from farming on 
the enrolled land. 
B. Forestland can yield higher income than farmland. 
C. There is not sufficient labour in my household to manage farmland. 
D. Participating in the program can extend the tenure of the enrolled land. 
E. The program is strongly encouraged by the government. 
F. Many households in my village have participated in this program. 
 
 
Figure 5.1  The Most Important Reason for Participation in the SLCP 
                                            
64  Another option of “Other reasons” was also given to the respondents and 
a blank was left in the questionnaire for respondents to specify their most 
important reason. Since no respondent chose this option, it is not 
mentioned in the main text.   
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The survey result (Figure 5.1) showed that the most important reasons were: 
E (strong governmental encouragement) and B (better income from 
forestland), which were chosen by 45% and  26% of the SLCP-participating 
households respectively. In addition to the strong influence from the 
government, “peer pressure” was also an important driver as 9% (the third 
largest percent) of households chose option F (“many households in my 
village have participated in this program”). Noticeably, option A (High 
payment) was chosen by the smallest percentage (4%) of households, 
indicating that few households thought the payment of the SLCP was higher 
than the income from farming on the sloping land. 
5.2.2 Have the SLCP-participant households enrolled all their 
qualified sloping land in the program? If not, why? 
The survey found that 23% (37) of the SLCP participating households 
retained part of their qualified sloping land for growing crops, which on 
average accounted for 39% of these partially-participating households’ total 
land. An open-ended question was asked to the households about the 
reason for their partial participation. Surprisingly, 50% of these partially 
participating households reported that there were quotas of total enrolled 
land for their villages (assigned by the local forestry department), so they 
could not enrol all their qualified land even if they would like to.  
This quotas assignment issue is rarely mentioned by literature, and it is 
against the common impression that local officers have to persuade and 
even force farmers to join in the program instead of limiting the amount of 
land that can be enrolled (Xu et al. 2010). However, assigning quotas for 
each village does reflect a typical top-down administration style in the 
implementation of SLCP(Bennett 2008). In fact, it is possible that the 
assignment of quotas of enrolled land was actually an enforcement measure 
at the beginning of SLCP in the early 2000s, but with the farmer households’ 
increasing acceptance to this program due to the aforementioned reasons, 
such as higher income from forestland than farmland, the quotas then 
became a barrier to enrolling more sloping land in the villages.  
“The needs of growing subsistence crops” was another major reason for 
farmer households’ partial participation in the SLCP (mentioned by 18% of 
the partially participating households). Other reasons reflecting very 
particular circumstances of households are not reported here.  
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5.2.3 Will farmer households keep the converted forestland after 
the expiration of their SLCP contracts? 
The “permanence” of effect on land use behaviours, i.e. whether land 
managers keep their environment-benefiting land use behaviours after the 
payments cease, is considered as a criterion to evaluate the success of PES 
programs (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008; Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 
2008). The literature review in Section 2.3 also indicates that the farmers’ 
post-program land use decision is one of the most important research issues 
in SLCP studies.  
 
Table 5.2 Reasons for Keeping Forestland after the Expiry of SLCP 
Contracts  
112 households’ SLCP contracts had expired, and 96 of them were still 
keeping the forest in the enrolled land.  
Reason for Keeping Forestland Percentage 
Higher income from fruit trees than crops 45% 
Timber trees not ready for sale 15% 
Inadequate labour to grow crops 9% 
Difficulties to clean up the trees for growing crops 9% 
Opportunity of off-farm income 4% 
Sufficient non-enrolled land to grow subsistence crops 2% 
Not allowed to convert forestland back to farmland 2% 
Looking forward to extending the SLCP contract 1% 
No answer 13% 
Number of households                 96 
 
When this survey was conducted, the SLCP contracts of 112 (70%) of the 
161 participating households had expired 65
                                            
65 The current SLCP contracts are 5 or 8 years. 
. In those 112 farmers, 96 (86%) 
households were still keeping the forestland after the SLCP contracts 
expired. With regard to the reasons for keeping forestland (Table 5.2) , 45% 
of the 96 households mentioned “higher income from fruit trees than crops”, 
which is in agreement with the abovementioned result that “higher income 
from forestland (than farmland)” was the second most chosen reason for 
their participation in the SLCP (Figure 5.1). Other major reasons included  
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“timber trees not ready for sale” (15%), “inadequate labour to grow crops” 
(9%)66
On the other hand, 49 (30%) of the 161 participating households were still 
under the SLCP contracts, and 39 (80%) of these 49 households did not 
have the plan to convert the forestland back to farmland. Generally, they 
reported similar reasons as the aforementioned households who were still 
keeping forest in the enrolled sloping land after the expiration of SLCP 
contracts. Additionally, one benefit of converting farmland to forestland was 
mentioned by several farmers was that trees needed less tending time than 
crops, so they could save time to earn additional income from off-farm work 
or simply have more leisure time (especially for the old farmers). The 
willingness to protect the environment was also mentioned by several 
farmers. 
 and “difficulties to clean up the trees for growing crops” (9%). 
The analysis above shows that 135 (84%) out of the 161 SLCP participating 
households were keeping or would keep forestland after the expiry of their 
SLCP contracts. This result provides an evidence of the ability of the SLCP 
to generate considerable extent of permanent effect on farmers’ land use 
behaviours. However, it is noted that some households are prone to 
changing the land cover when their timber trees are mature for sale, and 
those who did not re-cultivate forestland because of inadequate labour may 
also change their decisions if family members working away from the 
villages come back for farming. Therefore, the possibility of farmers’ 
converting forestland back to farmland is not negligible if the SLCP ceases 
when the current duration expires.  
5.2.4 Are farmer households willing to continue with the SLCP 
under the current contract?  
86 (53%) out of the 161 participating households answered yes when they 
were asked whether they were willing to continue with the SLCP if the 
contract conditions remain the same. 27 (17%) households answered no 
while 48 (30%) of them gave no answer. All these 48 no-answer households 
had already fulfilled their SLCP contracts but did not convert their forestland 
back to farmland, so they might be willing to accept a renewal of the SLCP 
with better conditions. For those who did not want to continue with the SLCP 
under the current conditions, one of their major reasons was stated to be 
                                            
66
 Generally, this is because nowadays most young people in rural China 
leave their villages to find jobs in cities and towns, and farmers staying in 
villages are aging.   
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“less income from trees than crops”. Interestingly, this was contrary to the 
experiences of some other farmers who considered forestland more 
profitable as mentioned above. These crops-favouring households also 
mentioned the lack of techniques for increasing the production rate of fruit 
trees and more fluctuation in the prices of fruits than in crops. Additionally, 
dissatisfaction about the program payments was another major reason for 
being reluctant to renew the SLCP. 
Although the majority of households showed willingness to renew their SLCP 
contracts, this did not mean they were totally satisfied about the current 
program. 75 out of the 161 participating households provided suggestions on 
the improvement of SLCP. 45 (60%) of them asked for a higher payment, 9 
(12%) of them complained about the limited quotas of enrolled land and 6 
(10%) of them reported payments not duly and fully delivered (one of them 
mentioned corruption). Moreover, extending the tenure of the program, 
technical assistance in planting and tending of fruit trees and marketing 
assistance in fruits sale were also mentioned  by farmers. 
5.2.5 What are the non-participating farmer households’ reasons 
for not participating the SLCP? 
As mentioned above, 85 farmer households  who have qualified sloping land 
but did not participate in the SLCP were also interviewed in this study. On 
average, each of the non-participants household had 11.4 mu (0.76 hectare) 
qualified sloping land (Table 5.1), which is close to the average enrolled land 
of the participant households and accounted for 60% of the non-participating 
households’ total land. 
Given the high percentage of qualified sloping land held by the non-
participating households, a natural question is why they did not participate in 
the SLCP. Surprisingly, the most mentioned reasons by the farmers were 
“not aware of the program at the time of implementation” (46%) and “no 
quota of enrolled land was assigned  to them” (32%). This result together 
with the above finding that over half of the participating households did not 
enrol all their qualified sloping land because of limited quotas suggests that 
the potential of enrolling more sloping land in the SLCP could be substantial 
in these villages. 72 out of the 85 non-participating households answered an 
open-ended question about what adjustment/improvement of the SLCP 
could persuade them to take part in the program. 33% of them mentioned 
“raising the program payments to avoid decrease in income”, but no farmers 
specified the desired level of payments. 31% of them said they “are willing to 
participate as long as quotas of enrolled land are assigned to them”, which 
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supports the above argument of SLCP’s potential to expand in the villages. 
Moreover, 13% of the households asked for better information about the 
program and 7% asked for longer contract tenure.         
5.3 The SLCP’s Effect on Farmer Households’ Livelihood 
As reviewed in Section 2.3, the socio-economic effect of SLCP is one of the 
major research issues in existing SLCP studies. Apparently, hardly any real 
success can be achieved if a PES scheme like SLCP makes participants’ 
livelihood worse off after taking part in the program. This study has 
examined the effect of SLCP on farmer households’ livelihood from three 
aspects, i.e. comparison of the income per mu from crops before the SLCP 
and from trees after the program, comparison of households’ income from all 
their sloping land before and after joining in the SLCP, and comparison of 
the total income (including both on-farm and off-farm income) of SLCP-
participating and non-participating farmers. 
5.3.1  Comparison of Income per mu from Trees and Crops 
Table 5.3 lists the major species of trees the interviewed households planted 
on the enrolled sloping land after joining in the SLCP and major crops before 
the program, gross income per mu generated by the trees/crops, percentage 
of households planting the trees/crops and percentage of households 
receiving income from the trees/crops67
As shown in Table 5.3, 63% of famers planted orange trees on their enrolled 
sloping land which generated the highest gross income (916 yuan/mu/year) 
among all the trees and crops. It is noticeable that farmers’ gross income 
from orange trees exhibited a considerably wide range from 400 to 2000 
yuan/mu/year. This huge difference explains why some farmers asked for 
technique assistance in cultivating and tendering fruit trees. Other major 
trees planted on the enrolled sloping land included poplar, chestnut, peach 
walnut and fir.  As trees take years to mature for producing fruits, nuts or 
timber, some farmers had not received income from their trees at the time of 
survey, which was particularly the case for timber trees like poplar and fir.   
. The comparison between income 
per mu from trees and crops is visualized by Figure 5.2. 
                                            
67 Some households’ trees had not matured for sale or producing fruits, and 
some households grew crops only for their own consumption. In these 
cases, the households received no income from the trees or crops.   
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Table 5.3  Gross Income per mu from Major Trees and Crops  
Percent-HH1: percentage of households planting the trees or crops. 
Percent-HH2: percentage of households receiving income from the 
trees or crops. As many households planted multiple trees/crops, the 
percentages here do not sum to unity.   
Tree/Crop Mean 
a 
(yuan/year)  
5% - 95% 
Percentiles 
Percent- 
HH1 b 
Percent- 
HH2 
Enrolled Forestland  
Orange 916 (430) 400 – 2000 63% 61% 
Poplar 470 (191) 175 – 800 16% 10% 
Chestnut 661 (237) 385 – 960 12% 9% 
Peach 733 (187) 510 – 980 8% 7% 
Walnut 514 (267) 216 – 932 9% 6% 
Fir 511 (270) 247 – 667 11% 2% 
Former Farmland 
Sesame 381 (150) 241 - 652 45% 45% 
Wheat 394 (222) 200 - 900 43% 38% 
Rapeseed 399 (226) 212 - 710 31% 29% 
Maize 546 (449) 138 - 1625 34% 22% 
Peanut 587 (354) 200 - 1190 15% 14% 
a Values in parentheses are standard deviations 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Comparison of Gross Income from Trees and Crops 
Points represent the mean values while the slim bars represent the quantile 
range of 5%-95%. 
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Before the SLCP, major crops grown on the sloping land included sesame, 
wheat, rapeseed, corn and peanut. Some farmers grew crops like wheat and 
corn just for their households’ own consumption rather than selling for 
money. In general,  crops grown on the sloping land generated lower income 
than trees planted after the SLCP. Maize and peanut were relatively high-
income crops (546 and 587 yuan/mu/year respectively), but still generate 
significantly lower income than orange trees 68
The payment from the SLCP, 230 yuan/mu/year, was lower 
. This result is consistent with 
the above finding that 26% (the second largest percentage) of farmers chose 
“forestland can yield higher income than farmland” as the most important 
reason for their participation in the SLCP.  
69
5.3.2  Comparison of Households’ income from Sloping Land 
before and after the SLCP 
 than the mean 
gross income from all the major crops but larger than the lower bound of 5% 
quantile values (except for sesame). That is to say, the income of a few of 
households from crops before the SLCP was lower than the payment from 
the SLCP, which is in agreement with the finding above that 4% of farmers 
attributed their participation in SLCP to the reason that “the payment from 
the program is higher than the income from farming in the enrolled land 
before”. 
As most households planted multiple crops/trees on their sloping land, 
another aspect to assess the SLCP’s effect on their livelihood is comparing 
their aggregate income from the sloping land before and after the SLCP. On 
average, the SLCP participant households received 5,365 yuan/year from 
crops on the sloping farmland before the SLCP. The income disparity 
between households was substantial given the large standard deviation of 
9953 yuan/year. In fact, while about 10% of the households grew crops only 
for their own consumption and received no income, a few of them earned 
more than 20,000 yuan/year.  Comparatively, households’ average income 
                                            
68 The significance of difference here was tested by the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test for two independent samples assuming no 
normal distribution. Moreover, although the average gross income of 
maize and peanut in the former farmland seemed higher than trees like 
poplar and walnut (Table 5.3), tests showed that the differences were not 
significant. On the other hand, however, chestnut and peach did generate 
significantly higher gross income than sesame, wheat and rapeseed.  
69 However, It should be noted that the payments from the SLCP can be 
considered as net income for farmers.  
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from trees after the SLCP was 7,727 (with the standard deviation of 10,882) 
yuan/year, which was significantly higher than their average income from 
crops before the program 70
The distribution of households’ income from the sloping land before and after 
the SLCP is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Generally speaking, more households 
were at the relatively high income levels after the SLCP than before. For 
example, 32% of farmers earned more than 10,000 yuan/year after the 
SLCP while only 14% did so before the program. When comparing each 
household’s income from the sloping land before and after the SLCP, the 
analysis showed that 71% of households were not earning less after joining 
in the SLCP. When the payments from the SLCP were counted, the 
corresponding percentage increased to 75%, and farmers’ average income 
from the enrolled land after the SLCP increased to 8,008 yuan/year. 
.  
 
Figure 5.3 Distribution of Farmers’ Income from Sloping Land 
Each bar (in the same colour) represents an income range of 2,000 
yuan/year. Accordingly, each five red/green-blue bars represent an income 
range of 10,000 yuan/year.  
                                            
70
 The significance here was tested by the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test for two matched datasets (same farmers, before/after the 
SLCP) assuming no normal distribution of farmers’ income. 
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5.3.3  Comparison of the Total Income of SLCP Participant and 
Non-participant Households 
The analysis in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 indicates that trees planted on the 
sloping land generally produced higher income per mu than crops, and  the 
SLCP participant households generally received higher income from the 
sloping land after joining in the SLCP. These results seemingly suggest that 
the SLCP is able to improve participants’ livelihood. However, caution is 
needed in making this argument. It should be noted that the majority of the 
households entered the SLCP before 2005, which means the information of 
their income from crops before the SLCP was largely based on grain prices 
quite a few years ago, while the information of their income from trees after 
the SLCP was based on recent prices of forestry products (e.g. fruits, 
timber). This temporal disparity in the income information may cause some 
extent of bias in comparative analysis above, given the economic 
development and accompanied rising commodity prices in China. In order to 
overcome this potential bias and better understand SLCP’s effect on 
participants’ livelihood, further comparison was made between the total 
income of SLCP participant and non-participant households. The similarity in 
the characteristics of the two groups of households (see Section 5.1.1) 
ensures the validity of this comparison.  
Most of the interviewed farmer households had multiple income sources, 
including trees in forestland, crops in farmland, livestock, agricultural 
products processing, part-time off-farm work, small businesses, money sent 
back by family members working in cities and towns and so on. For the 
convenience of comparing the two groups of households, income from 
forestland and farmland were classified as “land income”, while income from 
all the other sources were classified as “other income”. Table 5.1 presents 
the composition of the total income of the two groups of farmer households. 
On average, the total income of the SLCP participant households was 
23,430 yuan/year. While 11,500 yuan/year came from the enrolled forestland 
(8008 yuan/year) and retained farmland (3,487 yuan/year), approximately 
another half, 11,940 yuan/year came from other sources. The average 
percentage of households’ income from enrolled forestland in the total 
income was 41.5%. That is to say, the forestland enrolled in the SLCP was 
an important income source but not the dominate one of the participant 
households. However, the disparity of households’ reliance on the enrolled 
forestland was great, while about 12% of households received no income 
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from the enrolled forestland, 11% of them relied on the enrolled forestland as 
the only income source. 
 
Table 5.4  Total Income of Two Groups of Farmer Households 
Income Source Mean (Sd) Median 5%-95% Percentiles 
SLCP Participant Households 
Land income   11,500 (20,367)   7,650 0 - 30,860 
     Enrolled Forestland a      8,008 (11,079)   5,000 0 - 20,000 
    Retained Farmland     3,487 (15,988)      200 0 -   8,800 
Other income   11,940 (14,497)   8,500 0 - 40,000 
               Total Income 23,430 (24,784) 18,600 4,730 - 52,000 
Non-participant Households 
Land income   19,340 (28,378)   9,725 1,320 - 65,560 
Other income     7,166 (8482)   4,500 0 - 24,700 
               Total Income   26,510 (27468) 18,000 3,940 - 65,840 
a The reported income here includes both income from trees and payments from 
the SLCP if the households were still under the program.  
 
In contrast, the average total income of the non-participant households was 
26,510 yuan/year, in which 19,340 yuan/year came from land and 7,166 
yuan/year came from other sources. Interestingly, the survey found that 81% 
of the non-participant households also planted orange trees even without 
payments from the SLCP due to the relatively high profitability. The Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon Test for assessing the significance of difference between 
the two groups of households indicated that while the non-participant 
households received significantly higher land income than the participant 
households, their income from other sources was significantly lower than the 
participant households. As a result, the difference in the total income of the 
two groups of households was not statistically significant.  
The higher land income of the non-participant households could partly be 
explained by the slightly but significantly larger total land held by them (see 
Section 5.1.1). That is to say, the lower land income of the participant 
households should not be entirely attributed to their participation in SLCP. 
The insignificant difference in total income between the two groups of 
households indicates that participation in the SLCP at least did not make 
famer households significantly worse off because their potential income 
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increase from other income sources could largely offset their possible 
income loss from land.  
5.4 Choice Modelling Results of Farmers Households’ 
Preferences for the Design of Water Protection 
Programs 
As explained in the Methodology chapter, farmer households’ preferences 
for the design of water protection programs (including the existing SLCP and 
a hypothetical fertilizer reduction program) were modelled in terms of 
households’ preferences for three defined attributes of the two programs and 
households’ trade-offs between the three attributes in choosing the preferred 
program design. With regard to the SLCP, the three defined attributes were 
the annual payment (200, 300 and 400 yuan/year/mu), the contract length 
(5, 10 and 15 years) and the maximum percentage of commercial trees 
allowed to be planted on the enrolled land (0%, 50% and 100%) 71
With regard to the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program, the three 
attributes of the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program were the annual 
payment (300, 400 and 500 yuan/year/mu), the contract length (2, 5 and 8 
years) and the reduction rate of the fertilizers (25%, 50% and 75%). 
Similarly, each household was asked to choose the preferred policy scenario 
(design) from each of the three choice cards.  
. Each 
household was given three choice cards, each of which had three policy 
scenarios and each scenario was a combination of the three attributes at 
different levels. The households were asked to choose the preferred policy 
scenario from each choice card, so their preferences and trade-offs for the 
three attributes can be revealed by econometric models. As one of the 
attributes is the annual payment, the marginal values of the other two non-
monetary attributes, i.e. the ratios of the coefficients of the non-monetary 
attributes to the coefficient of the annual payment, revealed how much 
farmer households were willing to trade (forgo) for a unit change in the 
contract length and the maximum percentage of commercial trees to be 
planted on the enrolled sloping land. 
                                            
71
 “Commercial trees” (e.g. fruit trees) refer to trees that can generate 
relatively high economic profits but less ecological benefits than 
“ecological trees”. The specific species of trees under the two categories 
are designated by the Chinese National Bureau of Forestry.  
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5.4.1  Farmer Households’ Preferences for the Design of SLCP  
5.4.1.1 Marginal Values of Contract Length and Commercial Trees 
As introduced in the Methodology chapter, the Conditional Logit Model 
(CLM), which is the classic and most widely used choice model, was applied 
in this study to reveal farmer households’ preferences and trade-offs 
between three attributes of the SLCP. Table 5.6 presents the CLM 
estimation results of the two groups of households and the pooled sample of 
all households. The coefficients of variables (attributes) in the CLM 
represent the change in farmer households’ utility (an ordinal variable 
describing their satisfaction to different policy scenarios) that is associated 
with a unit change in the corresponding attributes. The signs of the 
coefficients indicate whether farmer households prefer (positive signs) or 
dislike (negative signs) an increase in the attributes. 
 
Table 5.5  Conditional Logit Model of Farmer Households’ 
Preferences for the Design of SLCP 
 Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment  a 0.047 (0.006) *** 0.033 (0.008) *** 0.042 (0.005) *** 
Contract-length 0.033 (0.012) **  0.038 (0.017) * 0.035 (0.010) *** 
P-com-trees b 0.044 (0.012) *** 0.069 (0.016) *** 0.053 (0.010) *** 
Log-likelihood -489.57 -262.78 -754.40 
Marginal Value of the Attributes 
Contract-length  
  (yuan/year) c 
6.97 
(1.95, 12.45) 
11.37 
(1.67, 25.39) 
8.27  
(3.80, 13.20) 
P-com-trees 
(yuan/10%) 
9.41 
(4.48, 15.15) 
20.78 
(10.66, 41.82) 
12.54 
(8.02, 18.04) 
a For the convenience of presenting the results, Annual Payment was input in 
models in the unit of 10 yuan/mu, so the coefficient here represents the change 
in farmers’ utility for every increase of 10 yuan/year/mu in the program payment.    
b The maximum percentage of commercial trees was input in models in the unit of 
10% for the convenience of presenting the results 
c Values in the parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates.  
 
As Table 5.5 shows, all the three attributes of SLCP are with positive and 
significant coefficients in the models of the three samples of households, 
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which means farmer households significantly preferred higher payments, 
longer contracts and less restriction on the planting of commercial trees. The 
magnitudes of coefficients in the CLM are relatively small (below 0.1) simply 
because of the units of attributes used in the modelling process. For 
example, If the unit of annual payment was changed from 10 yuan/year/mu 
to 100 yuan/year/mu, the coefficient of annual payment in the model of all 
households would increase from 0.042 to 0.42. However, the unit of 10 
yuan/year/mu is more convenient for policy interpretation as the current 
annual payment of the SLCP is 230 yuan/mu/year.      
The marginal values of contract length and the maximum percentage of 
commercial trees are also presented in Table 5.5. The SLCP-participant 
households were found to be willing to forgo 6.97 yuan/mu/year for every 
extra contract year at least within the range of 5-15 years72
Noticeably, non-participant households were willing to forgo almost twice  
the payment as the participant households would do for an extra year of 
contract length or the permission of 10% more commercial trees. This 
substantial difference between the two groups of households may be 
attributed to the strong interests of the non-participant households in joining 
in the SLCP. As reported in previous sections, the two groups of farmer 
households had a similar amount of sloping land qualified for the SLCP and 
many households in both groups planted orange trees as an important 
income source, but the participant farmers could receive extra income from 
the SLCP payments. Moreover, many non-participant households did not 
join in the program, not because they had no intention but because no 
quotas of enrolled land was assigned to them. Therefore, the attractiveness 
of receiving extra income from the SLCP with no need to change much of 
the current land use activities might have lowered the non-participants’ 
 and 9.41 
yuan/mu/year for each 10% more commercial trees allowed to be planted on 
the enrolled sloping land within the full range of 0%-100% (i.e. from 
complete restriction to no restriction at all). In contrast, the non-participant 
households were willing to forgo 11.37 yuan/mu/year for every extra contract 
year and 20.78 yuan/mu/year for each extra 10% commercial trees. With 
regard to the pooled sample of all farmers, the marginal values of contract 
length and the maximum percentage of commercial trees were 8.27 and 
12.54 yuan/mu/year respectively.  
                                            
72 This is the range of contract length that were presented to farmers in the 
survey. Any evaluation involving shorter or longer contract length requires 
extrapolation, which is less reliable than evaluation within the range.      
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expectation for the program payments (i.e. they were willing to forgo more 
money for extra contract years and higher percentage of commercial trees).    
The uncertainties/distributions of the marginal value estimates are described 
by the 95% confidence intervals shown in Table 5.5 and illustrated in Figure 
5.4. It can be noted that the marginal values estimates of non-participant 
households exhibit more dispersed distributions (in green shade) than the 
estimates of SLCP-participant households (in red shade). This can be 
attributed to the larger standard errors of the estimated coefficients in the 
model of non-participant households (see Table 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5.4  Distribution of Marginal Value Estimates of the SLCP 
 
5.4.1.2 Farmer Households’ Preferences for Longer SLCP Contracts 
It is common to find preferences for higher payments and less restrictions on 
land use activities in the literature on farmer households’ willingness to 
participate in agri-environmental schemes (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Chen et 
al. 2009a; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurle and Ruto 2010; Christensen et 
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al. 2011; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013). However, it is rarely reported in the 
literature that farmer households preferred longer contracts and would forgo 
certain payments for extra contract years as found in this study. Doubts may 
arise on whether the farmer households simply chose the policy scenarios 
with the largest aggregate payments (i.e. the product of the Annual Payment 
and Contract-length) or they just considered the aggregate payments and 
the maximum percentage of commercial trees in their choices instead of 
truly preferring longer contracts. In order to clarify these doubts, further 
analyses are conducted from the following two aspects.  
Firstly,  a descriptive statistical analysis of farmer households’ choices in the 
survey (Table 5.6) shows that the policy scenarios with the largest aggregate 
payment in the three choice cards (highlighted in bold) were chosen by 57%, 
30% and 31% households respectively, which were far from dominant. 
Obviously, the aggregate payment was not the decisive factor of 
households’ choices of preferred design of SLCP.  
 
Table 5.6  Farmer Households’ Choices for Policy Scenarios of SLCP  
In the real survey, Aggregate Payment (yuan/mu) did not actually appear in 
the choice cards presented to farmers, and policy scenarios were neither 
listed in descending nor ascending order to avoid any ordering effect on 
farmers’ choices.   
Annual Payment 
(yuan/mu) 
Contract- 
length (year) 
P-com-
trees  
Aggregate 
Payment 
Households’ 
Choice 
Choice Card A 
400 15 50% 6000 57% 
300 10 100% 3000 33% 
200 5 0 1000 9% 
Choice Card B 
300 15 0% 4500 30% 
400 5 100% 2000 49% 
200 10 50% 2000 21% 
Choice Card C 
400 10 0% 4000 31% 
200 15 100% 3000 31% 
300 5 50% 1500 38% 
 
Secondly, two modified conditional logit models were constructed to 
examine the modelling effect of contract length and aggregate payment. The 
first modified model (Modified CLM-1) replaced the annual payment and 
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contract length in the original CLM with the aggregate payment and the 
second modified model (Modified CLM-2) removed contract length from the 
original CLM. The modelling results (Table 5.7) show that both of the two 
modified models exhibit significantly lower goodness of fit than the original 
CLM, especially for the pooled sample of all households. That is to say, 
including contract length in the choice model can significantly improve the 
model’s ability to explain farmer households’ preferences for the policy 
scenarios of SLCP, and considering the contract length and annual payment 
as two separate variables is a significantly better strategy to understand 
farmers’ choice than using the aggregate payment in the model.   
 
Table 5.7  Modelling Effect of Contract-length and Aggregate Payment  
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-participants Non-participants All Households 
 Modified CLM-1 
Aggregate Payment  0.002 (0.000) ***  0.002 (0.000) ***  0.002 (0.000) *** 
P-com-trees  0.054 (0.012) ***  0.077 (0.017) ***  0.062 (0.010) *** 
Log-likelihood a -502.92 -265.30 -769.38 
LR-test with CLM b 2.37×10-7 0.02 4.41×10-8 
Modified CLM-2 
Annual Payment 0.045 (0.006) *** 0.030 (0.008) *** 0.040 (0.005) *** 
P-com-trees 0.037 (0.012) *** 0.063 (0.016) *** 0.046 (0.009) *** 
Log-likelihood -493.23 -265.39 -760.81 
LR-test with CLM 0.007 0.02 3.44×10-4 
a Log-likelihood indicates the goodness of fit of the model. Larger log-likelihoods 
indicate better model fitting. The log-likelihoods of the original CLM for the SLCP-
participants, non-participants and the pooled sample of all households are -
489.57, -262.78, -754.40 respectively, which are all larger than that of the 
modified models. 
b Values in this row are the p-values of likelihood ratio test. P-values less than 0.05 
mean that the original CLM has significantly better fitting than the modified 
models.  
 
The analyses from the above two aspects indicate that substantial farmer 
households did not prefer the policy scenarios with the largest aggregate 
payment and contract length significantly contributed to the model fitting as a 
separate variable. This implies that farmers households did take account of 
contract length as a significant variable in making their choices and the 
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result of their preferences for longer contracts revealed by the CLM is 
valid73
5.4.2  Farmer Households’ Preferences for the Design of Fertilizer 
Reduction Program  
. In fact, longer contracts of agri-environmental schemes could both 
have the benefit of generating stable income and the drawback of reducing 
the flexibility of land use activities. The preferences for longer contracts 
revealed by this study indicates that the interviewed farmer households put 
more weight on the positive side of long-term SLCP than its drawback. This 
finding has important policy implications that will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
In addition to the existing SLCP, this study also investigated farmer 
households’ preferences for the design of a hypothetical water protection 
program for reducing the use of Nitrogen and Phosphate fertilizers on the flat 
farmland that cannot be covered by the SLCP. As presented in Table 5.8, 
farmer households showed significant preferences for higher annual 
payments, longer contracts and understandably significant dislike of higher 
percentages of fertilizer reduction.  
 
Table 5.8  Conditional Logit Model of Farmer Households’ Preferences 
for the Design of Fertilizer Reduction Program 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment a  0.045 (0.006) ***  0.047 (0.008) ***  0.046 (0.005) *** 
Contract-length  0.147 (0.021) ***  0.073 (0.028) **  0.120 (0.017) *** 
P-ferti-reduce b -0.069 (0.025) ** -0.087 (0.033) ** -0.075 (0.020) *** 
Log-likelihood -452.09 -252.13 -706.5 
Marginal Value of the Attribute 
  Contract-length  
  (yuan/year) c 
32.51 
(21.95, 47.98) 
15.37 
(3.66, 31.66) 
26.45 
(18.28, 36.96) 
  P- fert-reduce 
(yuan/10%)  
-15.19 
(-30.23, -4.03) 
-18.45  
(-37.96,  -4.39) 
-16.39 
(-27.54, -7.42) 
a Annual Payment was input in the model in the unit of 10 yuan/mu. 
b Percentage of fertilizer reduction was input in models in the unit of 10%.   
c Values in the parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals. 
                                            
73
 Similar analysis will not be repeated for the fertilizer reduction program. 
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With regard to the marginal values of contract length and fertilizer reduction 
rate, the SLCP-participant households were willing to forgo 32.51 
yuan/mu/year for every extra contract year within the range of 2-8 years, but 
they would require 15.19 yuan/mu/year for reducing the use of each 10% of 
fertilizers within the range of 25% to 75%. Comparatively, the non-participant 
households would forgo only about half of the annual payment (15.37 
yuan/mu/year) as the participants did for every extra contract, and they 
required more money (18.45 yuan/mu/year) than the participants for 
reducing the use of each 10% of fertilizers. When the two groups of 
households were pooled together for analysis, they were willing to trade 
every extra contract year for 26.45 yuan/mu/year and each 10% lower 
fertilizer reduction rate for 16.39 yuan/mu/year. Figure 5.5 illustrates the 
distribution of the marginal value estimates for the attributes of contract 
length and fertilizer reduction rate. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Distribution of Marginal Values Estimates of the Fertilizer 
Reduction Program 
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Interestingly, while the non-participant households were willing to forgo more 
money for extra contract years and the permission of planting more 
commercial trees when choosing the preferred design of SLCP, they would 
forgo less money for extra contract years and require more money for higher 
fertilizer reduction rates when choosing the preferred design of the fertilizer 
reduction program. In other words, the non-participant households showed 
relatively less interests in reducing the use of fertilizers in the flat farmland. 
This may be explained by the earlier finding mentioned in Section 5.3 that 
the non-participant households were more reliant on income from their land, 
thus the fertilizer reduction program may impose a larger effect on their 
livelihood.   
5.5  Heterogeneity in Farmer Households’ Preferences for the 
Design of Water Protection Programs 
5.5.1  Estimation Results of the Random Parameters Logit Model  
In Section 5.4, the classic Conditional Logit Model (CLM) is applied to reveal 
farmer households’ preferences for the design of water protection programs. 
In the CLM, farmer households’ preferences for each program attribute is 
represented by one estimated coefficient, which implies that all households 
in the sample had homogeneous preferences. This was useful simplification 
for modelling but not necessarily true in practice. In order to take account of 
the heterogeneity in farmer households’ preferences, the advanced Random 
Parameters Logit Model (RPL) is applied in this section.  
The RPL estimates a statistic distribution for the coefficient of each attribute, 
so the coefficient representing farmer households’ preferences for the 
attribute is allowed to vary among households and follow the estimated 
distribution. Normal distribution represented by mean and standard deviation 
was mostly used in literature (Train 1998; Hanley, Wright and Alvarez-Farizo 
2006; Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurle and Ruto 
2010) and thus was applied in this study. However, farmer households’ 
preferences for the monetary attribute was usually assumed to be uniform 
among households for the convenience of calculating the marginal values of 
non-monetary attributes. 
5.5.1.1 Farmer Households’ Heterogeneous Preferences for the Design 
of SLCP 
Table 5.9 presents the RPL estimates of farmer households’ preferences for 
the design of SLCP. The attributes of contract length and maximum 
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percentage of commercial trees in the RPL have two coefficients, i.e. the 
mean and standard deviation of the normal distributions that describe farmer 
households’ heterogeneous preferences for the two attributes. If the 
standard deviation coefficient is significant, it means that there is significant 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for the attribute. When the standard 
deviation coefficient is relatively large compared with the mean coefficient (in 
terms of the absolute value), it implies that some households showed 
opposite preferences for the attribute to what is indicated by the mean 
coefficient 74
 
.  The likelihood ratio test (LR-test with CLM) showed that the 
RPL significantly improves the model fitting than the CLM for all the three 
samples of farmer households, especially for the pooled sample of all 
farmers (with the p-value of 4.07×10-7).  
Table 5.9  Radom Parameters Logit Model of Farmers Households’ 
Preference for the Design of SLCP 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-Participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment 0.055 (0.007) *** 0.035 (0.009) *** 0.048 (0.006) *** 
Mean-Contract-length 0.033 (0.015) * 0.035 (0.018) * 0.034 (0.012) ** 
Mean-P-com-tree 0.054 (0.017) ** 0.079 (0.022) *** 0.064 (0.013) *** 
Sd-Contract-length a 0.109 (0.034) ** 0.019 (0.143) 0.086 (0.029) ** 
Sd- P-com-trees 0.131 (0.033) *** 0.137 (0.042) ** 0.134 (0.026) *** 
Log-likelihood -478.39 -257.94 -739.69 
LR-test with CLM b 1.40×10-5 0.003 4.07×10-7 
  Marginal Value of the Attribute 
Contract-length c 
(yuan/year) 
6.02 
(0.63, 12.15) 
9.91  
(0.00, 26.02) 
7.19 
(2.45, 12.64) 
P-com-trees 
(yuan/10%) 
9.98 
(3.87, 17.04) 
22.45 
(10.16, 47.36) 
13.35 
(7.84, 19.98) 
a This refers to the standard deviation coefficient of the attribute of contract length.  
b Values in this row are the p-values of the likelihood ratio test for assessing the 
significance of improvement in model fitting from the Conditional Logit Model to 
the Random Parameters Logit Model.  
c Values in the parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals. 
                                            
74 This is because for a normal distribution, a relatively large standard 
deviation (compared with the mean) implies that the distribution disperses 
on both sides of the x axis. So there are both positive and negative values  
in this distribution no matter that the mean is on the positive or negative 
side.  
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For the SLCP-participant farmer households (Table 5.9), the standard 
deviation coefficients of contract length and the maximum percentage of 
commercial trees (Sd-Contract-length and Sd-P-com-trees) are significant at 
the 0.01 and 0.001 level respectively, which means participant households 
showed significant heterogeneity in their preferences for the two attributes. 
Specifically, the SLCP-participants’ heterogeneous preferences for contract 
length can be described by a normal distribution with the mean of 0.033 (the 
coefficient of Mean-Contract-length) and standard deviation of 0.109 (the 
coefficient of Sd-Contract-length). In such a normal distribution, the 
probability of having a negative value is 38%. That is to say, although the 
SLCP-participant households preferred longer contracts on average (as the 
mean coefficient of 0.033 indicates), 38% of them had different preferences 
to the majority and preferred shorter contracts.  
Furthermore, the SLCP-participant households’ preferences for the 
maximum percentage of commercial trees can be described by a normal 
distribution with the mean of 0.054 and standard deviation of 0.131, which 
implies 34% of them showed different preferences to the majority and 
preferred lower percentage of commercial trees allowed to be planted on the 
sloping land. This preference for stricter restriction on commercial trees 
seems strange, a possible explanation is that some households were 
actually indifferent to this restriction and chose the policy scenarios with 
stricter restriction but higher annual payment and longer contracts (such as 
the first policy scenario in Choice Card B and Choice Card C in Table 5.6), 
which made them appear to favour stricter restrictions on commercial trees.  
The marginal values of attributes in the RPL were calculated based on the 
mean coefficients of the two non-monetary attributes and the coefficient of 
annual payment. On average, the SLCP-participant households willing to 
forgo 6.02 yuan/mu/year for every extra contract year and 9.98 
yuan/mu/year for the permission of each 10% commercial trees. These 
estimates are close to the estimates of the CLM (6.97 and 9.41 
yuan/mu/year respectively), which reflects the consistency between the two 
models.  
As for the non-participant farmer households, no significant heterogeneity 
was found in their preferences for contract length since the standard 
deviation coefficient (Sd-Contract-length) in the RPL is not significant (Table 
5.9). That is to say, households in this group showed homogenous 
preferences for longer contracts. In contrast, non-participant households 
showed heterogeneous preferences for the maximum percentage of 
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commercial trees (at the 0.01 significance level), which can be described by 
a normal distribution with the mean of 0.079 and standard deviation of 0.137. 
This means 28% of them showed preferences for stricter restrictions on the 
planting of commercial trees, which indicates lower heterogeneity than the 
SLCP-participant households with the corresponding percentage of 34%. 
Similar to the case of the SLCP-participant households, the marginal value 
estimates of the non-participant households by the RPL are similar to the 
estimates by the CLM. On average, farmer households in this group were 
willing to trade every extra contract year for 9.91 yuan/mu/year and the 
planting permission of each 10% commercial trees for 22.45 yuan/mu/year.   
When the two groups of households were pooled together, the RPL 
estimates show that farmer households’ preferences for  contract length and 
the maximum percentage of commercial trees were both significantly 
heterogeneous and could be described by a normal distribution with the 
mean of 0.034 and standard deviation of 0.086 and another normal 
distribution with the mean of 0.064 and standard deviation of 0.134 
respectively. This means while they preferred longer contracts and less 
restriction on commercial trees on average, 34% of them showed preference 
for shorter contracts and 32% of them preferred stricter restrictions on 
commercial trees. Moreover, the marginal values of an extra contract year 
and the permission of 10% more commercial trees are 7.19 and 13.35 
yuan/mu/year respectively, which are similar to the estimates of the CLM 
(8.27 and 12.54 yuan/mu/year).  
5.5.1.2 Farmer Households’ Heterogeneous Preferences for the Design 
of Fertilizer Reduction Program 
Table 5.10 presents the RPL estimates of farmer households’ preferences 
for the design of the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program. It can be noted 
that the standard deviation coefficients of fertilizer reduction rate in the 
models of all the three samples of farmer households are insignificant, which 
indicates that all households had homogeneous preferences for lower 
requirement of reducing the use of fertilizers. The non-participant (of SLCP) 
households also showed homogenous preferences for longer contracts. 
Since this group of households did not show significant heterogeneity in their 
preferences for both the attributes of contract length and fertilizer reduction 
rate, the RPL of this group of households did not exhibit significant 
improvement in model fitting than the CLM as shown by the likelihood ratio 
test (p-value=0.45).  
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In contrast, the SLCP-participant households showed significantly 
heterogeneous preferences for contract length which can be described by a 
normal distribution with the mean of 0.171 and standard deviation of 0.199. 
This means 20% of households in this group preferred shorter contracts 
while the whole group preferred longer contracts on average. For the pooled 
sample of all farmer households, the heterogeneity in their preferences for 
contract length is at the 0.001 significance level and can be described by a 
normal distribution with the mean of 0.138 and standard deviation of 0.178, 
which indicates 22% of the pooled sample of all households preferred 
shorter contracts. 
 
Table 5.10  Radom Parameters Logit Model of Farmer Households’ 
Preference for the Design of Fertilizer Reduction Program 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 * 
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-Participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment 0.049 (0.007) ***  0.049 (0.009) *** 0.049 (0.005) *** 
Mean-Contract-length 0.171 (0.026) ***  0.080 (0.031) * 0.138 (0.020) *** 
Mean-P-fert-reduce   -0.075 (0.028) ** -0.088 (0.037) *   -0.079 (0.022) *** 
Sd-Contract-length 0.199 (0.051) ***  0.127 (0.080) 0.178 (0.042) *** 
Sd-P-fert-reduce 0.018 (0.454)  0.010 (1.002) 0.018 (0.373) 
Log-likelihood -446.17 -251.33 -700.17 
LR-test with CLM 0.003 0.45 0.002 
Marginal Value of the Attribute 
  Contract-length 
(yuan/year) 
34.84 
(23.27, 51.42) 
16.39 
(3.83, 33.43) 
28.21 
(19.52, 39.34) 
P-fert-reduce 
(yuan/10%) 
-15.26 
(-30.75, -3.93) 
-18.04 
(-38.56, -3.22) 
-16.18 
(-27.62, -7.02) 
 
The marginal value  estimates of the RPL for the fertilizer reduction program 
are similar to the estimates of the CLM. The SLCP-participant households 
were willing to forgo more money for extra contract years (34.84 in contrast 
with 16.39 yuan/mu/year) and required less money (15.26 in contrast with 
18.04 yuan/mu/year) for achieving higher fertilizers reduction rate. For the 
pooled sample of all farmer households, the marginal values of contract 
length and fertilizer reduction rate are 28.21 and -16.18 yuan/mu/year 
respectively, while the estimates by the CLM were 26.45 and -16.39 
yuan/mu/year respectively. 
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5.5.2  Factors Causing Heterogeneity in Farmer Households’ 
Preferences for the Design of Water Protection Programs 
The Random Parameters Logit Model (RPL) provides useful information of 
the distribution of farmer households’ heterogeneous preferences for the 
design of water protection programs. However, it does not explain what 
factors might have caused the revealed heterogeneity. A possible method to 
understand the source of farmer households’ heterogeneous preferences is 
to introduce their characteristics into the RPL through interactions with the 
program attributes. Special interests are focused on the heterogeneous 
preferences for contract length as farmer households’ overall preferences for 
longer contracts is a special finding of this study, and it would be interesting 
to know which types of households showed significantly greater or less 
interests in longer contracts. Table 5.11 presents the estimation results of 
RPL with interaction terms between farmer households’ characteristics and 
the contract length of SLCP 75
For the SLCP-participant households, education, the percentage of enrolled 
land in their total land and total income were significant factors causing the 
heterogeneity in households’ preferences for contract length. The heads of 
households who had at least completed middle school education showed 
significantly greater interests in longer contracts (at the 0.01 significance 
level), which may be attributed to their better knowledge and skills to receive 
income from trees on the sloping land and other sources. Households with 
higher total income were also significantly more willing to accept longer 
contracts (at the 0.01 significance level). It is possible that these well-off 
households received higher income after joining in the SLCP and thus had 
more positive attitudes to this program, or they were less sensitive to the 
change in opportunity cost (e.g. crops prices) of converting farmland to 
forestland and appreciated SLCP more for the benefit of stable income and 
less labour input needed for trees than crops.  
.   
On the other hand, households who enrolled higher percentages of their 
total land in the SLCP were significantly less willing to accept longer 
contracts (at the 0.001 significance level), probably because they would like 
to retain more flexibility in land use and  preferred more diversified land 
management. Interestingly, the standard deviation coefficient of contract 
                                            
75
 The RPL with interaction terms between farmers’ characteristics and the 
maximum percentage of commercial trees did not generate satisfactory 
estimation results and thus is not reported here. 
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length (Sd-Contract-length) is no longer significant after introducing the 
interaction terms between farmer households’ characteristics and contract 
length in the RPL for the SLCP-participant households. That is to say, the 
heterogeneity of this group of households’ preferences for the contract 
length of SLCP has been well captured by these interaction terms. 
 
Table 5.11  Heterogeneity in Farmer Households’ Preference for the 
Contract length of SLCP 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-Participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment 0.055 (0.008) ***  0.035 (0.009) *** 0.048 (0.006) *** 
Mean-Contract-length 0.186 (0.066) **  -0.040 (0.092) 0.108 (0.051) * 
Mean-P-com-trees   0.058 (0.017) ***  0.081 (0.022) ***   0.066 (0.013) *** 
Sd-Contract-length 0.065 (0.046)   0.005 (0.505) 0.066 (0.034) ○ 
Sd-P-com-trees 0.127 (0.034) ***   0.138 (0.043) ** 0.133 (0.026) ***  
Log-likelihood -444.87 -251.33 -711.92 
Interaction Terms with Contract  Length 
Gender (female) 0.005 (0.034) 0.026 (0.043) 0.003 (0.026) 
Age 0.030 (0.033)  -0.014 (0.047) 0.022 (0.025) 
Education 0.084 (0.032) **  -0.018 (0.047) 0.043 (0.025) ○ 
Family Size    -0.013 (0.009) 0.009 (0.016) -0.007 (0.008) 
Hiring Labour a 0.031 (0.033) 0.017 (0.052) 0.025 (0.027) 
Total Land    -0.021 (0.037)  -0.082 (0.058) -0.017 (0.030) 
P-enrolled/qualified b    -0.214 (0.065) *** 0.130 (0.083) -0.086 (0.045) ○ 
Total Income 0.128 (0.041) ** 0.050 (0.055) 0.090 (0.031) ** 
P-land-income c    -0.071 (0.051)  -0.038 (0.073) -0.078 (0.039) * 
a This is a binary variable indicating whether the households hired labour for 
farming.  
b This variable refers to the percentage of the households’ sloping land enrolled (for 
SLCP-participants) or qualified (for non-participants) in their total land.  
c This variable refers to the percentage of the households’ land income in their total 
income. 
 
For the non-participant households, no significant heterogeneity was found 
by the original RPL in their preferences for contract length (Table 5.9). 
Introducing the interaction terms does not change this finding and none of 
the interaction terms are significant in this new model either. However, the 
RPL with interaction terms performs relatively well for the pooled sample of 
all households. Similar to the case of the SLCP-participant households, 
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education and total income were positive factors of the preferences for 
longer SLCP contracts while the percentage of enrolled/qualified land in the 
total land was a negative factor, but the effect of education and percentage 
of enrolled/qualified land decreased to the 0.1 significance level due to the 
integration of the two groups of households.  
Additionally, percentage of land income in households’ total income (P-land-
income) was a significantly negative factor at the 0.05 significance level, 
indicating that households who were more reliant on land income had 
significantly less interest in longer contract. This is probably because greater 
reliance on land income made farmer households more sensitive to the 
changing market prices of crops and forest products, so they preferred 
greater flexibility in land use and thus chose shorter SLCP contracts. After 
introducing the interaction terms in the RPL, the standard deviation 
coefficient of contract length is only significant at the 0.1 level while it is at 
the 0.01 significance level in the original RPL. That is to say, the interaction 
terms has largely but not completely captured the heterogeneity of 
households’ preference for the contract length of SLCP.  
Table 5.12 presents the estimation results of RPL with interaction terms 
between households’ characteristics and the contract length of the 
hypothetical fertilizer reduction program. Unlike the case of SLCP, the 
standard deviation coefficients of contract length in the models of the SLCP-
participant households and the pooled sample of all households are still 
significant after introducing the interaction terms 76
                                            
76
 The standard deviation coefficient of contract length in the original RPL of 
the non-participant households is not significant (Table 5.10), so the 
insignificance of this coefficient in the new RPL (Table 5.12) can hardly be 
attributed to the introduction of the interaction terms.   
. That is to say, the 
interaction terms with households’ characteristics cannot well capture all the 
heterogeneity in households’ preferences for contract length of this 
hypothetical program. Nevertheless, it is found that female heads of 
households in the group of SLCP-participants showed significantly less 
interest in longer contracts, education is a significantly positive factor of the 
non-participant households’ preferences for longer contracts and both 
gender and education are significant factors causing the heterogeneity in the 
pooled sample of all households’ preferences for contract length. These 
results are useful information for future studies on farmer households’ 
heterogeneous preferences for the design of fertilizer reduction programs. 
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Table 5.12  Heterogeneity in Farmer Households’ Preference for the 
Contract length of Fertilizer Reduction Program 
Significance Level: 0.001 ***, 0.01 **, 0.05 *, 0.1 ○  
Variable 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SLCP-Participants Non-participants All Households 
Annual Payment 0.050 (0.007) ***  0.049 (0.009) *** 0.049 (0.005) *** 
Mean-Contract-length 0.341 (0.125) **   0.191 (0.152) 0.275 (0.091) ** 
Mean-P-fert-reduce  -0.074 (0.028) **  -0.088 (0.037) *   -0.079 (0.022) *** 
Sd-Contract-length 0.171 (0.057) **   0.056 (0.155) 0.156 (0.046) *** 
Sd-P-fert-reduce 0.001 (1.120)   0.006 (1.511) 0.004 (0.803)  
Log-likelihood -428.67 -244.63 -680.99 
Interaction Terms with Contract  Length 
Gender (female)    -0.031 (0.056) *  -0.046 (0.069) -0.090 (0.042) * 
Age     0.074 (0.058)   0.009 (0.074)  0.038 (0.045) 
Education 0.043 (0.054)    0.164 (0.080) *  0.103 (0.043) * 
Family Size    -0.021 (0.017)  -0.011 (0.023) -0.017 (0.013) 
Hiring Labour 0.002 (0.056)   0.103 (0.082)  0.038 (0.044) 
Total Land    -0.005 (0.066)  -0.004 (0.087)   -0.001 (0.050) 
P-enrolled/qualified    -0.132 (0.117)   -0.161 (0.128)   -0.106 (0.082) 
Total Income 0.087 (0.069)  -0.068 (0.078)  0.009 (0.049) 
P-land-income    -0.009 (0.085)  -0.083 (0.114)   -0.084 (0.65)  
 
5.6  Summary 
This chapter presents the research findings of the Choice Experiment survey 
in seven villages around the Danjiangkou Reservoir on farmer households’ 
preferences for the design of water protection programs. For the existing 
Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP), the estimation results of the 
classic Conditional Logit Model show that farmer households in general 
preferred higher payment, longer contracts and higher percentage of 
commercial trees allowed to be planted on the enrolled sloping land. The 
finding of preferences for longer contracts is different from the results of 
most choice modelling studies on agri-environmental programs, which may 
be attributed to the relatively positive effect of SLCP on farmer households’ 
livelihood.  
Analysis of farmer households’ trade-offs between defined program 
attributes of the SLCP found that households who had not participated in the 
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SLCP were willing to forgo twice as much payment as the households who 
had participated in the SLCP did for every extra contract year and the 
permission of planting each 10% more commercial trees. When the two 
groups of farmer households were pooled together for the analysis, they 
were willing to forgo about 8 yuan/mu/year for every extra contract year and 
13 yuan/mu/year for the each 10% more commercial trees. 
With regard to the hypothetical program for reducing the use of fertilizers on 
flat farmland, farmer households in general preferred higher payment, longer 
contracts and lower fertilizer reduction rate. Unlike the case of SLCP, the 
non-participant households showed less interest in this hypothetical program 
as they were willing to forgo only about half of the payment as the SLCP-
participant households did for every extra contract year and required more 
payment for reducing their fertilizer use by each 10%. When the two groups 
of households were pooled together for analysis, they were willing to trade 
each extra contract year for about 26 yuan/mu/year but required 16 
yuan/mu/year for reducing the use of fertilizers by each 10%. 
The Random Parameters Logit Model was applied in this study to reveal the 
heterogeneity in farmer households’ preferences for the design of water 
protection programs. The modelling results indicate that there was significant 
heterogeneity in the SLCP-participant households’ preferences for both 
contract length and the maximum percentage of commercial trees. Although, 
on average, households in this group preferred longer contracts and the 
permission of higher percentage of commercial trees, 38% of them showed 
contrary preferences for shorter contracts and 34% of them did not prefer 
higher percentage of commercial trees. The non-participant households only 
showed significant heterogeneity in their preferences for commercial trees 
and 28% of them did not prefer the permission of higher percentage of 
commercial trees. For the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program, both of 
the two groups of households show homogeneous preferences for lower 
fertilizer reduction rates. The non-participant households showed 
homogeneous preferences for longer contracts as well. But the SLCP-
participant households showed significantly heterogeneous preferences for 
contract length and 20% of them preferred shorter contracts. 
In order to understand the source of farmer households’ heterogeneous 
preferences for the design of water protection programs, interaction terms 
between farmer households’ characteristics and the variable of contract 
length were introduced into the random parameters logit models. The results 
indicate that introducing the interaction terms can well capture the 
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heterogeneity in the SLCP-participant households’ preferences for the 
contract length of SLCP. While education level of the heads of households 
and households’ total income are significantly positive factors of the 
preferences for longer contracts, larger percentage of enrolled land in 
households’ total land could lead to significantly less interests in longer 
contracts. Additionally, the percentage of land income in households’ total 
income is also a significantly negative factor of the preferences for longer 
contract in the pooled sample of all households. In contrast, the interactions 
terms with households’ characteristics cannot well explain their 
heterogeneous preferences for the contract length of the hypothetical 
fertilizer reduction program, which needs more studies in the future.  
In addition to the choice modelling questions, some auxiliary questions were 
also asked in the farmer households survey which provides useful 
information for better understanding the implementation of SLCP in the 
surveyed villages. The survey results show that the most important two 
reasons for farmer households’ participation in the SLCP were strong 
promotion of the program by the government and the prospect of higher 
income from forestland than farmland. On the other hand, households with 
qualified land did not participate in the SLCP mainly because of 
unawareness of the program or limited quotas of enrolled land assigned to 
their villages. In fact, limited quotas of enrolled land was also the major 
reason why some of the participant households only enrolled part of their 
qualified land in the SLCP. These results indicate the potential for extending 
the SLCP in these villages in the future.  
The analysis of the effect of SLCP on farmer households’ livelihood found 
that the participant households generally received higher income from the 
sloping land after joining in the SLCP as a result of higher income per mu 
generated by trees (especially orange trees) than crops. Further comparison 
of the participant and non-participant households found that the difference in 
the average total income of the two groups of households was not 
significant. The participant households were less reliant on land income 
because, as some households stated, managing forestland needed less 
tending time than farmland and thus they had better chance to receive 
income from other sources. Overall, a conservative argument is that 
participation in the SLCP at least did not make farmer households’ livelihood 
significantly worse off.  
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and Implications 
Chapters 4 and 5 have discussed the modelling results of residents’ 
Willingness to Pay for water protection from the demand side of PES and 
farmers’ preferences for different designs of water protection programs from 
the supply side, respectively. This chapter focuses on the implications 
derived from the research findings of the two preceding chapters. Comparing 
the total WTP of all water users in the four northern cities and the budget of 
the central government’s water protection plan, Section 6.1 assesses the 
financial feasibility of establishing a water protection PES scheme by levying 
higher water prices in northern cities. Section 6.2 focuses on improving the 
contractual design of the Sloping Land Conversion Program in the water 
supply area with the findings of farmers’ preferences for program attributes. 
Section 6.3 summaries the major results and arguments of this chapter.  
6.1 Financial Feasibility of PES for Water Protection 
6.1.1 Aggregate WTP for Water Protection  
One of the major purposes of this research is to assess the financial 
feasibility of establishing a water protection PES scheme by levying higher 
water fees in the northern cities along the middle route of the South-to-North 
Water Transfer Project. The Contingent Valuation study in Chapter 4 has 
provided the estimates of urban residents’ mean WTP for water protection in 
terms of an increase in water price. With the data of daily water consumption 
per capita and the residential population of water consumers in the four 
cities, the annual WTP per capita and the aggregate annual WTP of all water 
users can be calculated (see Table 6.1). The aggregate WTP can be 
compared with the cost of water protection in the water supply area as 
estimated by the Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in 
Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream Areas77
                                            
77
  As introduced in the Introduction chapter, this plan was issued in 2006 by 
the Chinese central government to guide the water protection in the water 
supply area. 
. The percentage that annual 
WTP per capita accounts for residents’ annual disposable income per capita 
is useful information to indicate the potential impact of the proposed PES 
scheme on residents’ income.  Additionally, the annual WTP per household 
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for water protection was calculated using the mean household size of the 
four cities for comparison with the results of similar studies in the literature. 
 
Table 6.1 The Aggregate WTP for Water Protection 
Rows highlighted in olive green shading present the calculation results of aggregate 
WTP. Secondary data of water consumption per capita, annual disposable income 
per capita and the numbers of residential water users were obtained from the online 
database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
City Beijing Tianjin Shijiazhuang Zhengzhou 
Mean WTP (yuan/m3) a  0.71 (4.00) 
0.25 
(4.40) 
0.39 
(3.63) 
0.36 
(2.40) 
Increase  in % of  
the current water price  17.8% 5.7% 10.7% 15.0% 
Water consumption 
 Per Capita (m3/day) b 0.173 0.129 0.124 0.109 
Annual WTP per  
capita (yuan) 44.73 11.75 17.72 14.27 
Annual Disposable 
Income per capita 
(yuan) 
32,903 26,921 20,534 21,612 
Annual WTP as % of 
individual disposable 
income 
0.14% 0.04% 0.09% 0.07% 
Average Household 
Size 3.15 3.06 3.55 3.42 
Annual WTP per  
household (yuan) 140.91 35.96 62.89 48.80 
Residential population 
of water users (million) 17.41 6.15 1.88 4.28 
Annual city WTP  
(million yuan) 778.69 72.33 33.31 61.07 
Total WTP 945.09 million yuan/year 
a Values in parentheses are the current water prices in the four cities.  
b As the data of Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou are not available, the data of Hebei 
and Henan Province where these two cities are located were used for aggregate 
calculation. 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, the annual WTP per capita of residents in Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou are 44.73, 11.75, 17.72 and 14.27 
yuan which account for 0.14%, 0.04%, 0.09% and 0.07% of the annual 
disposal income per capita in the four cities, respectively. Accordingly, the 
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aggregate WTP of all water users in the four cities would be about 778.69, 
72.33, 33.31, 61.07 million yuan/year respectively, leading to a total WTP of 
945.09 million yuan/year. It can be noted that Beijing could contribute 
substantially more funding for water protection than the other three cities due 
to the largest mean WTP per capita, largest water consumption per capita 
and population of tap water users.  
The calculation of aggregate WTP above is relatively conservative for 
deriving policy implications for the future. Firstly, the population of water 
users adopted in the calculation were the data of 2011 since the Contingent 
Valuation survey was conducted in the January and February of 2012. In 
fact, with the growth of total population, expansion of urbanization and 
improvement of water service infrastructure, the population of water users in 
these four cities is growing fast. For example, the population of water users 
increased by 0.43 million in Beijing and 0.34 million in Tianjin from 2011 to 
2012. Secondly, as the water consumption data of Shijiazhuang and 
Zhengzhou are not available, the data of Hebei and Henan Province have 
been used in this calculation. The actual water consumption data could be 
larger than the provincial average level as the two cities are provincial 
capitals which are more developed than other cities in the provinces and 
usually consumed more water per capita. Larger estimates of total WTP 
could be derived with larger population of water users and water 
consumption.  
6.1.2 Comparison with the results of Similar Studies  
Table 6.2 lists the estimates of annual households’ WTP for water quality 
improvement in the recent Contingent Valuation studies in China.  
 
Table 6.2 WTP for Water Quality Improvement in Similar Studies   
Surface water quality is classified into Grade I to V in China, and Grade I refers to 
the highest level of water quality. Water used for tap water processing should be at 
Grade III or above. The objective of the Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil 
Conservation in Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream Areas is to maintain the 
water quality in the reservoir at Grade II. 
Study Time of Survey Valued Services 
Annual WTP 
(yuan) a 
Wang et al. 
(2013a) 
2007 
Rural households’ WTP for improving 
water quality of two major local rivers 
from Grade IV to Grade III, Yunnan 
Province, Southwest China 
888 (5%)  
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Wang et al. 
(2013b) 
2007 
Rural and urban households’ WTP for 
improving water quality of Puzhehei 
Lake from Grade III to Grade II, 
Yunnan Province, Southwest China 
360 (3%) 
Zhao et al. 
(2013) 
2008 
Urban households’ WTP for restoring 
ecosystem services of an urban river in 
Shanghai, East China b 
243 
Zhang 
(2011) 
2008 
Urban households’ WTP for improving 
water quality of Tai Lake (reaching at 
least Grade IV), East China 
141 (0.7%) 
Jiang, Jin 
and Lin 
(2011) 
2009 
Urban households’ WTP for ensuring 
water quality of upstream Min River at 
Grade III, Fujian Province, Southeast 
China  
53  
Shang et al. 
(2012) 
2011 Urban households’ WTP for improving river network c, Shanghai, East China 226 
 a Values in parentheses are the percentages of annual WTP in households’ 
income.  
 b The restoration aims to ensure three types of  ecosystem services, i.e. landscape 
and recreational use, habitat for fish and wildlife and flood control. No specific 
grade of water quality was mentioned in this study.  
 c The proposed services included raising connectivity of rivers, improving water 
quality (but no specific quality grade was mentioned) and building riparian zone 
for recreation. 
 
Overall, this study provided more conservative estimates (36-141 yuan/year 
in the four cities) than similar studies in the literature (53-888 yuan/year). A 
possible reason is that this study did not ask respondents’ WTP in terms of a 
lump-sum (as those studies did) but an increase in water price. In this study, 
the current water price and average water consumption per capita in the 
cities were provided as a clear benchmark for the respondents to consider 
their WTP78
                                            
78
 This information was especially important when some respondents were 
actually not aware of the current water price and their annual water fees.   
. In contrast, none of the studies asking respondents whether 
they were willing to pay a lump-sum of money for better water quality 
provided such a benchmark to let respondents know the implication of their 
WTP answers. Therefore, better provision of information and the 
convenience of comparing the offered increase in water price and the 
current water price might have made respondents in this study take more 
realistic and serious consideration and give more conservative estimates of 
annual WTP. 
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Interestingly, in the studies listed in Table 6.2, Jiang, Jin and Lin (2011) was 
the only study that investigated respondents’ WTP in terms of an increase in 
water price (as this study did), and their result (53 yuan/year) was the lowest 
among the given studies and was closest to the results of this study. This 
finding just supports the above explanation.  
6.1.2 Total WTP versus Total Cost of Water Protection  
The budget of implementing the central government’s Plan of Water 
Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in Danjiangkou Reservoir and 
Upstream Areas during 2011-2020 was estimated to be 12.44 billion yuan 
(£1.24 billion). Implementing the SLCP to convert 30.98 thousand hectares 
of sloping land to forests in the water supply area 79
As calculated above, the total WTP of all residents in the four cities 
amounted to 945.09 million yuan per year. That is to say, in the period of 10 
years, the potential funds raised from water users could be 76% of the 
budget of the aforementioned central government’s water protection plan, 
113% of the SLCP funds and 45% of the total cost of water protection. Given 
that there will be far more than four cities to be served by the middle-route 
water transfer project
 was integrated into the 
water protection plan, but the 8.375 billion yuan of SLCP funds were not 
included in the aforementioned budget since the SLCP had started 
implementation before the water protection plan was made and its funds 
were allocated separately by the central government. So, the overall cost of 
water protection was 20.82 billion yuan (approximately £2.08 billion 
annually) for 10 years.         
80
                                            
79
 The “water supply area” includes 40 counties (the villages surveyed in this 
study belong to one of these counties) of three provinces that are 
designated by the water source protection plan. 
, substantially more funds could possibly be raised 
from residents in all the benefited cities along the water transfer route. 
Therefore, a water protection PES scheme co-funded by water users and 
the central and local governments could be highly feasible without imposing 
heavy financial burden to water users. In fact, even if a PES scheme solely 
funded by water users is financially feasible, it may not be as politically 
feasible as a multi-source funding scheme because the findings revealed in 
Chapter 4 indicate that respondents had high expectation on the 
80
 The exact number of cities and the total population that will be supplied 
with the transferred water are currently unavailable for a more 
comprehensive estimate of residents’ total WTP. 
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governments, especially the central government to play the leading role in 
funding the water protection.   
6.2 Improving Sloping Land Conversion Program in the 
Water Supply Areas 
6.2.1 Marginal Values of Program Attributes in Similar Studies  
The Choice Experiments study discussed in Chapter 5 has revealed farmers’ 
preference for major attributes of the SLCP such as the marginal values of 
the program attributes of contract length and the maximum percentage of 
commercial trees 81
Chen et al. (2009b) included the annual payment and contract length in the 
modelling attributes but neglected the maximum percentage of trees. Their 
results showed that farmers significantly preferred a 6-year contract than a 
3-year one, but did not show preference for a 10-year contract over a 6-year 
one. Chen et al. (2009b) did not calculate the marginal value of an extra 
contract year, but according to the coefficients in their model 
 to be planted in the sloping land. As reviewed in Chapter 
2, only two choice modelling studies on the SLCP have been found in the 
literature, and they both conducted surveys in different provinces of China 
and adopted different choice modelling designs from this study (Grosjean 
and Kontoleon 2009; Chen et al. 2009a). However, findings from those 
studies were rather consistent with the results of this study.   
82, the marginal 
value of an extra contract year (in the range of 3-6 years) would be 9.97 
yuan/year, which is quite close to the result of this study (8.27 yuan/year 83
                                            
81
 “Commercial trees” (such as fruit trees), compared with “ecological trees”, 
refer to trees that can generate relatively high economic profits but less 
ecological benefits. The specific tree species belonging to the two 
categories are designated by the Chinese National Bureau of Forestry.  
). 
Grosjean and Kontoleon (2009) included the maximum percentage of 
commercial trees in their choice modelling, but they neglected the attribute 
82
 Marginal values are simply the ratios of the coefficients of non-monetary 
attributes (e.g. contract length) to the coefficient of the monetary attribute 
(annual payment). 
83
 This is the estimate for the pooled sample of both participant and non-
participant farmers by the Conditional Logit Model (CLM). The results of 
the separate samples were 11.37 and 6.97 yuan/year, respectively. As 
the results of the CLM and the Random Parameter Logit Model are not 
substantially different, only the results of the CLM are discussed in this 
chapter. 
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of contract length. Nevertheless, they found that marginal value of 10% more 
commercial trees were 11.68 yuan, while the corresponding result of this 
study is 12.54 yuan.     
6.2.2 Using Information of Farmers’ Trade-offs between Program 
Attributes to Improve SLCP  
Marginal values represent farmers’ choices to trade-offs between the 
program attribute of annual payment and the non-monetary attributes of 
contract length and maximum percentage of trees. In a broad sense, the 
choice modelling study discussed in Chapter 5 has constructed a utility 
function to represent farmers’ satisfaction to different policy scenarios (i.e. 
different combinations of attributes at different levels) of SLCP 84
Utility = 0.042*Payment + 0.035*Contract-length + 0.053*P-econ-trees 
, i.e.  
where Payment is in the unit of 10 yuan/year/mu, Contract-length in year 
and the maximum percentage of commercial trees in the unit of 10% (for the 
convenience of presenting the results). The larger utility farmers derive from 
a policy scenario, the larger possibility they would prefer this scenario over 
others. And at the same utility level, trade-offs can be made between all the 
three attributes.  
In addition to the marginal values, trade-offs between the two non-monetary 
attributes also provide valuable information for policy makers. For example, 
the utility function indicates that the utility change of each 10% more 
commercial trees is equal to 0.053/0.035=1.5 extra contract year for farmers. 
Interestingly, policy makers of the SLCP have also made trade-off between 
contract year and the maximum percentage of commercial trees since there 
are two types of SLCP contracts at the same payment level, i.e. the 5-year 
contract for planting commercial trees and the 8-year one for ecological 
trees. This implies that policy makers are willing to trade 0.3 extra contract 
year with 10% less commercial trees while farmers would require 1.5 extra 
contract years. In other word, policy makers have underestimated farmers’ 
preference for commercial trees and the current design of SLCP contracts is 
actually discouraging farmers to plant ecological trees which can generate 
more ecological benefits. 
                                            
84
 Explanation of the Utility Theory underlying this choice modelling study 
can be found in Section 3.5. As mentioned before, this utility function is 
based on the CLM results. 
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Another way to examine this problem is to compare the utility of the two 
SLCP contracts calculated by the above function. The utility farmers derive 
from the 8-year/ecological-trees contract is 1.25 85 while the utility of the 5-
year/economic-trees contract is 1.67. Obviously, farmers would prefer the 
contract of planting commercial trees, which confirms the argument stated 
above that the current SLCP design is not favourable for the planting of 
ecological trees. Moreover, based on the utility function, it can be inferred 
that policy makers should either prolong the contract to 20 years at the 
current payment level or continue to offer an 8-year contract but increase the 
annual payment to 331 yuan/year/mu to attract farmers to plant ecological 
trees 86
Generally, longer contract is desirable for policy makers since it could bring 
longer period of ecological benefits. Yet, concerns may arise for the 
possibility of long-term funding. A PES scheme that levies higher water fees 
in northern cities is promising to provide this long-term funding as residents’ 
water consumption in the northern cities is naturally long-term. As mentioned 
in the last section, the potential funds from water users in the four surveyed 
northern cities alone could account for 76% of the budget of the 
governmental water protection plan and 113% of the SLCP funds needed in 
all the water supply area during 2011-2020. Actually, most water protection 
measures in the governmental plan are engineering projects (e.g. riparian 
zone construction, terrace land construction, new wastewater treatment 
plants) and thus need much less funds to maintain once they are 
constructed. So, even if the central government stops funding the SLCP 
after 2020, the PES scheme proposed in this study can provide sufficient 
funds for farmers to maintain trees in the sloping land.   
. With regard to the aggregate payment in the contract term, the 20-
year contract is 230*20=4600 yuan and the 8-year contract is 331*8=2548 
yuan. The 20-year contract at the current payment level seems more 
efficient since it can achieve more than double duration of ecological 
benefits with less than double aggregate payments.  
Interestingly, recent news reported that the central government has been 
planning the third round of SLCP and it is very likely that the new SLCP will 
                                            
85
 Utility is an ordinal variable to present the degree of satisfaction and with 
no specific unit. 
86
 This means that farmers can derive the same utility from these two 
contracts as they derive from the contract of 5 years for planting 
commercial trees. 
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give farmers the full flexibility of planting commercial trees in the enrolled 
sloping land (Gu 2014). This is quite a radical change compared with the 
current requirement of no more than 20% commercial trees. Apparently, 
policy makers have realized farmers’ strong preference for commercial trees, 
and they are willing to forgo the additional ecological benefits generated by 
the ecological trees in exchange for farmers’ re-enrolment in the new SLCP. 
As revealed by this study, removing the restriction on commercial trees is 
indeed an economical way to raise the SLCP’s attractiveness to farmers 
since the other two measures, i.e. increasing the annual payment level and 
contract length, will both raise the cost of the program. However, the 
rationale of removing the restriction on commercial trees is also dependent 
on how much more ecological benefits the ecological trees can generate 
than the commercial trees.  If the difference is too large, higher re-enrolment 
rate of the new SLCP does not guarantee greater ecological benefits. 
Unfortunately, this important question has not been examined by 
researchers and policy makers and it is beyond the scope of this PhD study. 
Great attention should be paid to this question by the policy makers and 
interdisciplinary efforts from both ecologists and economists should be 
involved in the future. 
Disregarding the possible loss of ecological benefits by removing the 
restriction on commercial trees, the information of farmers’ trade-off between 
the annual payment and contract year can be used to improve the economic 
efficiency of the new SLCP with no restriction on commercial trees. Results 
in Chapter 5 indicate that farmers would forgo 8.27 yuan/mu/year for each 
extra contract year on the basis of the current contract for commercial trees 
(230 yuan/mu/year for 5 years). So, if policy makers would like to achieve 
long-term ecological benefits, they can offer longer contracts with slightly 
lower annual payment (shown in Table 6.2). For example, a 10-year contract 
with 189 yuan/mu/year could generate the same utility as the current 5-year 
contract with 230 yuan/mu/year. Compared with a 10-year contract with the 
current annual payment, the suggested contract design could save 310 
yuan/mu in 10 years. For the 30.98 thousand hectares of sloping land 
enrolled in the SLCP in all the water supply areas, a total of 144 million yuan 
(about £ 14.4 million) could possibly be saved in 10 years.  
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Table 6.2 Policy Options for New SLCP (100% commercial trees) 
The original cost is the production of the contract year and the current 
payment (230 yuan/mu/year).  
Payment 
(yuan/mu/year) 
Contract 
Length 
(year) 
Total Cost 
(yuan/mu) 
Original 
Cost 
(yuan) 
230 5 1150 1150 
222 6 1332 1380 
213 7 1491 1610 
205 8 1640 1840 
197 9 1773 2070 
189 10 1890 2300 
180 11 1980 2530 
172 12 2064 2760 
164 13 2132 2990 
156 14 2184 3220 
147 15 2205 3450 
 
6.2.3 Hypothetical Program for Reducing Fertilizers  
The choice modelling study shown in Chapter 5 has also revealed farmers’ 
preference for major program attributes of a hypothetical water protection 
program for reducing the use of Nitrogen and Phosphate fertilizers in 
farmland that cannot be covered by SLCP. A utility function can also be 
constructed with the modelling results for this hypothetical program. 
 Utility = 0.046*Payment + 0.120*Contract-length - 0.075*P-fert-reduce 
where Payment is increments of 10 yuan/year/mu, Contract-length in year 
and  the percentage of fertilizers reduction in the unit of 10%. The negative 
sign of the coefficient of P-fer-reduce means that the higher the fertilizer 
reduction rate, the less likely farmers would be to accept the program. 
This function can help to assess the attractiveness of different policy 
scenarios. For example, a contract of 6 years with 480 yuan/year/mu and 
fertilizer reduction rate of 25% is more attractive than a contract of 8 years 
with 500yuan/year/mu and the fertilizer reduction rate of 75%. Results 
shown in Chapter 5 indicate that farmers would be willing to forgo 25.40 
yuan/mu/year for each extra contract year but it would require 16.39 
yuan/mu/year for each 10% fertilizer reduction. Farmers’ trade-off between 
the two monetary attributes indicates that under the same payment level, 
each 10% more fertilizer reduction rate requires 1.6 extra contract years to 
compensate farmers’ loss in utility. Using this information of farmers’ trade-
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off between the three program attributes, policy options that generate the 
same utility as a particular reference scenario can be provided like those 
listed in Table 6.2. However, since there is no such fertilizer reduction 
program under implementation or results in similar studies to provide a 
benchmark, no further policy suggestions can be provided for this 
hypothetical program here. Nevertheless, this study has provided a basis for 
further research in this uncharted area.      
6.3 Summary 
Based on the research results in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter examines 
the financial feasibility of establishing a water protection PES scheme for the 
middle-route South-to-North Water Transfer Project and improvement that 
could be made to the contract design of Sloping land Conversion Program in 
the water supply area (as an important part of the governmental water 
protection plan).  
Using the estimates of residents’ mean WTP for water protection in Chapter 
4, aggregate calculation shows that the annual WTP per capita of Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou are 44.73, 11.75, 17.72 and 14.27 
yuan which account for 0.14%, 0.04%, 0.09% and 0.07% of the annual 
disposal income per capita in the four cities, respectively. These estimates 
are much more conservative than the results in similar studies, which could 
be attributed to the use of an increase in water price instead of a lump-sum 
of money to elicit respondents’ WTP.  
In total, 945.09 million yuan/year could be raised from all water users of the 
four cities, which accounts for 76% of the annual budget of the government’s 
Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in Danjiangkou 
Reservoir and Upstream Areas or 113% of the annual SLCP funds for all the 
water supply area during 2011-2020. With the estimates given in this chapter 
and the findings from Chapter 4, it is evident that a water protection PES 
scheme co-funded by water users and governmental budgets is both 
financially and political feasible without imposing heavy financial burden to 
water users.  
Choice modelling results shown in Chapter 5 help to construct a utility 
function to assess the attractiveness of different contract designs of the 
SLCP. The analysis shows that policy makers have underestimated farmers’ 
preference for planting commercial trees in the sloping land and the current 
SLCP contract of planting ecological trees is actually discouraging farmers to 
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choose ecological trees which can generate more ecological benefits but 
less economic profits. To rectify this design flaw, policy makers should either 
prolong the contract of planting ecological trees to 20 years at the current 
payment level or keep the current 8-year contract but increase the annual 
payment to 331 yuan/year/mu. If the 20-year contract is adopted, funding 
raised from water users in northern cities can sufficiently support the extra 
10 years of program after 2020 (beyond the duration of the governmental 
water protection plan). 
If policy makers plan to remove the restriction on commercial trees (as 
reported by the recent news) to increase the attractiveness of the new round 
of SLCP to farmers, greater attention should be paid to the difference of the 
ecological benefits generated by the ecological and commercial trees; 
otherwise, a higher enrolment rate does not necessarily mean higher 
ecological benefits of the new SLCP. Moreover, based on the information of 
farmers’ trade-offs between program attributes, a series of policy options for 
contracts with no restriction on commercial trees are offered to policy 
makers. With longer contracts and appropriately less annual payment, these 
policy options can generate the same utility for farmers as the current SLCP 
contract of planting commercial trees but achieve long-term ecological 
benefits with less total cost.      
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
After presenting the research findings of two surveys in Chapters 4 and 5 
and discussing their implications in Chapter 6, this chapter gives the current 
perspective and conclusions of this study. Section 7.1 provides an overview 
of the major research findings of this study, Section 7.2 summarizes the 
significant implications and offers suggestions to policy makers, Section 7.3 
highlights the major contributions of this study, Section 7.4 depicts 
challenges and future research directions and Section 7.5 provides 
concluding remarks.  
7.1 Overview of Research Findings 
This research study applied non-market economic valuation to provide policy 
suggestions for establishing a Payment for Ecosystem Services scheme for 
protecting the water supply area of the middle route of the South-to-North 
Water Transfer Project in China. From the water demand perspective, a 
Contingent Valuation survey was conducted in 4 cities (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou) along the water transfer route with a total of 
755 survey questionnaires in order to investigate urban residents’ WTP for 
water protection. From the water supply perspective, a Choice Experiment 
survey with 246 survey questionnaires was conducted in 7 villages in the 
water supply area in order to reveal farmer households’ choices of different 
potential designs of water protection programs. Below is a summary of the 
questions that have been answered by this study. 
(1) Which are the factors influencing urban residents’ attitudes toward 
a PES scheme for water protection? 
Generally, the probability of residents’ accepting such a PES scheme is 
significantly decreasing with the proposed increase in water price and 
significantly increasing with residents’ income, knowledge of the water 
transfer project and supportiveness to the general idea of PES 87
                                            
87
 In the Chinese questionnaires presented to famers, PES was termed as 
Ecological Compensation, the policy instrument with a similar idea to PES 
in China which is introduced and discussed in Section 2.2. 
. In 
contrast, demographic variables (except income) did not show universal 
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influence on residents in the four cities. Particularly, the education level of 
residents, which was usually reported as a significant variable in similar 
WTP studies (Spash et al. 2009; Ramajo-Hernandez and del Saz-Salazar 
2012; Zhao et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2013b), did not exhibit significant 
influence on residents’ attitudes toward the PES scheme in any of the four 
cities in this study 88
On the other hand, the extent of influence and significance level of the 
influential factors varied considerably among residents in different cities. For 
example, an increase of 1 yuan/m3 in water price in Zhengzhou could lessen 
the odds of residents’ acceptance toward the PES scheme by 94% at the 
0.001 significance level, but the same increment in Beijing could only lessen 
the odds by 60% at the 0.1 significance level. Some factors only showed 
significant influence on residents in one city. For instance, residents with 
larger family size in Beijing were significantly less willing to pay a higher 
water price at the 0.01 significance level
.    
89
(2) How much are residents (in the northern cities) willing to pay for 
water protection? 
. More discussion on the influential 
factors of residents’ acceptance to an increase in water price for raising 
water protection funds can be referred to in Section 4.4 and Table 4.8.    
On average, residents in Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou were 
willing to pay an increase of 0.71, 0.25, 0.39 and 0.36 yuan/m3 in water price 
respectively90
                                            
88
 And no strong correlation was found between residents’ education level 
and their knowledge of the water transfer project or supportiveness to the 
general idea of PES. 
 for funding the water protection of the middle-route water 
transfer project. Income disparity showed a significant effect on residents’ 
WTP. For example, in Beijing, the mean WTP of residents was 0.36 yuan/m3 
with income below 2500 yuan/month and 0.86 yuan/m3 with income above 
89
 This may be explained by the fact that residents in Beijing have 
substantially larger water consumption per capita than residents in other 
cities (see Table 6.1), thus larger family size means substantially larger 
water consumption and the resultant water fees in total.  
90
 The WTP estimates of Beijing, Tianjin and Shijiazhuang reported here 
were the results of the Double Bound Parametric Model, while the 
estimate of Zhengzhou was the result of the Single Bound Parametric 
Model. The choice of model estimates was based on the robustness of 
the model estimation as discussed in Section 4.4. 
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2500 yuan/month. In Tianjin, residents earning less than 2500 yuan/month 
were only willing to pay an increase of 0.04 yuan/m3 in water price. The 
lower bound of the 95% confidence interval of this small WTP was -0.32 
yuan/m3, which implied that some low-income residents in Tianjin actually 
looked forward to a decrease in water price91
(3) Is it feasible to establish a PES scheme for water protection by 
levying higher prices in northern cities? 
. In contrast, residents earning 
2500-4000 yuan/month and more than 4000 yuan/month in Tianjin were 
willing to pay 0.45 and 0.86 yuan//m3 respectively. More results and 
discussion of residents’ WTP for water protection can be referred to in 
Section 4.5 and Table 4.10. 
From a financial perspective, by levying a hypothetical fee equal to 0.14%, 
0.04%, 0.09% and 0.07% of the annual disposal income per capita in 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou respectively, this study shows 
that a conservative estimate of a total of 945.09 million yuan/year 
(approximately £ 94.5 million/year) could be raised from water users in the 
four cities, which accounts for 76% of the annual budget of the central 
government’s Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation in 
Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream Areas during 2011-2020 92 or 113% of 
the annual funds of Sloping Land Conversion Program, an existing agri-
environmental program in the water source areas at the same period 93
Synthesizing these results, the answer of the above question is that it would 
be highly feasible to establish a water protection PES scheme that is co-
. In 
practice, a water protection PES scheme could raise even more funds than 
the estimate given in this study as there are far more than four cities that will 
be served by the middle-route water transfer project. From a political 
perspective, the surveys in the four cities found that residents were in favour 
of a multiple-source funding mechanism for water protection involving both 
governments (central and local) and water users, but they expected the 
central government to play the leading role in such a PES scheme.  
                                            
91
 This could be explained by the fact that residents in Tianjin were currently 
paying the highest water price in the four cities (see Table 6.1). 
92
 The whole duration of the water protection plan is 2004-2020, and it was 
divided by policy makers as the short-term plan (2004-2010) and long-
term plan (2011-2020). 
93
 This means 45% of the total cost of the water protection plan and SLCP. 
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funded by governmental budgets and water users in the northern cities 
without imposing heavy financial burden to water users.  
(4) What is farmers’ preference for major design attributes of water 
protection programs?  
Two water protection programs were examined in this study, namely the 
existing Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) and a hypothetical 
program for reducing the use of fertilizers in flat farmland that cannot be 
enrolled in the SLCP. For the existing SLCP, farmers showed significant 
preferences for higher annual payment, longer contracts and less restriction 
on the planting of commercial trees in the enrolled sloping land94
(5) How do farmers trade-off major design attributes of water 
protection programs in deciding the preferred program design?    
. The 
preference for longer contracts indicates that farmers put more weight on the 
positive side of longer contracts in generating stable income than the 
negative side of reducing the flexibility of land use. This finding is different 
from findings in similar choice experiments studies on agri-environment 
programs (Ruto and Garrod 2009; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurle and Ruto 
2010; Christensen et al. 2011; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013), and it is particularly 
useful for policy makers as longer contracts are beneficial to achieving long-
term environmental benefits. Similarly for the hypothetical fertilizer reduction 
program, farmers exhibited significant preference for higher annual payment, 
longer contract and lower fertilizer reduction rate.  
On average, farmers were willing to forgo about 8 yuan/year/mu for every 
extra SLCP contract year and 13 yuan/year/mu for each 10% more 
economic trees to plant in the enrolled sloping land95
                                            
94
 It has been tested and demonstrated in Chapter 5 that farmers did not 
simply prefer the program design with larger aggregate payment, i.e. the 
production of annual payment and contract length.  
. Additionally, every 
10% more commercial trees were worth 1.5 extra SLCP contract years for 
farmers. For practical application, a utility (ordinal variable to present 
farmers’ satisfaction) function (see Section 6.2.2) was established to assess 
farmers’ preference for different program design of SLCP. Assessment using 
this utility function indicates that policy makers have underestimated farmers’ 
preference for commercial trees and the current SLCP contracts are 
95
 These two marginal values,  i.e. the amount of money farmers were willing 
to trade with a certain change in the non-monetary attributes, were 
between the estimates of two choice models applied in this study. 
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discouraging for farmers to choose the contract of planting ecological trees 
which generate more ecological benefits than the commercial trees.   
Interestingly, significant difference was found between the current SLCP 
participants and non-participants in their trade-offs between annual payment 
and the other two program attributes. Compared with the current SLCP 
participants, the non-participant farmers were willing to forgo almost a 
double amount of decrease in annual payment for the same change of 
contract length and permission of commercial trees. More results and 
discussion of the SLCP attributes’ marginal values can be referred to in 
Section 5.4.1 and Table 5.5.  
With regard to the hypothetical fertilizer reduction program, farmers were 
willing to forgo about 27 yuan/year/mu for each extra contract year but 
required 16 yuan/year/mu for reducing every 10% of the use of fertilizers, 
and each 10% less fertilizer reduction rate was equal to 1.6 extra contract 
years in farmers’ views. A utility function for assessing different program 
design was also established for the hypothetical program (see Section 
6.2.3). Similarly to the findings on the SLCP, the non-participant farmers 
were willing to forgo a larger decrease in annual payment and require less 
for the same change in contract length and fertilizer reduction rate. Detailed 
discussion can be referred to in Section 5.4.2 and Table 5.8.   
(6) An auxiliary but important question: are farmer households better 
off or worse off after participation in the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program? 
This question was examined from three aspects, i.e. comparison of the 
income per mu from crops before the SLCP and from trees after the 
program, comparison of farmers’ income from all their sloping land 
before/after joining in the SLCP, and comparison of the total income 
(including both on–farm and off-farm income) of participant and non-
participant farmers. 
In general, trees generated higher income per mu after the SLCP than crops 
before the program. For example, the average income from orange, poplar 
and chestnut trees, the most widely planted trees in the enrolled sloping land 
after the SLCP, was 916, 470 and 661 yuan/mu, respectively. In 
comparison, the average income from the most widely planted crops in the 
sloping land before the SLCP, i.e. sesame, wheat and rapeseed, was 381, 
394 and 399 yuan/mu respectively. Accordingly, farmers’ average income 
from all their sloping land was 5,365 yuan/year from crops before the SLCP 
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and 7,727 yuan/year from trees after the program. These calculation results 
correspond with another finding of this farmer household survey that 26% of 
the participant farmers take “forestland can yield higher income than 
farmland” as the most important reason for their participation in the SLCP. 
Interestingly, although the non-participant farmers received significantly 
higher on-farm (land) income than SLCP participants96
Overall, this study found that farmers are not worse off (and possibly even 
better off) after participating in the SLCP. This could partly explain why 
farmers favoured longer contracts when choosing the preferred design of 
SLCP.  
, they received 
significantly lower off-farm income (e.g. small businesses, wages of family 
members working in towns and cities) than SLCP participants. This finding 
reflects one benefit of participation in the SLCP mentioned by farmers, i.e. 
trees need less tending time than crops so farmers have more time to earn 
income from other sources. In fact, shifting farmers from on-farm work to off-
farm work is also an objective of the SLCP (Liu et al. 2008). In total, non-
participant famers received 26,510 yuan/year/household while the SLCP 
participants received 23,430, but the difference was not statistically 
significant due to large income disparities within each group of farmers.  
7.2 Policy Recommendations  
Based on the research findings, major policy suggestions provided by this 
study are as follows: 
 (1) Policy makers and practitioners will have a better chance to raise more 
water protection funds if they can make better efforts to disseminate 
knowledge about the water transfer project and promote the idea of 
PES/Ecological Compensation among residents in the northern cities. 
(2) A multi-source funding mechanism involving both government funds and 
additional water fees from water users could be feasible for a PES 
scheme for water protection in both financial and political perspectives.   
(3) It could be better to adopt differentiated increments in water price onto 
residents at different income levels, given the substantial difference in 
their willingness to pay for water protection and the potential socio-
                                            
96
 This can be partly due to the fact that non-participant farmers in the survey 
have slightly but significantly (in terms of statistics) more land per 
household than the SLCP participants 
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economic effect of raising water price. Specifically, the current starting 
point of the personal income tax in China (3500 yuan/month) is a useful 
benchmark which well fits both the practical policy context and the 
modelling results of this study. 
(4) If policy makers want to encourage farmers to plant ecological trees on 
sloping land to generate more ecological benefits, the current SLCP 
contract for planting ecological trees is not helping. Policy makers should 
either extend the contract length or increase the annual payment 
according to a utility function established by this study to evaluate 
farmers’ satisfaction to different contract design (discussed in Section 
6.2.2). 
(5) According to the findings of farmers’ trade-offs between major design 
attributes of the SLCP, if policy makers plan to remove the restriction on 
commercial trees to promote farmers’ participation in the next round of 
SLCP, they can adopt longer contracts with appropriately lower annual 
payment, such as a 10-year contract with 189 yuan/year/mu, to achieve 
long-term ecological benefits with lower cost than simply extending the 
current contract (5 years with 230 yuan/year/mu) at the same payment 
level.  
(6) Since the non-participant farmers were willing to forgo significantly more 
annual payment for the same extra contract years and permitted 
percentage of commercial trees than the SLCP participant, it is possible 
to apply differentiated payment levels onto the two groups of farmers in 
the new round SLCP, whereby higher payment is given to participant 
farmers as a reward to “loyal participants” and lower payment is given to 
new participants (currently non-participant farmers) in order to reduce 
the program cost and thus improve its economic efficiency.  
7.3 Major Contributions to the Literature 
This PhD study has contributed to the literature from the following aspects: 
(1) This study helped to fill the literature gap of applying non-market 
economic valuation and integrating public opinions in the design of PES 
schemes. 
 (2) This study introduced Stepwise Regression and Best Subset Regression 
techniques in Contingent Valuation and constructed an integrated 
procedure with automatic selection algorithm and manual adjustment for 
model simplification and improvement. 
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(3) This study strengthened our understanding of applying multiple modelling 
techniques (non-parametric, single-bound parametric and double-bound 
parametric models) for WTP estimation. 
(4) This study enriched our insights of farmers’ preference for different 
design of agri-environmental programs, their trade-offs between major 
program attributes and the heterogeneity in farmers’ preference. 
7.4 Limitations and Directions of Future Research  
Despite the research findings, policy suggestions and contributions to the 
literature as summarized above, this study has limitations that need to be 
considered and hence, directions of further research are proposed.    
(1) Larger sample size and broader study scope  
Due to the constraints of funding, time and other resources, the major 
limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size compared with the 
large population in the surveyed cities. As for the study scope, this study has 
focused on four big cities that will be the priority of future supply of the 
transferred water and seven villages around the Danjiangkou Reservoir 
where farmers’ behaviours can directly influence water quality of the 
reservoir. However, there are other relatively small cities/towns that will be 
supplied by the transferred water and other villages in further upstream 
watershed of the reservoir that are also designated as water supply areas. 
The limitations in sample size and study scope could to some extent 
constrain the applicability of the policy suggestions provided by this study. 
With sufficient funding, time and other resources, surveys with larger sample 
size can be conducted in more cities/towns and villages to collect more 
comprehensive information and then test, confirm, improve or rectify the 
findings and policy suggestions of this study.  
(2) More advanced modelling techniques 
This study has applied the state-of-art modelling techniques in both 
Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments research, and a 
methodological contribution was made by introducing the stepwise 
regression and best subset regression techniques in Contingent Valuation 
for model selection and improvement. Nevertheless, a few more advanced 
modelling techniques can be researched to further exploit the survey data of 
this study in the future, especially for the Choice Experiments data. For 
example, the Latent Class Model is another advanced modelling technique 
to reveal the heterogeneity of respondents’ preference in addition to the 
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Random Parameters Logit Model used in this study (Beharry-Borg et al. 
2013; Drake et al. 2013). The Agent-based Models for simulating individuals’ 
behaviours and interactions seems to be another interesting extension to 
choice modelling (Chen et al. 2009a).  
(3) Linking micro and macro-scale economic research 
Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments investigate individuals’ 
choices in environmental (and other) issues and both belong to the area of 
micro-economic research. a number of macro-economic studies have been 
found in literature to apply input-output models (Ma et al. 2006; Guan and 
Hubacek 2007) and game theory-based Models (Wei et al. 2010b) on water 
resources management related to the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project. Currently, the micro and macro-economic research spheres are 
quite disconnected in PES studies. It could be very interesting and 
challenging to search the possibility of linking those two research spheres to 
study the regional effects of individual choices in large-scale water transfer 
projects and PES schemes.  
(4) Interdisciplinary research 
Raising sufficient funds and allocating funds efficiently with well-designed 
contracts do not necessarily lead to successful PES schemes since the 
ultimate success of PES depends on whether the aimed for ecosystem 
services have really been ensured or improved. In fact, one of the common 
drawbacks of the existing PES scheme is the lack of clear information 
between the contracted behaviours like increasing forest cover and 
ecosystem services like water quality improvement (Muradian et al. 2010). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, understanding the real difference in the 
ecological benefits generated by ecological and commercial trees is 
important to determine whether policy makers should remove the restriction 
on commercial trees in the new round of SLCP. Interdisciplinary research is 
needed in the future to incorporate economic and ecological studies for 
achieving the ultimate success of the PES scheme for water protection. 
7.5 Conclusions 
As the pioneer research to apply non-market economic valuation and PES 
study for the middle-route South-to-North Water Transfer Project, this study 
has provided useful findings on urban residents’ attitudes toward paying for 
water protection and farmer households’ preferences for different designs of 
water protection programs. PES is a promising policy instrument to secure 
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the supply of clean water for the middle route project, and Non-market 
Valuation Methods (including Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments) 
are useful tools to reveal public attitudes and preferences in the design of 
PES schemes. 
While this study comes to the end, the middle route of the SNWTP will start 
transferring water from the Danjiangkou Reservoir to Beijing this October 
and the legislation of the Ecological Compensation Ordinance is also close 
to completion to establish the national legal framework for implementing a 
similar idea of PES in China. The research findings and policy suggestions 
of this study are of particular policy relevance at this very time and will be 
valuable for further research in the future. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire of the Contingent Valuation Survey 
Questionnaire Number:             Date & Time:           
Name of city:                             Street Name: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
1. What do you think about the supply of domestic water in this city?  
A. Very abundant    B. Abundant    C. Moderate     D. Scarce   
E. Very scarce       F. No opinion   G. Don’t know 
      
2. Are you satisfied with the current tap water service?  
A. Very satisfied     B. Satisfied     C. Acceptable   D. Dissatisfied 
E. Very dissatisfied   F. No opinion   G. Don’t know 
If D “Dissatisfied” or E “Very dissatisfied”, continue with Question 
3; otherwise, please proceed to Question 4. 
 
3. What has caused your dissatisfaction to the current tap water 
service? (Please choose as many as applicable)   
A. Frequent interruption of water supply     B. Insufficient water pressure 
C. Turbidity of the water     D. Bad odour    E. Bad taste 
F. The price is too high      G. Others (Please specify):                           
   
4. Approximately, how much does your family pay for the water bill 
per month?  
A.            yuan/month             
B.  I don’t know. 
 
5. How many people are usually living in your house including 
yourself (using water) over the last 12 months?      
5.1 Number of Adults: ________;   5.2 Number of children: ________ 
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6. Do you know the current water price? 
   A. Yes              yuan/m3              B. No   
 
7. Have you heard about the South-to-North Water Transfer Project 
before?  
A. Yes        B. No 
 
If “Yes”, proceed to Question 8; otherwise, the interviewers will give 
you some background information before you proceed to Question 
12. 
 
8. What benefits do you think the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project can bring to this city? 
   A. Provide water for domestic and production use 
   B. Improve the quality of domestic water 
C. Alleviate the decline of underground water table 
D. Improve urban ecological-environment  
   E. Others (Please specify):                           
F. I don’t know                     
G. No opinion 
 
9. Where did you get the information about the South-to-North Water 
Transfer Project? (Please choose as many as applicable) 
A. TV      B. Radio    C. Newspapers    D. Websites  
E. Others (Please specify):                           
 
10. Have you heard about the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water 
Transfer Project before? 
A. Yes         B. No 
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If “Yes”, continue with Question 11; otherwise, the interviewer will 
give you some background information, after reading that, please 
proceed to Question 12. 
 
11. Do you know where the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water 
Transfer Project starts?  
A. Yes, it is:                            B. No, I don’t know. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
  
Now the interviewers will give you some background information to 
assist you to answer the following questions (on a separate page).    
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
  
12. In your opinion, who should pay for the cost of water quality 
protection in the water source areas? (Please choose as many as 
applicable) 
A. The central government     B. Local governments of the water source 
areas 
C. Local people/entities that implement water quality protection measures 
D. Governments of northern cities which will use the transferred water 
E. Residents/entities that will use the transferred water in northern cities 
F. Others (Please specify):                           
G. I don’t know               
H. No opinion 
 
13. Have you ever heard about the Ecological Compensation Policy 
before? 
B. Yes        B. No 
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If “Yes”, continue with Question 14; otherwise, please proceed to 
Question 16.  
 
14. Can you briefly describe what Ecological Compensation means? 
A.       
 
 
 
 
B. I don’t know 
 
15. Where did you get the information about Ecological Compensation? 
(Please choose as many as applicable) 
A. TV      B. Radio    C. Newspapers    D. Websites  
E. Others (Please specify):                           
 
16. The main idea of Ecological Compensation is to see environment 
protection as a kind of service. The service providers, i.e. people 
who carry out environmental protection measures, receive a certain 
amount of compensation from beneficiaries to assure that the 
environmental quality is maintained at the required level. What do 
you think about this idea?         
A. Highly agree       B. Agree       C. I am not sure     D. Disagree         
E. Highly Disagree    F. No opinion  
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Some more background information we would like to give you before 
answering the following questions. Thank you for your patience. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Implementation of the Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil Conservation 
in Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream Areas requires more than 19.4 
billion yuan by 2020, and it is planned to adopt a co-funding policy between 
the central government and the local governments in the water source 
areas. For example, the local governments need to provide about 50% 
funding for soil reservation projects. Most of the water source areas are 
mountainous and less economically developed. While the restriction on 
some industries for pollution control has exerted economic losses to them, 
they also need to invest more funding to implement the water quality 
protection plan. This actually has exerted a heavy financial burden to the 
local governments.   
According to the official monitoring data, the water quality of the Danjiangkou 
Reservoir has fluctuated between Class II and III in 2010, but stayed at 
Class II in 2011. However, if the problem of insufficient funding is not solved, 
the water quality may fluctuate in the future, and the economic interests of 
the water source areas will not be properly safeguarded either.    
In order to overcome the funding problem in the long-term, it has been 
proposed to establish an Ecological Compensation scheme between the 
water source areas and the cities which will benefit from the water quality 
protection, such as appropriately increasing the water price in relevant 
northern cities to supplement the funding for water quality protection. Some 
people think it is a good idea while others think it is not. Obviously, too much 
increase in water price will have impact on residents’ spending in other 
aspects, while too little increase offers very limited help to solve the problem. 
We would like to hear your opinion on this issue.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
17. If the water price increases (     ) yuan/m3 for funding the 
implementation of “The Plan of Water Pollution Control and Soil 
Conservation in Danjiangkou Reservoir and Upstream Areas” to 
ensure the reservoir’s water quality maintaining at Class II, are you 
willing to pay? 
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Reminder: (1) the current water price in Beijing is 4 yuan/m3; (2) 
according to the National Statistics Bureau’s data in 2009, a resident in 
Beijing generally consumes approximately 70m3 of domestic water per 
year.  
  
A. Yes         B. No       C. I am not sure     D I don’t know  
 
18.  Can you briefly explain the reasons for your answer to last 
question?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.  What about the increase of (   X2    ) yuan/ m3 (the interviewer will tell 
you the value of X2)? Are you willing to pay? 
A. Yes          B. No       C. I am not sure    D I don’t know  
 
20.  Can you please briefly explain the reasons for your answer to last 
question?  
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, we would like to get some information about you. All replies will be 
held securely and confidentially, and they are solely used for this research. 
21. Gender  
A. Male                 B.  Female  
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22. Age 
A. Below 18     B. 18-21      C. 21-30      D. 31-40     E. 41-50 
F. 51-60        G. 61-65      H. Over 65     I. I don’t want to answer 
 
23. Education level (Please choose the highest level you’ve already 
completed) 
A. Primary school or below   B. Middle school     C. High school 
D. Undergraduate Degree     E. Masters           F. PhD   
G. I don’t want to answer 
 
24.  Individual monthly income (yuan) 
A. Below 1500   B. 1500 - 2000     C. 2000 - 2500     D. 2500 - 4000 
E. 4000 - 7000    F. 7000 - 15000   G. 15000 - 20000   H. Over 20000 
  I. I don’t want to answer 
 
25. How long have you lived in this city? (year) 
A. Below 5      B. 5 - 10        C. 10 - 20       D. Over 20    
E. I don’t want to answer 
 
26. Have you ever been to the water source areas? (As shown in the 
map in the “Background Information” given by the interviewer) 
A. Yes         B. No 
 
27. Do you have any relatives or close friends who are from or living in 
the water source areas? 
A. Yes         B. No    C. I don’t want to answer 
 
28. Occupation:  
A. Governmental officer     B. State-owned company/institution staff 
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C. Private employer and employee       D. Independent businessman 
E. Freelancer       F. Retired      G. Unemployed       H. Students  
I. Others (please specify):                        J. I don’t want to answer 
 
29. Do you have any comments or suggestions on this survey? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much for your time & co-operation! 
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Illustration of the Middle Route of the South-to-North Water Transfer 
Project in China (in Chinese) 
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Illustration of the Water Supply Area of the Middle Route of the South-
to-North Water Transfer Project (in Chinese) 
 
 
 
 
- 205 - 
Appendix 2 
Questionnaire for Household Survey in the Water Supply 
Area (participants of the Sloping Land Conversion Program) 
 
Interviewer:     Date:     Time:  
Village:     Questionnaire ID No.:  
   
 
Part I. The Sloping Land Conversion Program 
1. When did your household start to participate in the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program? 
 
 
 
2. What’s the most important reason for you to participate in the 
Sloping Land Conversion Program? (Please select one option only) 
A. The payment from the program is higher than the total income of 
farming in the enrolled land before. 
B. Managing forest (such as fruit trees) can yield higher profit than 
farming (growing crops). 
C. We don’t have enough labour to work on the land. 
D. The tenure of the enrolled land can be extended. 
E. The program is strongly encouraged by the government. 
F. Many households in our village have participated in the program. 
G. Other reason, please specify: 
 
 
 
3. How many mu* of land does your household have in total? 
 
 
* Mu is the unit of area commonly used in rural China, 15 mu = 1 ha 
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4. How many mu of your land has been enrolled in the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (converted to ecological and economic forest)? 
 
Forest Type Area (Mu) 
Ecological Forest  
Economic Forest  
 
5. What is the payment you receive from the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program? 
 
 
 
6. What trees are planted in the enrolled land now? Apart from the 
payment of the Sloping Land Conversion Program, do you have 
extra income from them?  
 
7. Prior to the enrolment, what was the land primarily used for (e.g. 
grow rice for subsistence or oilseed crops for sale)? And how much 
had you earned from the specified activity (or activities) at that time? 
Land Use Area (mu) 
Gross Income 
(yuan/mu/year) 
   
   
   
 
8. What is the primary use of the non-enrolled land and how much can 
you gain from it?  
Use of Land Area (mu) Gross income 
Tree Area (mu) 
Gross Income 
(yuan/mu/year) 
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(yuan/mu/year) 
   
   
   
 
 
9. Is there any land of household which is eligible for the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (with slope larger than 25 degree), but is not 
enrolled? 
A. Yes   B. No  C. I do not know 
 
If “Yes”, how many mu of eligible land is not enrolled, and what is it 
presently used for? 
Use of Land Area (mu) 
  
  
  
And why did you decide not to enrol the land? 
 
 
 
 
10. Has your program contract expired? 
 A. Yes   B. No  
If “Yes”, please proceed to Question 11; if “No”, please jump to 
Question 12. 
 
11. Have you re-converted the enrolled land to farmland or used it for 
other purposes? 
If “Yes”, could you please specify what your plans are, and how much 
net income you would expect to generate? 
Use of Land 
Area 
(mu) 
Gross Income 
(yuan/mu/year) 
   
- 208 - 
   
If “No”, could you please give reasons for that? 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Do you plan to re-convert the enrolled land to farmland or use it for 
other purposes after the current contract expires? 
A. Yes   B. No  
If “Yes”, could you please specify what your plans are, and how much 
net income you would expect to generate? 
 
Use of Land 
Area 
(mu) 
Gross Income 
(yuan/mu/year) 
   
   
   
If “No”, could you please give reasons for that? 
 
 
 
 
13. If the current contract will be extended on the same terms and 
conditions (e.g. payment, duration, etc.), will you continue to 
participate in the Sloping Land Conversion Program? Please give 
reasons for your decision. 
A. Yes   B. No  
 
 
 
14. Assuming there are several proposals on revising the contract of 
the Sloping Land Conversion Program in terms of payment 
amount, contract duration and the maximum percentage of 
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economic forests allowed to be planted, within the following 
proposals presented by the interviewers, which do you prefer?  
 
 
(The interviewer shows the choice cards to the respondent) 
 
 
15. Do you have other suggestions and expectations on the adjustment 
and improvement of the Sloping Land Conversion Program? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II Agro-environmental policy 
16. Do you think there are some improvements on the local ecological 
environment after the implementation of the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program? 
A. Yes   B. No  
If “Yes”, could you please specify the improvements that have been 
made? 
 
 
 
 
17. Apart from the Sloping Land Conversion Program, do you know 
any other measures implemented by the government to protect the 
water quality in the Danjingkou Reservoir? 
A. Yes   B. No  
If “Yes”, could you please name the measures? 
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18. Do you know why the government pay so much attention to the 
water quality in the Danjingkou Reservoir? 
A. Yes   B. No    
 If “Yes”, could you please give reasons for that? 
 
 
 
 
19. How much Nitrogen and Phosphate-fertilizer do you usually use on 
your land in a year? What is the cost of the fertilizers last year?  
Use of Land 
Nitrogen Fertilizer 
(kg/mu) 
Phosphate 
Fertilizer (kg/mu) 
   
   
   
   
   
Cost of fertilizer in last year 
(yuan/kg): 
  
                  
 
20. Assume that a new program will be implemented to pay you to 
reduce the use of Nitrogen and Phosphate fertilizers, in the 
following proposals presented by the interviewers, which do you 
prefer?   
 
(The interviewer shows you the choice cards to the respondents) 
 
 
21. The new program mentioned above is still on a very preliminary 
design stage, do you have any suggestions for it? 
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Part III Socio-economic and Demographic Information 
In this part, we will ask you some questions about you and your family. Let 
us re-assure you that all the information provided in this section (and the 
whole survey) will be treated in strict confidence and will be used solely for 
this research study. 
 
22. Could you please provide information on the following? 
20.1 Gender:  A. Male   B. Female 
22.2 Age:        A. Below 30  B. 30 – 40  C. 40 – 50  
   
              D. 50 – 60  E. Over 60 
23.2 Education (the highest level completed):  
        A. Below primary school B. Primary school  C. Middle school 
        D. Secondary technical school or High school  E. Higher education   
 
23. How many people (including yourself) in your household are living 
in this village (over 9 months in a year), and how many are working 
or studying outside the village? 
In Village Studying outside Village Working outside Village 
   
   
24. For those household members who are living in this village (over 9 
months in a year), what are their age groups and genders?  
Age Below 16 16 – 60 Over 60 
Male members    
Female members    
  
25. How many household members are usually (over 9 months in a 
year) working on your land? 
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26. Do you hire someone to work on your land? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how many people do you hire, and what is the annual cost? 
Number of People Hired Total Cost (yuan/year) 
  
 
27. Apart from working on land (cultivation, forestry, orchard), do you 
and your household members who live in the village have other 
sources of income?  
Income Source Gross Income (yuan/year) 
Livestock  
Business  
Financial support received from 
household members who work 
outside the village 
 
Other (please specify):   
 
28. Do you provide financial support for household members studying 
or working outside the village? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, approximately how much does it cost in a year? 
Support household members to study 
(yuan/year) 
 
Support household members to work 
(yuan/year) 
 
 
29. Have your household members participated in the Cooperative 
Medical Insurance Scheme administered by the government? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how many household members have participated in the 
scheme? How much does it cost in total each year? 
Number of Participants Total Cost 
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30. Have the older family members (over 60) been covered by the Rural 
Social Endowment Insurance Scheme administered by the 
government? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how much money do they receive from the scheme (in yuan 
per person per month)? 
 
 
31. Has your household taken part in any resettlement scheme to move 
to this village? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how long have you resided in this village? 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much for your time & co-operation! 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire for Household Survey in the Water Supply 
Area (non-participants of the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program) 
 
Interviewer:    Date:     Time:  
Village:    Questionnaire ID Number: 
   
 
Part I. The Sloping Land Conversion Program 
1.  How many mu of land does your household have in total? 
 
 
2. What do you use your land for and how much income can your land 
generate in a year?  
Use of Land Area (mu) Net income (yuan/mu/year) 
   
   
   
   
   
 
3. Are there any households in your village who have participated in 
the Sloping Land Conversion Program? 
 A. Yes  B. No 
 
4. How many mu of your land is eligible for the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program? And what it is presently used for? 
Land Use Area (mu) 
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5. Why did you decide not to participate in the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program? 
 
 
 
 
7. What changes must be made on the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program so that you would like to take part in this program? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II Agro-environmental policy 
8. Do you think there are some improvements on the local ecological 
environment after the implementation of the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program? 
A. Yes   B. No  
If “Yes”, could you please specify the improvements that have been 
made? 
 
 
 
 
9. Apart from the Sloping Land Conversion Program, do you know any 
other measures implemented by the government to protect the water 
quality in the Danjingkou Reservoir? 
A. Yes   B. No  
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If “Yes”, could you please name the measures? 
 
 
 
 
10. Do you know why the government pay so much attention to the 
water quality in the Danjingkou Reservoir? 
A. Yes   B. No    
 If “Yes”, could you please give reasons for that? 
 
 
 
 
11. How much Nitrogen and Phosphate-fertilizer do you usually use on 
your land in a year? What is the cost of the fertilizers last year?  
Use of Land 
Nitrogen Fertilizer 
(kg/mu) 
Phosphate 
Fertilizer (kg/mu) 
   
   
   
   
   
Cost of fertilizer in last year 
(yuan/kg): 
  
                  
 
12. Assume that a new program will be implemented to pay you to 
reduce the use of Nitrogen and Phosphate fertilizers, in the 
following proposals presented by the interviewers, which do you 
prefer?   
 
(The interviewer shows you the choice cards to the respondents) 
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13. The new program mentioned above is still on a very preliminary 
design stage, do you have any suggestions for it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III Socio-economic and Demographic Information 
In this part, we will ask you some questions about you and your family. Let 
us re-assure you that all the information provided in this section (and the 
whole survey) will be treated in strict confidence and will be used solely for 
this research study. 
 
14. Could you please provide information on the following? 
14.1 Gender:  A. Male   B. Female 
14.2 Age:        A. Below 30 B. 30 – 40  C. 40 – 50   
                D. 50 – 60  E. Over 60 
14.3 Education (the highest level completed):  
        A. Below primary school B. Primary school  C. Middle school 
        D. Secondary technical school or High school  E. Higher education   
 
15. How many people (including yourself) in your household are living 
in this village (over 9 months in a year), and how many are working 
or studying outside the village? 
In Village Studying outside Village Working outside Village 
   
   
16. For those household members who are living in this village (over 9 
months in a year), what are their age groups and genders?  
Age Below 16 16 – 60 Over 60 
Male members    
Female members    
- 219 - 
  
17. How many household members are usually (over 9 months in a 
year) working on your land? 
 
 
18. Do you hire someone to work on your land? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how many people do you hire, and what is the annual cost? 
Number of People Hired Total Cost (yuan/year) 
  
 
 
19. Apart from working on land (cultivation, forestry, orchard), do you 
and your household members who live in the village have other 
sources of income?  
Income Source Gross Income (yuan/year) 
Livestock  
Business  
Financial support received from 
household members who work 
outside the village 
 
Other (please specify):   
  
 
20. Do you provide financial support for household members studying 
or working outside the village? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, approximately how much does it cost in a year? 
Support household members to study 
(yuan/year) 
 
Support household members to work 
(yuan/year) 
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21. Have your household members participated in the Cooperative 
Medical Insurance Scheme administered by the government? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how many household members have participated in the 
scheme? How much does it cost in total each year? 
Number of Participants Total Cost 
  
  
22. Have the older family members (over 60) been covered by the Rural 
Social Endowment Insurance Scheme administered by the 
government? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how much money do they receive from the scheme (in yuan 
per person per month)? 
 
 
23. Has your household taken part in any resettlement scheme to move 
to this village? 
A. Yes   B. No 
If “Yes”, how long have you resided in this village? 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks very much for your time & co-operation! 
 
 
 
 
 
